Covid-19 credit guarantees in the eurozone
Fecha: abril 2020
Miguel Carrión Álvarez, Funcas Europe
(This piece has been edited from the original version with Addenda to reflect the Spanish government’s second tranche of guarantees approved on April 10.)
The epidemic of the new Covid-19 coronavirus has forced one EU member state after another to adopt confinement measures resulting in a large and sudden reduction of economic activity. This is on top of the slowdown resulting from disruptions of international trade and global supply chains resulting from the effect of the epidemic on China and the far East.
EU countries responded to the first, external, shock with relatively small and targeted measures to support the external sector, be it exporters or the tourism industry. But as governments adopted mandatory lockdowns, it became a necessity to sustain public health and roll out broad economic packages.
One of the forms this takes is credit support. Banks are expected to defer mortgage payments and roll over the revolving credit of firms so that firms and households can get through the health crisis without defaulting on their obligations. The supervisory arm of the European Central Bank has allowed Banks temporarily to operate below their capital and liquidity buffers in order that these don’t deter them from lending. The Single Supervisory Mechanism also announced it would be flexible in the application of guidelines on non-performing loans, as they apply to loan forbearance measures during the coronavirus emergency.
This all contributes to making regulatory capital and liquidity requirements less likely to prevent bank from providing the short-term credit support the economy needs to get through the health crisis. But, in the throes of an economic crisis, banks are not likely to consider it an acceptable credit risk to refinance existing credit. The odds of the borrower failing anyway are too high. For this reason, and since the origin of the crisis is to some extent public policy, it may be necessary for the government to provide credit guarantees.
Mario Draghi, in a rare public intervention since his term as ECB president expired, has suggested such public guarantees must cover 100% of crisis credit, and be given for free. This is in the understanding that it is a matter of equity not to burden banks with the cost of being a vehicle of public policy, and also that many of these loans may end up going sour anyway.
This note looks at the loan guarantees making part of the Spanish government’s measures to mitigate the economic impact of the Covid-19 crisis and its own epidemic containment measures, and compares them to those adopted by other European countries.
Mario Draghi’s new whatever-it-takes
The way the Spanish government is structuring its credit guarantees is much less ambitious than what Mario Draghi suggested recently in a Financial times op-ed (1):
Banks must rapidly lend funds at zero cost to companies prepared to save jobs. Since in this way they are becoming a vehicle for public policy, the capital they need to perform this task must be provided by the government in the form of state guarantees on all additional overdrafts or loans. Neither regulation nor collateral rules should stand in the way of creating all the space needed in bank balance sheets for this purpose. Furthermore, the cost of these guarantees should not be based on the credit risk of the company that receives them, but should be zero regardless of the cost of funding of the government that issues them.
The temporary relaxation of regulation and collateral rules that Draghi suggested had already been decided by the SSM as early as March 12 (2).
Draghi suggests that banks should lend at zero cost, whereas the Spanish government is only requiring that costs are not higher than before the crisis. The rationale for lending at no cost is that most firms are experiencing a loss of revenue as a result of the health crisis and of government policy. They need liquidity to fund operating expenses, while fees and interest will only add to their fixed costs.
But then, as Draghi says, it is also unfair to force banks to bear the cost of acting as agents of government policy. For that reason, the government guarantee should be of 100% of the necessary credit. A 100% credit guarantee is no different from the government actually lending the money by using the private banks as intermediaries. Usually, the ICO does this with a 50% state guarantee. In the case at hand, therefore, what Draghi is suggesting would mean expanding ICO lending by €100bn in addition to granting a credit guarantee of equal size.
In addition, according to Draghi the cost of the guarantee should be borne by the government, too, by making it available at zero cost. This is not the case for the Spanish government guarantee, which in fact will charge banks up to 1.20% for the privilege.
Addendum: the EU’s guarantee framework
On March 19, within about 10 days of the first national lockdown in Italy, the European Commission adopted a temporary state-aid framework in the context of the Covid-19 outbreak (3). As regards credit guarantees, the Commission’s standard is as follows:
- the amount of state-guaranteed credit can be the borrower’s one-quarter’s turnover or two-years’ wages;
- the guarantee can cover up to 35% of credit if the state takes first loss in case of default, or 90% if the state and the lender share any credit losses proportionally;
- the cost of the guarantee can be:
- for SMEs, which according to the EU standard means up to 250 employees or up to €50m annual turnover: 0.25% for the first year, 0.50% for the second and third years, and 1% for years four to six.
