

**UNDERSTANDING WARRANTS PRICING:
A CASE STUDY OF THE FINANCIAL MARKET IN SPAIN**

**DAVID ABAD
BELÉN NIETO**

**FUNDACIÓN DE LAS CAJAS DE AHORROS
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO
Nº 387/2008**

De conformidad con la base quinta de la convocatoria del Programa de Estímulo a la Investigación, este trabajo ha sido sometido a evaluación externa anónima de especialistas cualificados a fin de contrastar su nivel técnico.

ISSN: 1988-8767

La serie **DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO** incluye avances y resultados de investigaciones dentro de los programas de la Fundación de las Cajas de Ahorros.
Las opiniones son responsabilidad de los autores.

Understanding Warrants Pricing: A case study of the financial market in Spain*

David Abad y Belén Nieto

Dpto. Economía Financiera, Contabilidad y Marketing
Universidad de Alicante.

Abstract

Using non-arbitrage arguments, this paper investigates whether Spanish warrants trade under a fair price. Moreover, we look for possible explanations when arbitrage opportunities seem to be found. The analysis is twofold. On the one hand, price differences between traditional options and equivalent warrants are analysed. On the other, we also compare prices of warrants that have the same pay-off functions but are issued by different issuers. The results show that warrants are systematically overpriced with respect to options and also that an important portion of such price differences are related to the design of both market structures. Strikingly, depending upon the issuer, relative price differences between warrants are also found. These last differences are hardly justifiable but they seem to be related to who issues the warrant first in time.

Keywords: *Options, Warrants, Market Design, Microstructure*

JEL: *G10, G13*

* The authors acknowledge financial support from MEC research grant SEJ2005-09372/ECON and the University of Alicante grant GRJ06-13. They also thank seminar participants at the Universidad de las Islas Baleares, Castilla La Mancha, and the XIV Foro de Finanzas at the Universidad Jaume I in Castellón. They are especially grateful to Gonzalo Rubio for suggesting the topic and for detailed and constructive comments.

1. Introduction

Security design and market design are key concepts for understanding the price formation of financial securities. There are many and well known examples of changes in the regulation of trading mechanisms that have influenced the quality of prices and the volume of trading assets. This is, of course, a very interesting issue with serious implications not only for researchers, but also for practitioners and regulators. Hence in recent years a tremendous amount of financial research has been devoted to understanding the impact of market microstructure on the informational efficiency of security prices.

Along these lines, differences in the way markets are designed have recently received special attention in terms of comparing primary security markets with derivatives markets.¹ Among other things, important differences between these two markets rely not only on the security design, but also on the liquidity provision functions. In primary markets these are decided by separate agents: the issuers (corporations) decide the security design (either a stock or a bond) and the market makers (or, alternatively, the electronic limit order book, LOB) play the role of liquidity providers. A detailed analysis of the implications of such separation can be found in Biais and Mariotti (2005). In any case, it should be clear that this flexibility introduces a high degree of competition into these markets. However, in a typical highly standardized derivative market, the presence of the exchange clearing house, as a common counterparty, has important consequences and limitations both for the competition of liquidity providers, and the security design. In other words, the presence of a clearing house which basically centralizes the security design function significantly affects the competition between liquidity providers. On the other hand, while inventory

costs and asymmetric information are well-recognized disadvantages of fragmented markets such as the primary security markets, these costs are negligible in derivatives.²

Unfortunately, to study the effects of these two alternative designs on the quality of prices and trading volume is an extremely difficult task. Of course, the products traded in these two types of market are very different.

Since the late 1990s, European capital markets with less developed derivative exchanges than those in the US, have been flooded with a large number of bank-issued options. Interestingly, these warrants are traded on special segments of the regular European stock exchanges. Thus, the recent development of warrants issued by financial entities presents an excellent opportunity to investigate the impact of market and security design on the quality and transparency of prices.

This paper analyses the case of the warrants market in Spain. Since November 2002 these assets have been electronically traded in a special segment of the *Sistema de Interconexión Bursátil Español* (SIBE). This operating mechanism has generated a pronounced increase in the trading volume of the warrants market which, by 2003, reached the traded levels of MEFF, the official market of futures and financial options in Spain, which was created in 1989.³

As discussed in other papers, the securities traded in warrant markets are identical or similar to standardized options. However, the warrants market design is different to the typical derivative market design. This makes a price comparison between two markets an interesting exercise which can offer new insights into how market design determines the way in which market makers act, what the investors are looking for when choosing one of these two markets, and, of course, what the consequences are for the resulting price formation process. Examples of previous

literature along these lines are found in Chan and Pinder (2000) for the Australian market, Horst and Veld (2003) on the Euronext Amsterdam stock exchange, and Bartram and Fehle (2003, 2007) for the German market. These papers compare the price of traditional options and bank-issued options with similar characteristics and find significant differences indicating systematic overpricing of warrants. Horst and Veld argue that overvaluation can be attributed to a behavioural preference of private investors, while the explanation of this overpricing in the other two papers is related to differences in the market structure. Bartram and Fehle use clientele arguments, and argue that investors are willing to buy a more expensive warrant if they expect to have the possibility of selling it at a higher price. Market design, and therefore liquidity supply, is responsible for the creation of such expectation investors.⁴ Similarly, Chan and Pinder find that an important part of the overpricing of warrants is due to liquidity reasons such as the number of market makers competing in the market, the relative trading volume, or the possibility of electronically trading the asset. Therefore, the different characteristics of the warrants market and the options market, whether in Australia or Germany, apparently show that both derivatives markets could exist side-by-side with significant overlap in their products but significant differences in their prices.