- Twice as much for larger firms.
This is clearly a far cry from the suggested 100% credit guarantee, free and essentially unlimited in amount, suggested by Mario Draghi. As we shall see below, member states, notably France, have been converging towards this Commission standard in the definition of their own guarantees.
The Spanish government’s credit measures
On March 12, the Spanish government endowed a €400m ICO credit line specifically to support the liquidity needs of the tourism industry and related activities affected by the Covid-19 crisis (4)
In order to ensure the swift access to the funds, the government used the existing credit line instituted to deal with the bankruptcy of the Thomas Cook group in October 2019. This credit line included a 50% government guarantee (5). This level of guarantee was maintained.
The Spanish government went on to impose a national lockdown by declaring a state of emergency on March 14. The main package to mitigate the effect of the Covid-19 containment measures was then adopted on March 17(6). In it, the government decided to increase the lending capacity of the country’s official credit institute (ICO) by €10bn (7). This is intended to support banks’ liquidity provision to firms and the self-employed by expanding existing credit lines.
The amount of discretionary spending decided alongside these credit measures was under €1.7bn, an order of magnitude smaller (8). Most of the fiscal stimulus will take place by means of automatic stabilisers, which were enhanced. Liquidity support also includes tax deferrals for firms affected by the health emergency, and a moratorium on mortgage payments for vulnerable households.
But the larger part of the stimulus, as with other EU countries, has taken the form of credit guarantees. The March 17 package includes €100bn in credit guarantees to ensure liquidity remains available to solvent firms even if their revenue dries up due to the coronavirus containment measures. The Spanish government left it to a later cabinet meeting, which took place on March 24, to set the conditions for firms to take advantage of these credit guarantees. The government also expanded by €2bn the existing credit guarantees for exporters, especially targeted to SMEs aiming to internationalise their business.
The Spanish government estimated initially that its €100bn of loan guarantees would be able to back €150-200bn in bank loans to firms, be it refinancing of existing debt or new credit. This presupposed that guarantees would cover an average of 50-67% of loan amounts.
Over the week between March 17 and 24 there were discussions about the extent of the guarantees. Naturally the government would have preferred a coverage as low as 50%, allowing the headline €100bn of guarantees to underpin €200bn of credit. Some in the financial industry were reported to have demanded a coverage of up to 80% which would have brought the total credit down to €125bn. The example of Germany (see below) was cited, as well as the fact that the Spanish government was partly motivated by the aim to reduce the eventual budget impact, given that about 40% of similar guarantees given after the global financial crisis had been activated by borrower defaults.
On March 24, the Spanish government specified the rules for a first tranche of €20bn out of the €100bn of credit guarantees that had been authorised a week earlier (9). Half of this first tranche of credit guarantees, that is €10bn, is earmarked for SMEs and the self-employed. The credit guarantees are to be managed by the official credit institute ICO, for which private banks already act as agents. Guarantees can be applied to loans granted for the following six months, until September 30, and retroactively since March 18, that is the day after the Spanish government’s declaration of a state of emergency came into force.
In the end, for guarantees extended to SMEs and the self-employed, the Spanish government decided on 80% coverage. This will be at least half of the first tranche of €20bn, that is no less than €10bn, funding €12.5bn of credit. For larger firms, the guarantees will cover 70% for new loans, and 60% for refinancing of existing loans. This means the guarantees may support up to €14.3-16.7bn in credit to large firms. The total will therefore be less than €30bn in any case. If further tranches of the €100bn guarantee are structured along the same lines, in the end the €100bn of government guarantees will support less than the €150bn the government billed initially.
The guarantees are being given for a maximum period of 5 years, which will probably set the term of the refinancing or new credit extended by banks under the guarantees. Importantly, the government is not providing the guarantee for free, even though such a thing might pass muster with the European Commission’s competition authorities given the extraordinary circumstances. The government mandates that the cost of the guarantee be borne by the lender. This will be between 20 and 120 basis points. The cost of credit for borrowers is to be kept at pre-crisis levels.