This paper analyses the bank-issued warrants market and the options markets in Spain along the lines described above. As with other countries, differences in the design of both markets appear. However, given its size, and the relative importance and flexible regulation of the warrants market, Spain can be considered as an extreme example relative to other countries. MEF is the traditional derivatives exchange which provides standardized option contracts with a clearing house serving as a common counterparty. Thus, security design is decided by the common issuer while market

makers are the liquidity suppliers. In particular, there are three market makers competing in a quote-driven electronic environment. In contrast, the warrants issuers are free to choose any characteristic of the contracts they offer. In other words, they can create products that may cover the investors' demand at any particular moment of time. Moreover, they are obliged to serve as market makers for their own products, providing liquidity in a competing market where other issuers could offer identical products and where investors can also provide prices because it is a hybrid market with a limit order book (LOB) functioning simultaneously. In the case of the Spanish warrant market, there are eleven authorized market makers. Finally, another difference between both markets is the possibility of being short in the options market, while the short-selling of warrants is subject to the same short-selling restrictions that apply to all common equities.

The analysis of market characteristics in determining prices may only make sense if the two markets offer competing products. *A priori*, given the freedom that issuers have in designing their warrants, we would expect to find a large variety of warrants with different characteristics with respect to the options traded in MEFF. However, evidence shows a high level of overlapping between the two markets in several European and Asian countries. Again, the case of Spain is even more striking. Data from 2003 shows that 83 per cent of trading volume (90 per cent of the total number of contracts) in the warrants market comes from assets with the same contract terms as contracts in the options market (underlying asset, option type, exercise style, expiration date, and strike price). Therefore, if systematic differences in prices of substitute products are observed, they may be explained by different market structures in the two markets. Our results show that the average overpricing of warrants over options is approximately 22 per cent. In this paper we investigate whether such a large

overpricing can be explained by clientele arguments, liquidity reasons, or aspects related to market microstructure.

Additionally, we find that the size of overpricing changes among different warrants issuers. This result has not been reported previously in European markets. Moreover, market design does not seem to be useful in explaining this finding. The second objective of this paper is to investigate the potential differences in prices of equivalent warrants that only differ upon the issuer. Given that the issuer determines all contract terms, including the bid-ask spread and the volume size of the issue, we might think that the liquidity characteristic of each contract explain its price. However, using intraday transaction prices, we do not find a relationship between the differences in prices and differences in alternative proxies for liquidity. Interestingly, the issuer also establishes the first price at which a warrant is quoted. Even if we accept this initial difference, it seems that arbitrage would eliminate or reduce these differences. Our evidence shows that this is not the case. In fact, we find that for a given pair of warrants, the one issued later is the most expensive and the price difference does not decrease near the expiration date. It should be made clear that differences in credit risk among issuers cannot explain the pricing differences. All issuers in the Spanish market enjoy very similar credit ratings.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the product characteristics and trading systems for the two alternative derivatives markets in Spain. This analysis allows us to establish some hypotheses which will be tested later. In Section 3, data and the methodology employed in matching samples are described. Section 4 discusses the relative price differences between warrants and options, and motivates potential explanations. Section 5 compares the prices of equivalent warrants issued by different issuers. Section 6 concludes.

2. Exchanged-Issued Options and Warrants (Bank-Issued Options) in Spain

While warrants were initially rights for acquiring shares linked to corporate debt issues, they were later disassociated from the underlying firm. Now, warrants are issued by well-known financial firms unrelated to the underlying asset. Hence, they have lost their financing role and they become investment products with the same characteristics as standard options. In the case of the Spanish market, the number of warrant issues experienced an initial and relatively large growth associated with the technology boom during the late 1990s. The second and more important increase in warrant issues was observed during 2003, the year immediately after a new segment of the Spanish Stock Exchange, SIBE, was created in November 2002 to trade warrants electronically.

Figure I shows the evolution of the number of traded contracts in the option and warrant markets from 2000 to 2005. As we can see, there was an increase in both markets in the number of contracts traded from 2000 to 2001 associated with the increasing uncertainty of technological firms.⁵ However, after 2002 the number of warrants traded carried on its increasing trend at the same time as the number of options traded was decreasing. This finding is observed until 2004, while in 2005 a slight recuperation on the option market occurred, along with a small decrease in the trading volume of warrants. Thus, it appears that the introduction of the screen-based trading facility for warrants had a negative impact over the option market. Of course, the two markets have to be competitors offering similar products. The initial success of warrants suggests that there are some advantages linked to the warrants market that have made it expand relative to the option market after 2002. As suggested in the introduction, standardized products, in contrast to the flexibility associated with the electronic warrant market, may be behind this pattern. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the subsequent evolution in both markets has been relatively similar.

The first objective of this paper is to analyse these questions by comparing transaction prices of similar options and warrants traded in the two competing markets. Before presenting the main results of the paper, it seems convenient to describe the trading system and product characteristics in both markets to understand precisely the level of institutional overlapping. All the information provided below refers to 2003.

Table 1 describes the main characteristics of the option market and the warrant markets in Spain. One important difference between them is related to the liquidity supply. While the option market in Spain is a quote-driven market where market makers are the only institutions allowed to quote prices, in the case of warrants we have a hybrid market with a LOB and specialists. Moreover, each specialist works for the firm that issued the warrant because the issuer commits itself to make a market for its own contracts, quoting at least one price daily in both sides of the book until expiration date. Thus, investors always have the possibility of making a transaction at a price quoted by specialists or they can *make a market* by putting a limit order in the book. Under this arrangement, competition is assured.

Contrary to the flexibility and available information in the warrant market, sometimes liquidity requirements are not as clear in the case of options. The standardized option market is a quote-driven market with three market makers who can trade any contract. Although they are obliged to quote prices in each session, we have observed that only one ask price or bid price is available at most instants during the sessions. Moreover, they are trading contracts that they have not designed and, therefore, these are contracts which are not necessarily forced to be hedged because the last and common counterparty is the clearing house. Thus, we can expect that competition is less aggressive in this market with the possibility of lacking liquidity.

The rest of the characteristics abstracted in the Table 1 are very similar in both markets. For example, investors can trade electronically through an intermediary in both markets; the transparency level is basically the same; and the length of the trading session is quite similar.

Unlike standard options, it is very important to point out that it is not possible for investors to sell short bank-issued options. This fact has potential implications for arbitrage strategies between equivalent options. Let us assume that an option and a warrant on the same underlying assets have identical payoff functions but different prices. Benefits from arbitrage may exist if the warrant is cheaper than the option. In the opposite case, given the inability of investors to shorten the warrant, the arbitrage opportunity does not actually exist.

Comparing the security characteristics of the two markets in Table 2, we observe, once again, that all terms for option contracts are standardized, in contrast with the freedom that banks have when issuing a new contract. We can find warrants over a variety of underlying assets and with longer expiration dates. This standardization also makes options have larger contract sizes than warrants. For options on stocks the contract size is 100 underlying assets, while the contract size in warrants lies in a range between 0.1 and 2. Similarly, one option on the future on the Ibex-35 index is associated with one underlying asset, and the ratio⁶ for warrants on the index goes from 0.001 to 0.002. Then, *a priori*, the contract terms could be specific for warrants, with the implication that both markets may not have to be necessarily competitors in products if warrant issuers choose differentiated securities.

Table 3 contains the composition of the option and warrants markets. This allows us to easily extract the level of overlapping. During 2003, trading volume in

warrants was 1609.8 million euros. It is a small quantity when compared to other markets such as the stock market, but it should be noted that just one year after starting negotiating in their segment at SIBE, the trading volume in warrants became larger than the trading volume of the traditional derivative market. Unlike standard options, warrant contracts are predominantly calls. Given the freedom of the issuers to establish the option type, it is possible to think that this finding responds to the investors' demand. Thus, it suggests that investors participate in this market due to speculative reasons rather than having a hedging motivation.

The underlying assets in option contracts are standardized. The market allows trading in twenty national stocks and one equity market index (Ibex 35 mini-future). In the case of the warrant market, a much larger variety of underlying assets are possible (27 different stocks with two-thirds of the total volume), but 91.5 per cent of the trading volume in warrants trade on the same underlying assets than the options. Moreover, the 20 stocks that serve as the underlying assets for standard options are also underlying stocks of the warrant contracts. The trading volume within these contracts (1047.5 million euros) represents almost 99 per cent of the trading volume in warrants on individual stocks.

On the other hand, regular financial options have generally short-term horizons with standardized expiration dates: the third Friday of March, June, September, or December. Again, the freedom in the warrant contracts allows the issuer to establish long-term maturity warrants and flexible expiration dates. However, Table 3 shows that more than 96 per cent of the trading volume in either individual stocks or the market index corresponds to contracts with the same expiration dates as in the option market. Lastly, 83 per cent of the total available warrants in our sample have simultaneously the same underlying asset, strike price, and expiration date than existing options. Thus, a

very relevant part of the contracts traded in the warrants market presents the same characteristics as contracts traded in the options market. On the contrary, only 23 percent of the trading volume in the option market has an equivalent warrant.

In summary, given the additional flexibility that the warrant market enjoys relative to the highly standardized derivative market, warrants issuers could be able to offer differentiating products. However, evidence shows that most warrants traded in Spain are products that were already trading in the official derivative market.

In any case, it is interesting to point out that the warrant market was particularly concentrated on individual securities where the availability of alternative products is quite large. In this sense, the creation and the subsequent successful expansion of the warrant market occurred in a competitive environment. These facts may suggest a clientele movement from the option market to the warrant market. However, as pointed out above, only 23 per cent of the trading volume in the traditional option market corresponds to similar products in the new market. Hence, it may not necessarily be the case that the tremendous decrease in the trading volume of the option markets (from 24 million contracts in 2002 to 11 million contracts in 2004) is explained by the boom in the new market.

3. Data and Matching Samples

We first collect data on all options traded in MEF during 2003. They are options on twenty Spanish individual stocks; Acesa, Acerinox, Altadis, Amadeus, BBVA, Bankinter, Endesa, Gas Natural, Iberdrola, Indra, Inditex, Banco Popular, Repsol YPF, Santander, Sogecable, Telefónica, Telefónica Móviles, TPI, Terra, and Unión Fenosa, and one option on the Spanish future index, which is known as Ibex35 mini-future. We find 12,490 different options according to the following characteristics; underlying

asset, type, strike price, and expiration date. All options on individual stocks are American style and have a contract size of 100. Options on the index are European style and have a size of 1. We also obtain data on warrants traded in SIBE on the 21 underlying assets described earlier, with expiration dates which are always available in the options market. There are 1684 different warrants where different issuer warrants are counted individually. We collect information about the contract characteristics of all warrants and options in our sample. All warrants trading at SIBE are American style and have different sizes.

Then, from the two samples above we select equivalent options, i.e., options and warrants with identical underlying asset, expiration date, strike price and type. This exercise results in a matched sample of 1007 options and 1278 warrants. We can now find an option traded in MEFM with the same pay-off function for 76 per cent of the warrants issued on the 21 underlying assets and the expiration dates selected. On the other hand, only 8 per cent of all different options available in MEFM have a competitor in the warrant market.

Table 4 offers descriptive figures of coinciding options in both markets. In each panel, columns two and three report the total number of different options and warrants on the 20 underlying stocks and the index, while the expiration dates are displayed in the first column of the Table. Columns 4 and 5 indicate the number of options or warrants for which a warrant or an option with identical underlying asset, expiration date, type, and strike price exists. Given the obligation of issuing pairs of equivalent call and put options, we have the same number of puts and calls. However, there are twice as many call warrants as put warrants. On the other hand, the proportion of coinciding options in both markets is larger for puts, and this proportion is especially high in the case of warrants on the market index. Regarding the expiration dates, the highest level

of overlapping occurs for warrants expiring in December 2003. Since the sample contains live contracts during 2003, this is probably due to the fact that this expiration date is in the middle of all possible expirations that we consider.

We then collect a complete history of time stamp of intraday transactions from 2 January 2003 to 30 December 2003 for all options and warrants from the matching sample. Our options data contain the transaction price, the cumulative volume after each transaction, and the bid and ask prices and depths before each transaction. All this data is provided by MEFF. The available information for warrants consists of transaction prices and volume, and the bid and ask prices and depths before and after each transaction. This information is provided by the *Sociedad de Bolsas*.

In addition, we compute the following variables for all options and warrants from the matching sample: the daily level of moneyness as the ratio between the underlying asset closing price and the strike price for calls, and the inverse for puts; the daily number of days to maturity; the intraday relative bid-ask spread just before each transaction and the cumulative volume, in number of underlying assets, traded in the 15 days preceding each transaction day.