Addendum: the second tranche of Spanish guarantees
On April 10, the Spanish government approved a second tranche of €20bn with the same conditions as the first, but entirely reserved for SMEs and the self-employed, bringing the total to €30bn for SMEs and the self-employed, €10bn for all firms, and €60bn as yet unallocated. The financial conditions of this second tranche are the same as for the first (10), namely:
- the loan amounts will be up to the limits defined by the European Commission’s temporary framework, namely the borrower’s one-quarter’s turnover of two-years’ wages;
- the guarantee rate will be.
- 80% for loans to SMEs and the self-employed;
- for larger firms, 70% for new credit and 60% for refinancings;
- the cost of the guarantee will be:
- 0.20% for loans below €1.5m;
- For larger loans:
- to SMEs and the self-employed: 0.20% the first year, 0.30% on years 2-3; and 0.60% on years 4-5;
- to larger firms:
- for refinancings 0.25% the first year, 0.50% on years 2-3; and 1 % on years 4-5;
- for new credit 0.30% the first year, 0.60% on years 2-3; and 1.20% on years 4-5;
The Spanish guarantees in intra-EU comparison
We now do a survey of the credit guarantees announced by the largest EU member states.
Some features of the guarantee schemes are common across countries as they are derived from European rules, such as the limit of 250 employees or €50m turnover for SMEs, or the limit of three months’ turnover or two years’ wages for the amount of a guaranteed loan.
The main features of the various countries’ guarantee schemes are summarised in table 1.
Table 1: credit guarantee measures of largest euro countries (sources in text)
|country||budget||vehicle||loan amount||guarantee rate||government share||fee||beneficiary|
|Germany||€820bn||N/A||guarantee banks||50% operating capital||N/A||10%||N/A||all firms|
|€400bn||KfW / Economic Stabilisation Fund||N/A||80%||100%||N/A||otherwise ineligible firms||operating loans|
|France||N/A||BPI||25% turnover||100%||all firms|
|200% wages||innovative firms|
|€300bn total||90%||0.25% y1 0.50% y2-3 1% y4-6||250 employees, €50m turnover|
|0.50% y1 1.00% y2-3 2% y4-6||5000 employees, €1.5bn turnover|
|Italy||N/A||SME guarantee fund||€5m, €100bn total, 25% borrower revenue||80%||zero||new and refinancing|
|90%||reinsurance of guarantee societies|
|€ 25.000||SME, self-employed|
|Sace (existing)||€200bn||90%||export guarantees|
|Sace (new)||€30bn SMEs, €170bn rest, 25% turnover, 200% wages||90%||100%||5000 employees, €1.5bn turnover||domestic credit|
|€100bn||ICO||up to €1.5m||0,20%|
|€30bn||over €1.5m||80%||0.20% y1 0.30% y2-3 0.60% y4-5||SME, self-employed|
|€10bn||70%||0.25% y1 0.50% y2-3 1.00% y4-5||all firms||new loans|
|60%||0.30% y1 0.60% y2-3 1.20% y4-5||refinancing|
|N/A||BMKB||75% of credit||90%||SME|
|N/A||Agricultural guarantee||70%||1%||start-ups||2y bridge loan|
|Flanders||€3.4bn||€3bn||PMV Gigarant||€1.5m||N/A||100%||N/A||all firms||6y loan|
|€400m||PMV SME||N/A||N/A||0,25%||SMEs||1y loan|
|75%||new and increases|
|SOGEPA||€2.5m||75%||firms under restructuring|
|Brussels||N/A||Guarantee fund||€20bn||65%||0.50% borrower 0.25% lender||all firms|
|80%||0.25% borrower 0.25% lender||start-ups|
The German federal finance ministry advertises an economic protective shield against the coronavirus including under €820bn worth of credit guarantees (11). These include €400bn within an economic stabilisation fund, newly created under the Ministry for Economy and Energy, aimed at large firms and complementing the liquidity support normally available through the KfW public investment bank. In addition, the ability of the KfW itself to support SMEs and the self-employed through credit guarantees is enhanced.