The next step consists of matching transaction prices for all these pairs of options which provide investors with identical (or very similar) payoff functions. We decide to use transaction prices instead of quotes because, in the case of options traded at MEFF, the latter are missing in most time periods. The procedure is as follows. For each option price we search the nearest equivalent warrant transaction price. Then we compute the time difference between the two transactions within each pair. Figure II shows the histogram of these differences. It is rather striking to note that, for most cases, both options in each matching pair are traded close to each other in time (less

than five thousand seconds) in their respective markets. Moreover, it turns out that the distance in seconds between transactions is smaller than one hour in 75 per cent of all available pairs. Thus, our first matching criteria are that all price pairs have a time difference of no longer than one hour. This yields 12,636 price pairs. Other matching pairs are obtained with more restrictive temporal criteria as a maximum distance: half an hour, fifteen minutes, and seven and a half minutes. The number of price pairs in each case is 9516, 6955 and 4810 respectively.

As already mentioned, the contract size in regular options is standardized to 100 underlying assets, while the contract size in warrants is much smaller. This suggests that the euro volume of an option transaction is potentially larger than the volume of the equivalent warrant transaction. With this institutional constraint in mind, a second criterion of matching transaction prices consists of selecting those that have the nearest volume from transactions with no more than one hour as the maximum distance. In this case we obtain 9135 price pairs. Finally, in order to be more precise, we restrict the price pairs to those in which the time distance between transactions is less than one hour and trading volume in warrants on stocks is a multiple of 100 underlying assets. The number of pairs is 3447 in this case.

4. The Price Comparison between Equivalent Options and Warrants

4.1. What is expected?

In principle, since the two options in each pair have identical pay-off functions (with the exception of the quantity, given the different size contracts between both derivatives), no important or systematic differences in their prices should be observed when the two transactions occur near in time. However, empirical evidence shows that the overpricing of warrants occurs in many countries.⁷ The reason that may explain such overpricing is

the prohibition of short-selling warrants. Hence, arbitrage opportunities between the warrants market and options market cannot exist. Our first aim is to verify if a higher price of warrants is also observed in the Spanish market. The exercise is especially interesting because, unlike other countries, both the warrants market and the traditional options market belong to the same holding corporation in Spain, namely BME (*Bolsas y Mercados Españoles*).

In any case, if there were overpricing, we still need to explain why investors would be willing to pay a higher premium if a standard option appears to be a close substitute. The assumption of agent rationality suggests that if there are two very similar products trading at different prices in alternative market scenarios practically at the same time, investors would choose the cheapest market. Moreover, if these price differences persist, the expensive market could disappear. Otherwise, the potential differences in prices may have to be associated with different market structures. Our analysis is based on this fact. Indeed, there exist different reasons related to the market structure that could justify, at least partly, a higher price for warrants. Specifically, we explore whether the overpricing may be related to different clienteles or market-making quality and discuss its consequences on liquidity.

The argument of different clienteles is supported by the study of Bartram and Fehle (2005). They show that if an investor looks for speculative opportunities and, therefore, has a high probability of liquidating his derivative position before the expiration, he would be willing to pay a higher ask price for the warrant than for the option if he expects the future bid price for the warrant also to be higher than the future option bid price. Moreover the expected difference between futures bid prices should be higher than the difference between current ask prices. Of course, this expectation can only be supported if the warrants market presents narrower bid-ask spreads consistently.

This is the case of the German market. Bartram and Felhe (2007) find that, on average, traditional options have bid-ask spreads 43 per cent higher than bank-issued options.

Some characteristics of the market structures and securities in the two Spanish derivative markets are consistent with the argument of heterogeneous investors. First, warrant issuers provide more calls than puts while the use of the option for hedging suggests that investors would need to buy puts rather than calls. Secondly, the contract size in warrants is much smaller than in options, so individual investors/speculators would probably choose the warrants market, while institutional investors with hedging needs would use the option market. Moreover, after conversations with practitioners, we understand that no investor in the warrant market has ever exercised his option positions.

The other explanation for the overpricing of warrants that we consider is related to liquidity. On the one hand, as asset pricing theory has proved, an investor will be willing to pay a premium when buying an asset if the asset can be easily sold later at a reasonable price. Thus, higher prices of warrants could be explained by higher liquidity levels found in the warrants market relative to the options market. On the other hand, the heavy competition that the warrants market provides through the LOB also suggests that it would be a more liquid market. Therefore, we investigate whether the overpricing is cross-sectional related to differences in liquidity between the two derivatives markets.

4.2. Relative Price Differences

For each price pair of matching transactions according to the criteria described in Section 3, we compute the relative difference (RP) between warrant and option prices,

$$RP = \frac{P_w - P_o}{P_o} \quad (1)$$

where P_w and P_o are the transaction warrant price and option price respectively.

We compute the number of positive relative price differences, the number of negative differences, and the cases in which both prices are equal. Then, we compute the mean and the median of RP and, because of the skewness observed in the series, we only analyse the statistical significance of the median by the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. Table 5 shows the results. *P-values* for the tests of the median equal to zero are not reported because the null is always rejected for all cases. This is done for the total number of pairs and for observations grouped according to the option type, underlying asset, and warrant issuer. Panel A contains the statistics for price pairs with no more than one hour distance between transactions; in Panel B the price matching criterion is a maximum distance of 7.5 minutes between transactions;⁸ the results in Panel C correspond to the criterion of matching transactions with the closest volume, and with a time difference of less than one hour; and Panel D reports the results for transaction pairs with the same restriction as in Panel C, but now the trading volume in the warrant contract is a multiple of 100 underlying assets. In this last case, we only employ options on individual stocks.

Independently of the underlying asset, the option type, the warrant issuer, or the matching criteria, a systematic pattern is clearly observed in the results. Transaction prices in the warrant market are higher than transaction prices in the option market. On average, and using the median, we find a 25 per cent overpricing of warrants when we use intraday data and impose a maximum distance of one hour between transactions. The relative difference in prices is a bit lower when restricting the time distance

between the two transactions. In particular, the overpricing is 22.64 per cent for half an hour, 20.69 per cent for 15 minutes, and 19.36 per cent for 7.5 minutes. For all cases, the null hypothesis of median relative price differences equal to zero is always rejected at the 1 per cent level of significance. These results are quite surprising. As we indicated in the previous section, an overpricing of warrants may be expected, but the magnitude of the difference is much larger than the overpricing found to other countries. Chan and Pinder (2000) find a median overpricing of around 3 per cent for intraday transactions in the Australian derivative market. Bartram and Fehle (2005, 2007) use quotes instead of prices and compare ask quotes and bid quotes separately, for options traded in the Euwax market (bank-issued options) and for options traded in Eurex market (standard options) in Germany. They find that Euwax ask and bid quotes are higher than Eurex ask and bid quotes (4.7 per cent and 9.9 per cent, respectively). Other markets show similar results.⁹

We may try to explain such a large overpricing by the possibility of investors willing to trade small amounts of the underlying assets through the use of warrants; or alternatively, it may be the case that option market institutional investors may benefit from lower prices when trading large quantities. However, when we limit the matching process to warrant transactions with a size volume available in the option market, we still obtain a median overpricing of 17 per cent (Panel D).

Results in Table 5 also show that the level of overpricing is independent of the option type, and that the average overpricing in warrants is even more extreme for options on the index than for options on individual stocks. Moreover, we find significant differences in prices among warrant issuers. We will come back to this finding in Section 5.

4.3. Clienteles Hypothesis

As we pointed out before, the argument of differentiated clientele in both derivatives markets has been used to explain different prices in products with equivalent pay-offs (Bartram and Felhe, 2006). Individual speculators would trade in the warrants market instead of in the options market, although the former is more expensive, if they could obtain larger gains with the sell than the costs with the buy.

We now compare relative price differences by distinguishing between buy-initiated transactions (ask) and sell-initiated transactions (bid) with the criterion of one hour as a maximum time distance and with the closest volume. This is a fairer comparison because we are matching transactions in the same side of the spread. Moreover, this exercise allows us to test whether differences in bid prices are larger than differences in ask prices, supporting the argument of higher potential earnings in the warrant market for speculative investors. Table 6 contains the relative percentage pricing difference from this exercise. Panel A reports ask price differences, while Panel B displays bid price differences. As in Table 5, all relative price differences are statistically significant in median at a level of 1 per cent. The relative differences between ask transaction prices on the one hand, and bid transaction prices on the other, are minimal, the two are very similar. In fact, the difference in bid prices is slightly lower than the difference in ask prices.

To be more precise, in order to investigate if transaction costs are the reason behind the choice of the warrants market by a speculator, we now compare the relative bid-ask spreads for all the transaction pairs. We compute the relative spread (SP) just before each transaction for the two markets with the matching criteria of transactions with the closest volume and with a time difference of less than one hour. As before,

Table 7 reports the results of mean and median differences between the relative spreads. The number of pairs is now reduced to 6781 (instead of 9135 pairs in Table 5, Panel C) given the missing values in one of the two sides of the spread in whatever market. Specifically, it is not possible to compute the relative spread for 1254 warrant transactions and for 1302 option transactions. Here asterisks indicate that mean or median difference between the two relative spreads is statistically different from zero.

With respect to the mean differences it is observed that they are generally positive, indicating that transaction costs in the warrants market are higher than in the options market. This evidence would not support the hypothesis of speculator clientele in the warrants market for justifying its overpricing. However, analysing the median differences, we observe that they are negative in most cases and statistically different from zero for all transaction pairs, for call derivatives, and for issuers 1, 6, and 7. In general terms, the median of relative spread differences does not seem to be particularly large. For all pairs the option market is only a 0.04 per cent more expensive than the warrants market. This small reduction of transaction costs in trading warrants instead of options does not appear to be a sufficient justification for speculative investors to chose the warrants market and to pay higher prices that amount to a 22 per cent average difference.¹⁰ However, and curiously, the differences in spreads are higher when the issuers of the warrant are the numbers 6 or 7 (1.8 per cent and 1.1 per cent respectively), the issuers that present the higher levels of overpricing.

Summarizing our findings at this point, it is difficult to give a completely rational explanation of the striking success of the Spanish warrant market relative to the traditional option market. An important part of the market clearly overlaps with the existing option market. Transaction prices for warrants for which options with identical pay-offs exist are higher on average. In many cases, the trading volume in the warrant

transactions is not smaller than the minimum standardized size of the option counterpart. And the bid-ask spreads in the warrant market are only a bit smaller (in median) than the spreads for equivalent options. In the next section we look for additional understanding on these issues.

4.4. Warrants Liquidity Premium

A potential explanation for different option and warrant prices is the presence of a liquidity premium. The relative bid-ask spread is the most common proxy for liquidity. As we already pointed out, relative bid-ask spreads are similar on average for equivalent transactions in both the warrants market and the options market. However, it may be the case that cross-sectional changes in relative price differences are related to different liquidity levels. In order to investigate this possibility we now carry out a multivariate regression analysis. Our aim here is to test whether the relative price differences (*RP*) for the matched transactions are related to some explanatory variables associated with liquidity reasons.

Of course, one of these liquidity variables is the relative bid-ask spread. Specifically, for each matched transaction we compute the ratio between the relative spread just before the transaction in the option and the relative spread just before the transaction in the warrant (*RSP*). Additionally, assets with a higher level of activity are more liquid (Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman, 1996). Thus, the trading activity also contains information about the degree of liquidity in a market. Then, the second liquidity variable that we consider is the ratio that compares the trading volume in options to the trading volume in warrants during the 15 days preceding each matched transaction (*RVOL*). Given the overpricing of warrants and our hypothesis of the

existence of a liquidity premium, we expect the relationship between *RP* and *RSP* to be positive, while the relationship between *RP* and *RVOL* should be negative.