Germany has a category of guarantee banks specialising in the provision of credit guarantees for firms and liberal professionals. These guarantees are partly backed by federal and state governments. The German government is increasing to 10% its share in the capital of guarantee banks. This recapitalisation should by itself increase the volume of available guarantees. The government is also raising the guarantee banks’ exposure limits to firms’ operating capital, from 35% to 50%. Within this framework, the large guarantee programme involving parallel guarantees from the federal government and the Länder, will be extended to the whole country where before it was limited to structurally weak regions. The guarantee rate for loans within this programme is up to 80%.
An additional special KfW programme is to be created to give liquidity support to firms that wouldn’t normally have access to liquidity support. Guarantee levels may reach up to 80% for operating loans and 90% for investment. It is to these special programmes that the €400bn in guarantees for large firms from the new economic stabilisation fund will apply.
It is not clear whether these are all new guarantees. The €400bn from the economic stabilisation fund are clearly new. But the German finance ministry suggests the rest of the guarantees were already budgeted (12):
The German government will put the KfW in a position to fund these programmes by making the necessary guarantee volumes available. This is not a problem, because the federal budget includes a guarantee framework of approximately €460 billion. If necessary, this can be increased by up to €93 billion at short notice.
However, the expansion of eligibility for public guarantees as well as the increased risk limits may result in more guarantees being given from the €460bn allowance than would otherwise have been the case. In any case, it is also unclear how the advertised figure of €820bn is arrived at.
The French government will guarantee bank loans up to €300bn, about 15% of French GDP (13). Firms will be able to apply for guaranteed loans of up to 25% their annual turnover, or two years’ worth of wages net of employer’s social security contributions in case of firms classified as innovative, or that were started since the start of 2019. The guarantee can apply to loans taken after 16 March and for the rest of the year 2020. State-guaranteed loans will have no repayments for a year, at which point the borrower will have the option to amortise the loan over up to 5 more years. The guarantee will not cover a default in the first two months of a loan.
As the state guarantee is not total, the French government emphasises that banks will still bear some risk and will make loan decisions according to their own risk analysis. Nevertheless, the banks are said to have committed to make a best effort to grant as many loans as possible, and to lend at cost, that is, their cost of funds (which is close to zero) plus a state-determined insurance premium.
The state guarantee will cover 90% of the loan amount for firms having fewer than 5,000 employees or an annual turnover of under €1.5bn, and 70% for larger firms. The rest of the loan will be unsecured. For SMEs, defined as having under 250 employees or turnover below €50m, the insurance premium will be 0.25% the first year, rising to 0.50% for years 2 and 3, and 1% for years 4-6. The insurance premium will be double that for larger firms.
Italy took the leveraging of guarantees to a new level, by advertising initially that €5bn of capital would provide nearly €350bn of liquidity for households and firms (14). On April 6, the Italian government launched a second package of guarantees for at least €400bn of credit, bringing the total credit supported to over €750bn (15).
This total, however, is not limited to guarantees. The initial €350bn includes the following.
- €220bn of commercial loans that will benefit from deferred payments.
- Conversion of deferred tax assets into tax credits for banks and nonfinancial corporations, for the purpose of selling off non-performing loans. This is effectively a recapitalisation of the affected banks and firms, as deferred tax assets are conditional on future profits giving rise to sufficiently high tax liabilities within a certain time horizon. Tax credits, however, are unconditional. In the case of banks, This recapitalisation should back €10bn worth of additional credit.
The total of €340bn credit is then rounded up to “nearly €350bn,” for good measure.
Focusing on credit guarantees, the actual amounts were €2bn of extra resources for guarantee-giving institutions, broken down as:
- €1.5bn to increase the existing guarantee fund for SMEs. Together with existing guarantees, this may now back up to €100bn in loans. All of these are computed because the conditions are being relaxed, such as making the guarantees free for borrowers and waiving the fee to access the fund or extending the guarantee to refinancings of existing credit. Maximum loan amounts are doubled from €2.5m to €5m; or extending eligibility. The self-employed get access to a €3,000 credit line. Guarantee rates are typically up to 80%, or 90% for the case or reinsurance of mutual guarantee societies (confidi).