Other variables capture some well known patterns in the behaviour of option prices. Derivative prices change in response to variations in the underlying price, and time-to-expiration. Therefore, we also employ as control variables, moneyness degree (*MONEY*) and the number of days to expiration (*TTE*) of the two options in each matching pair. Trading activity in derivatives tends to increase when options are at-the-money or time-to-expiration is short. Thus, a large number of the transaction price pairs are expected to be found for both short-term to expiration and at-the-money options. Figure III clearly displays this pattern for the number of pricing pairs. We represent moneyness against the number of days to expiration for options in each pair, and for calls and puts separately. In both graphs we observe a concentration of observations on the left side of the graph (less than 90 days to maturity). Moreover, matching options are mostly out-of-the-money when time to expiration is more than 90 days. Only when transactions come close to expiration, are option pairs located around the at-the-money positions. This is especially true for puts, whereas for calls, there is a trend to find in-the-money transaction pairs the closer we are to expiration. In fact, the correlation between *TTE* and *MONEY* is highly negative and equal to -0.47.¹¹ The pattern in Figure III suggests that warrants with equivalent options are used to obtain returns by liquidating positions instead of exercising the options.

On the other hand, some researches have documented that bid-ask spreads and trading volume are larger at the beginning and end of the trading day in stock exchange markets.¹² To control for this intraday effect we include two dummy variables: *OPEN* for transactions that take place from 09:00 to 11:00, and *CLOSE* for transactions that take place in the last two hours of the session (from 15:30 to 17:30). Similarly, although

we do not find important differences in relative prices between calls and puts, given that the number of pairs is greater for calls than for puts, we also include a dummy variable to distinguish the option type (*CALL*). Finally, we have observed important differences in warrant overpricing between different issuers. Thus, we specify four dummy variables (D_i) to record pairs in which the warrant issuer is the number i : 1, 4, 6, and 7. Pairs in which the warrants are issued by issuer 5 are not considered because the lack of ask or bid prices makes it impossible to compute the *RSP* variable. The specific sample used for this regression is composed of pairs obtained with the matching criteria of choosing the warrant-option transactions with the closest volume over all pairs formed with one hour as a maximum time distance. A table summarizing all variables used in this analysis could be found in the Appendix.

Table 8 presents the results from the OLS estimation of following regression,

$$\begin{aligned}
 RP_n = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Money_n + \beta_2 TTE_n + \beta_3 RVOL_n + \beta_4 RSP_n + \beta_5 CALL + \\
 & + \beta_6 OPEN + \beta_7 CLOSE + \beta_8 D_1 + \beta_9 D_4 + \beta_{10} D_6 + \beta_{11} D_7 + u_n
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for individual significance from heterokedascity consistent standard errors. We first run the regression with the full cross-sectional sample as described above, and later we run the same regression for individual stocks and the market index separately. The number of observations is 6781 for the full sample of pairs, 2882 for individual stocks, and 3899 for the market index.

Given the definition of the independent variables, β_0 represents the average relative price difference for pairs of puts, in which the warrant is issued by issuer 9 (who is in the middle of the range of observed overpricing), and for transactions made during the intermediate trading session.

Generally speaking, the results indicate that most variables explain the relative price difference between warrants and options with the exception of the dummy controlling for the end of the trading day. The signs of the estimated coefficients are as expected. The difference in prices is smaller when the options are at-the-money or when the options are close to expiration. Variables representing relative liquidity also contain information about the difference in prices. The overpricing of warrants is larger for relatively more liquid warrants; that is, when the *RSP* is large and when *RVOL* is low. Although the relative volume is better in explaining the overpricing with regards to the index, and the relative spread is only significant in the case of the individual stocks. The overpricing is also larger for calls than for puts, and also for transactions during the initial hours of trading, and for issuers 6 and 7. As exceptions, *RVOL* and *OPEN* are not statistically significant in explaining differences in prices between warrants and options on individual stocks. Finally, the explanatory variables explain from 37 per cent for individual stocks to a high 57 per cent for the market index.

To summarize the evidence, we can assert that the warrants traded in the Spanish stock exchange are more expensive than similar options traded in the regular standardized option market. There is some evidence suggesting that this difference in prices is related to the heterogeneity of investors in both markets. The larger number of call warrants relative to available puts or the fact that investors do not exercise them suggest that investors are predominantly speculators. Unfortunately, for the evidence to be fully consistent with this hypothesis, we should observe smaller bid-ask spreads in the market for warrants. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to understand why investors may be willing to pay a higher price when buying a warrant if a cheaper equivalent option exists. Our data show that spreads in warrants are only a bit smaller than spreads in options and the median difference between both is only significant in

some cases. Of course, we have to be cautious in interpreting this result. Our data are taken from 2003, the first year after the incorporation of warrants into the electronic trading system and the year of the explosion of the warrant market in Spain. Finally, the results also show that the cross-sectional behaviour of overpricing is related to some liquidity patterns. In particular, warrants are more expensive when their bid-ask spreads before transactions are relatively smaller, and also when a larger volume has been traded in the days before the transaction.

5. Warrants Price Comparison

From the previous evidence it is already clear that the level of the relative price differences between options and warrants varies with the issuer. From this fact we can suppose that differences in the price of equivalent warrants (issued by different issuers) will also be found. In this section we carry out quite a similar analysis to the one just performed by comparing the prices of warrants with the same characteristics. However, this supposition and its respective analysis only make sense if there is a high level of products overlapping also among warrant issuers. If this was the case, the analysis of warrant prices within the specific warrants market could help us to better understand such large differences between prices of warrants and options.

Table 9 provides statistics on trading activity in the warrants market. The panel at the top refers to the whole market and the panel at the bottom refers to the trading volume of equivalent warrants, i.e., warrants with the same underlying asset, the same expiration date, and the same strike (also with the same style and type) but issued by different financial institutions. The first two columns are computed with the sample of all issuers and columns three and four refer to issuers 1, 7, and 9. As can be observed, these three issuers concentrate 95 per cent of the trading in the Spanish warrants

market.¹³ In terms of overlapping in products, 77.84 per cent of the total volume traded in the market corresponds to warrants with the same characteristics, and 76.32 per cent belongs to issuers 1, 7, and 9. Thus, not only do warrants imitate the products traded in the options market in Spain but also a heavy level of competition exists between warrants issued by the three main issuers in this market. The degree of overlapping clearly differs between call and put contracts, with a higher percentage for calls.