- A state guarantee of €500m for the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti public bank, expected to support €10bn of credit to medium enterprises not eligible for the previous fund. This implies a 20-fold multiplier effect from the guarantee.
This could account for up to €40bn of new credit backed by these guarantees, with rather optimistic leverage assumptions. The relaxation of the conditions for SME guarantees brings the total to €110bn. That is, only under a third of the advertised liquidity support is guarantees, most of the rest being achieved by deferred loan repayments.
The April 6 package is all in the form of credit guarantees.
- The Italian state will assume 90% of export guarantees given by SACE, the Italian foreign-trade insurance agency. This is estimated to allow the volume of export support for increase by €200bn.
- SACE will also channel state guarantees for €200bn of domestic credit through a new programme, the conditions of which are set by European state-aid standards. Firms with fewer than 5,000 employees and turnover below €1.5bn can enjoy a 90% state guarantee of their credit. Larger firms can have guarantees of 80% if their turnover is below €5bn, and 70% for turnover above €5bn. In all cases the amount of the guarantee cannot exceed a quarter’s worth of turnover, or two years’ wages. €30bn are reserved to guarantee loans to SMEs, once they have exhausted the support available to them through the SME guarantee fund.
- The conditions on access to the guarantee fund for SMEs are further relaxed. The existing guarantee of up to €25,000 loans for SMEs and the self-employed is raised from 80% to 100% and loans may now be given without credit analysis. These loans will have no principal repayments for the first 18 months of a term that can be up to 6 years. Firms with under 500 employees can have a 90% guarantee on loans of up to €5m. Firms with revenue below €3.2m can add a third-party guarantee to obtain a guarantee of 100% of up on loans of up to €800,000. In all cases, loans cannot exceed 25% of the borrower’s annual revenue.
The Dutch government is broadening the business financing guarantee scheme of the ministry of economic affairs and climate from €400m previously to €1.5bn, though it also commits to increase the volume of guarantees if necessary (16). In addition, in a letter to the Tweede Kamer, the lower house of the Dutch Parliament, the ministry included the enhancement of two other guarantee schemes among the list of economic support measures. First, the government guarantee for SME loans (BMKB) normally applies to 50% of the credit between a given lender and borrower. This limit is raised to 75%. The government guarantee covers 90% of this guarantee credit (17) and this rate is unchanged. Second, for the agricultural and horticultural sector there is a separate guarantee fund (BL) which has been augmented with a bridge loan facility (18). These are loans of up to two years’ maturity with a fee of 1% for start-ups and 3% for established firms, and a guarantee rate of 70%.
The federal government is drawing up a guarantee scheme for new bridging loans for a maximum term of 12 months, but the details are not yet known (19). In the meantime, credit support is given by the regions.
The region of Flanders is channelling measures through its entrepreneurial support agency PMV (20).
The total capacity of the Gigarant scheme, which offers guarantees for loans of up to 1.5m in size, has been doubled from €1.5bn to 3bn. Loans are for a 6-year terms. The cost of the guarantee and the coverage rate are not specified.
In addition, an existing generic guarantee scheme for SMEs with a €300m guarantee capacity is expanded by €100m, with the explicit possibility of further extensions. The existing guarantee covered bridging loans of up to 3 months, whereas the “corona crisis guarantee” will allow 12-month loan terms. The cost of the guarantee is halved from 0.50% to 0.25%. Within this fund it will also become possible to access a 50% guarantee of short-term loans of up to three months.
The government of Wallonia is making available loan guarantees of up to: 50% for existing short-term credit lines; and 75% on new short-term credit lines and credit line increases motivated by the health crisis (21). For firms under restructuring, the SOGEPA investment fund will be allowed to guarantee up to 75% of loans worth up to €2.5m per firm. The Walloon government has made available an extraordinary solidarity fund worth €350m, of which 2/3, that is over €233m is aimed at supporting firms and the self-employed. How much of this will go into guarantees is not estimated.
The Brussels Guarantee Fund will support the liquidity of affected firms by means of public guarantees on bank loans for a total of €20bn (22). The cost of the guarantees, or the coverage rate, are not specified. Since 2013, ordinary guarantees can be given for a period of up to 10 years (23). They cover up to 65% of loans, or up to 80% in the case of start-ups. The cost of guarantees is 0.50% for the borrower, 0.25% in the case of start-ups, plus 0.25% for the lender.
Under normal conditions a larger increase in the amount of credit may be obtained from recapitalising a public bank than from giving public guarantees. However, the coronavirus crisis is a sudden stop of economic activity with a sudden and sharp collapse of revenues and an uncertain outlook. Under those conditions, a public guarantee may be the only way to make credit risk bearable for private banks, even with the capital and liquidity relief announced by the supervisor. It is for this reason that Mario Draghi advocated 100% guarantees given free of charge, in the understanding that these will end up turning into large fiscal transfers to the distressed private sector. None of the six largest eurozone countries, which we surveyed, has come close to the model proposed by Draghi, with the possible exception of the latest Italian package as it applies to SMEs and the self-employed.
Despite some EU standards such as the definition of SMEs or loan amount limits, the measures adopted by the various governments are quite heterogeneous, which makes comparisons difficult. Even within the same country, programmes sized by the total amounts of guarantees or loans coexist with others where the government intervention relaxes the conditions on individual loans without a program-wide limit. This makes it difficult if not impossible to aggregate the different guarantee programmes except when the governments themselves give estimates of the impact. These estimates, however, are not provided. Interest rates and the cost of credit guarantees, where available, also show high cross-country variability.
That said, governments have been forced to act quickly, and so have resorted to repurposing or expanding existing programmes or agencies where possible. Therefore, the existence of networks of guarantee banks, as in Germany, helps deliver the government support. They also add to the heterogeneity of the measures and making comparisons more difficult, though.
This research also detected a strategy to influence expectations. There is indeed a proliferation of round numbers, mixing of new and old funding, and adding of heterogeneous quantities to arrive at the biggest possible “bazooka”. The Italian plan includes a fantastical multiplier of 70, claiming €5bn backs up to €350bn of credit. Germany’s numbers not clearly adding up to the advertised €820bn, and Spain announcing a €150-200bn stimulus plan which was later scaled down to under €150bn, are other cases in point. Perhaps the most transparent of all programs surveyed are those from France and Brussels, for which detailed term sheets are readily accessible, as well as the European Commission’s temporary state-aid framework.
A swift delivery and high take-up of these measures will be essential to avoid widespread or cascading insolvencies, which would aggravate the crisis. Follow-up studies should assess the take-up of each of the measures to determine not only which were most effective but also whether the various governments’ estimates of funding needs were accurate.
1.Draghi, Mario. We face a war against coronavirus and must mobilise accordingly. Financial Times. [Online] 25 March 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/c6d2de3a-6ec5-11ea-89df-41bea055720b.
2.Single Supervisory Mechanism. ECB Banking Supervision provides temporary capital and operational relief in reaction to coronavirus. Media and Publications. [Online] 12 March 2020. https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ssm.pr200312~43351ac3ac.en.html.
3. European Commission. State aid: Commission adopts Temporary Framework to enable Member States to further support the economy in the COVID-19 outbreak. Press corner. [Online] 19 March 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_496.
4. Gobierno de España. Gobierno moviliza 18.225 millones de euros en un Plan de medidas económicas para mitigar el impacto del COVID-19. Consejo de Ministros. [Online] 12 March 2020. https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/Paginas/enlaces/120320-enlace-plancovid.aspx.
5. Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado. Real Decreto-ley 7/2020, de 12 de marzo, por el que se adoptan medidas urgentes para responder al impacto económico del COVID-19. BOE. [Online] 13 March 2020. https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2020-3580.
6. Gobierno de España. Referencia del Consejo de Ministros. Consejo de Ministros. [Online] 2017 March 2020. https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/referencias/Paginas/2020/refc20200317.aspx.
7. Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado. Real Decreto-ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19. BOE. [Online] 17 March 2020. https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2020-3824.
8 Carrión Álvarez, Miguel. Muchos avales y poco gasto: el impacto de las medidas económicas sobre el coronavirus. Zona Crítica. [Online] 19 March 2020. https://www.eldiario.es/zonacritica/avales-impacto-medidas-economicas-coronavirus_6_1007609230.html..