Next, we carry out a price comparison analysis on equivalent warrants. First, we investigate whether differences in transaction prices of equivalent warrants exist. These warrants have identical pay-off functions but they are not identical products, mainly because the issuer and the size of the contract may be different. In this case, given that all warrants are traded in the same market, potential differences in prices cannot be explained by the actual trading regulations or the microstructural characteristics of the market.

As before, the criteria of matching transaction prices consists on selecting pairs of equivalent warrants with the nearest volume but with no more than one hour between both trades. Data are taken from intraday transactions during 2003. On top of that, we organize the matching samples as pairs of issuers. The final number of observations depends on the two issuers chosen in each case. As expected, we find that only three main issuers offer a number of price pairs sufficiently representative for carrying out the analysis. The number of observations finally used is 6496 for pairs with issuers 1 and 7, 12,246 for issuers 1 and 9, and 573 for issuers 7 and 9.

Table 10 contains the mean and median of the relative price difference for each group of pairs relative to issuers 1 and 7, 1 and 9, and 7 and 9 in panels A, B and C, respectively. As expected, given the results in the previous comparison between

warrants and options, call warrants issued by issuer 7 are more expensive than the equivalent warrants issued by institution number 1. Similarly, issuer 9 is also more expensive than issuer 1 for both calls and puts, and call warrants issued by institution 9 are cheaper than equivalent warrants issued by 7. The magnitude of such differences is smaller than in the options-warrants case, but they are important, especially for individual stocks and call options when comparing prices between issuers number 7 and 1. It is surprising to find that issuer number 7 has the cheapest put warrants. It would be interesting to discover the reasons why the same issuer can maintain these high prices for one type of its warrants but not for the other. Finally, differences between issuers are, generally speaking, larger for call warrants and for warrants on individual stocks.

Table 11 shows the price comparison by splitting the sample between buy- and sell-initiated trades. As before, the idea here is to see whether the difference in prices is related to the type of the transaction (buy or sell), given the impossibility of being short in warrants. We can observe a systematic pattern; price differences become larger when we consider buy-initiated trades instead of sell-initiated trades. Thus, systematic smaller spreads associated with warrants issued by a determined issuer could explain the decision of an investor to buy its warrants at higher prices. In this sense, the analysis of relative spreads may show that warrants issued by issuer 7 present smaller spreads than warrants issued by 1 or by 9, and that issuer 9 is cheaper than issuer 1 in terms of mean spread.

The comparison of relative spreads is shown in Table 12. Considering median values, the results offer puzzling evidence, since spread differences seem not to be linked with price differences. In particular, it seems that issuer 1 is the one who is quoting lower bid-ask spreads (with the exception of warrants on stocks), and that issuer 9 systematically provides the highest bid-ask spread compared with issuers 1 and 7.

Nevertheless, since all warrants are traded in the same market, clientele arguments (speculators instead of hedgers) are more difficult to support in this case. However, clientele arguments associated with the degree of confidence that investors have in the issuer could be considered. In this regard, there is some research that relates the price of warrants to the credit risk of the issuer.¹⁴ Unfortunately for the purposes of this study, our three warrants issuers are important financial institutions in Spain with good and very similar positions in credit ratings.

As before, a multivariate regression may be useful in understanding the relationship between price differences for two equivalent contracts and liquidity, as proxy by the relative spread and/or the relative trading volume. We may expect that warrants with smaller spreads and/or larger volumes present higher prices. The regression, in this case, is given by the following expression,

$$RP_n = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Money_n + \beta_2 TTE_n + \beta_3 RVOL_n + \beta_4 RSP_n + \beta_5 CALL + \beta_6 OPEN + \beta_7 CLOSE + u_n \quad (3)$$

where the explanatory variables are equivalent to the variables used in equation (2).

Table 13 reports the empirical results with respect to each pair of issuers. In general, we observe that the control variables, moneyness, time to expiration, the dummy for calls and the dummy for the opening of the session, are statistically significant for most cases. However, some of the estimated coefficients present signs contrary to what could be expected. For example, unlike the case of the option-warrant comparison, the price difference in equivalent warrants is larger the closer the time-to-expiration. This finding does not have an immediate interpretation, because the temporal value of options decreases as time goes by, and the investor expectations should reflect this temporal pattern. Moreover, at the beginning of trading, when there is

more uncertainty about the future behaviour of the security, the relative price difference is smaller. Finally, the price difference between calls and puts depends on the pair of issuers considered, and also on the underlying assets.

With respect to the variables that proxy for liquidity, either bid-ask spreads or trading volume, some contradictions are also observed. In this type of market where we find different issuers offering similar products, it seems plausible to expect competition by narrowing spreads. Surprisingly, however, we find that the relative spread is only significant when comparing issuers 9 and 1, and for warrants on individual stocks. On the other hand, the trading volume during the days before the transaction does not seem to be very informative either. Although *RVOL* is a significant variable in all regressions, we find different signs depending on the pair of issuers, and also depending on the underlying assets analysed.¹⁵ The R^2 are high, even more than those obtained for regressions in Table 8. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the reasons behind the differences observed in prices. This topic deserves further research. Moreover, it should be pointed that the evidence in this respect that would make international comparisons possible is basically non-existent.

These results seem to suggest that we may want to employ not only economic rational arguments but also a behavioural reasoning in order to explain these price differentials. Given that, generally speaking, investors choose warrants for speculative reasons, it seems that they are not particularly concerned about whether the price is fair or not. What becomes relevant is the actual behaviour of those prices over time. Note that the issue price for a new contract is exogenously given. In other words, this price is established for the issuer in a completely free decision.

We proceed to make an approximated analysis on this issue, matching pairs of warrants with the same underlying asset, strike price, and expiration date, but that are warrants issued by different issuers and, in this case, warrants issued at different moments of time. When analysing the precise moment of the issue, we have been able to verify that the more expensive warrant is issued later in 81 per cent of all cases. We think that this fact is important to understand why such differences in prices exist and whether or not they remain during the life of the contracts. Our future research will explore this issue by analysing the temporal evolution in quotes of pairs of equivalent warrants.