9. Gobierno de España. Referencia del Consejo de Ministros. Consejo de Ministros. [Online] 24 March 2020. https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/referencias/Paginas/2020/refc20200324.aspx#AVALES.
10. Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado. Resolución de 25 de marzo de 2020, de la Secretaría de Estado de Economía y Apoyo a la Empresa, por la que se publica el Acuerdo del Consejo de Ministros de 24 de marzo de 2020, por el que se aprueban las características del primer tramo de la línea de av. BOE. [Online] 26 March 2020. https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2020-4070.
11. Bundesministerium der Finanzen. Kampf gegen Corona: Größtes Hilfspaket in der Ge-schichte Deutschlands. Themen. [Online] 27 March 2020. https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Schlaglichter/Corona-Schutzschild/2020-03-13-Milliarden-Schutzschild-fuer-Deutschland.html.
12. German Federal Ministry of Finance. A protective shield for employees and companies. Themen. [Online] 13 March 2020. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/a/a-protective-shield-for-employees-and-companies.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.
13. Gouvernement de France. Prêt garanti par l’État: Quelles démarches pour en béneficier? Informations coronavirus. [Online] 24 March 2020. https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/PDF/2020/dp-covid-pret-garanti.pdf.
14. Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze. Sostegno alla liquidità delle famiglie e delle imprese tramite il sistema bancario. #CURAITALIA. [Online] 17 March 2020. http://www.mef.gov.it/covid-19/Sostegno-alla-liquidita-delle-famiglie-e-delle-imprese-tramite-il-sistema-bancario/.
15. —. Gualtieri: “Un bazooka di liquidità”. In Evidenza. [Online] 6 April 2020. http://www.mef.gov.it/inevidenza/Gualtieri-Un-bazooka-di-liquidita/.
16. Government of the Netherlands. Coronavirus: government takes package of new measures for jobs and economy [in Dutch]. Ministries. [Online] 17 March 2020. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-economische-zaken-en-klimaat/nieuws/2020/03/17/coronavirus-kabinet-neemt-pakket-nieuwe-maatregelen-voor-banen-en-economie.
17. —. Questions about the Guarantee for SME loans (BMKB) [in Dutch]. Topics. [Online] 17 March 2020. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-covid-19/veelgestelde-vragen-per-onderwerp/financiele-regelingen/bmkb.
18. Netherlands Enterprise Agency. Guarantee loans for Agriculture extended in connection with corona [in Dutch]. Grants & FInancing. [Online] 17 March 2020. https://www.rvo.nl/subsidie-en-financieringswijzer/borgstellingskrediet-voor-de-landbouw-bl/verruimd-verband-met-corona.
19. Flemish agency for innovation and entrepreneurship. Coronavirus – support measures for companies [in Flemish]. Information, guidance and advice. [Online] March 2020. https://www.vlaio.be/nl/begeleiding-advies/moeilijkhedencoronavirus/specifieke-maatregelen-mbt-het-coronavirus/coronavirus.
209. Flemish Participation Society. PMV measures against the impact of the coronaviru [in Flemish]. PMV.eu. [Online] March 2020. https://www.pmv.eu/nl/maatregelen-van-pmv-tegen-de-impact-van-het-coronavirus.
21. Wallonie. Covid-19 : Quelles mesures d’aide pour préserver l’économie et l’emploi en Wallonie? 1890.be. [Online] 31 March 2020. https://www.1890.be/article/coronavirus-quelles-mesures-pour-leconomie-et-lemploi-en-wallonie.
22. Région de Bruxelles-Capitale. Pandémie Coronavirus: Le Gouvernement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale prend des mesures économiques et sociales sans précédent. 1819.brussels. [Online] 26 March 2020. https://1819.brussels/blog/pandemie-coronavirus-le-gouvernement-de-la-region-de-bruxelles-capitale-prend-des-mesures.
23. Fonds Bruxellois de Garantie. Comparatif et description des différents produits de garantie. Home. [Online] 20 June 2013. http://www.fondsbruxelloisdegarantie.be/wp-content/uploads/a-VADE-MECUM-du-nouveau-r%C3%A8glement-20131.pdf.