6. Conclusions

This paper provides strong and rather striking empirical evidence in the sense that options with identical or similar characteristics but different prices exist side-by-side. We first compare prices of options with different market structures. This is to say, standard options traded in the derivative market in Spain (MEFF) and bank-issued options traded in the Stock Exchange Market (*Bolsa de Madrid*). There are two main differences between these markets. On the one hand, the issuer of the warrant is the party who decides the contract terms and, simultaneously, the offering prices. However, in the official derivative market these two functions are unlinked. Secondly, the liquidity provision is different because, unlike the options market, an electronic limit order book is employed to trade warrants. We exploit these different market structures to test whether differences in prices are actually observed.

As has been found in other countries, we show that warrants are significantly overpriced with respect to equivalent options, but the difference in prices in Spain is considerably larger than in other markets. We offer some insights that can partially

explain this fact. It appears that the creation of warrant markets may serve the speculator investor clientele for which liquidity is more important than a particular given price. We find that a higher relative price difference between warrants and options is positively correlated with the relative bid-ask spread, and negatively correlated with past trading volume. Unfortunately, bid-ask spreads on warrants are only slightly smaller than the corresponding bid-ask spreads for regular options. Thus, our data do not fully support the clientele hypothesis. In addition, our results show that the differences between warrant prices and option prices depend on the warrant issuer. This finding drives us to conduct the second analysis in this paper.

When comparing equivalent warrants with different issuers, neither market structure nor clientele reasons can be used to explain price differences. The evidence reported shows that warrants with the same characteristics but different issuers present significant divergences in prices. Interestingly, neither systematic mean difference in bid-ask spreads nor cross-sectional differences in bid-ask spreads are connected with these price differences. Moreover, credit risk associated with the issuer does not appear to be the reason behind the investor decisions when choosing a particular warrant because the three issuers that we compare have similar credit ratings. Our future research will analyse potential explanations of this surprising and new result. We suspect that the use of quotes instead of transaction prices may provide alternative explanations. In addition, we should carefully analyse the temporal evolution of our matching pairs to understand the dynamic behaviour of price differentials between alternative issuers.

References

Bartram, S.M. and F. Fehle, 2005, Alternative Market Structures for Derivatives, *SSRN Electronic Paper Collection*.

Bartram, S.M. and F. Fehle, 2007, Competition without Fungibility: Evidence from Alternative Market Structures for Derivatives, *Journal of Banking and Finance* 31, 659-677.

Biais, B. and T. Mariotti, 2005, Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design, *Review of Economic Studies* 72, 615-649.

Biais, B., L. Glosten and C. Spatt, 2005, Market Microstructure: A Survey of Microfoundations, Empirical Results, and Policy Implications, *Journal of Financial Markets* 8, 217-264.

Chan, K.C., W.G. Christie and P.H. Schultz, 1995, Market structure and intraday pattern of bid-ask spreads for NASDAQ securities, *Journal of Business* 68, 35-60.

Chan, H.W. and S. M. Pinder, 2000, The Value of Liquidity: Evidence from Derivatives Markets, *Pacific-Basin Finance Journal* 8, 483-503.

Chen, S., 2003, Valuation of Covered Warrant subject to Default Risk, *Review of Pacific-Basin Financial Markets and Policies* 6, 21-44.

Easley, D., N. Kiefer, M. O'Hara and J. Paperman, 1996, Liquidity, Information and Infrequently Traded Stocks, *Journal of Finance* 51, 1405-1446.

Fehle, F., 2006, Too Many Options? Theory and Evidence on Option Exchange Design, *Journal of Futures Markets* 26, 533-570.

Grossman, S.J. and M.H. Miller, 1988, Liquidity and Market Structure, *Journal of Finance* 48, 617-637.

Horst, J. and C. Veld, 2003, Behavioral Preferences for Individual Securities: The Case for Call Warrants and Call Options, *Working Paper, Tilburg University*.

Hull, J.C. and A. White, 1995, The Impact of Default Risk on the Prices of Options and other Derivative Securities, *Journal of Banking and Finance* 19, 299-322.

Kaul, G., M. Nimalendran and D. Zhang, 2004, Informed Trading and Options Spreads, *Working Paper, University of South Carolina*.

Klein, P., 1999, Pricing Black-Scholes Options with Correlated Credit Risk, *Journal of Banking and Finance* 25, 1211-1229.

McInish, T. and R.A. Wood, 1992, An analysis of Intraday Patterns in Bid/Ask Spreads for NYSE Stocks, *Journal of Finance* 47, 753-764.

Petrella, G., 2006, Option Bid-Ask Spread and Scalping Risk: Evidence from a covered warrants market, *Journal of Futures Markets* 26, 843-867.

Rubio, G. and M. Tapia, 1996, Adverse Selection, Volume, and Transactions around Dividend Announcements in a Continuous Auction System, *European Financial Management Journal* 2, 39-67.

Table 1. Market Design

This table shows the main characteristics of market design for MEFF (Option) and SIBE (Warrant) structures. Both markets coexist in Spain offering similar products.

	Option	Warrant
Market Regulator	MEFF RV (belongs to BME group)	<i>Sociedad de Bolsas Bolsa de Madrid</i> (belongs to BME group)
Market Supervision	<i>Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV)</i>	<i>Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV)</i>
Liquidity Supply	Quote-driven market	Hybrid market: LOB + Specialist
Order Type	Simple All or nothing Mixed -Combined	Limit Orders “Combinada”Order
Place	Electronic Market Investor members market	Electronic Market Investor Authorised Co.market
Open Auction	No	No
Close Auction	No	No
Session Time	9:00 – 17:35	9:00 – 17:30
Short Sales	Allowed (guarantees are needed)	Not Allowed
Priority Rules	Price-Time Mixed-Simple	Price-Time
Pre-arranged Trades	Among market members	Block Trades (ordinary session) Special Operations (Off-time)
Tick Prices	1 point = 1€(IBEX) 0.01€(shares)	0.01€
Price Limits	No	Static Range Dynamic Range
Transparency	Pre-trade: best bid and ask quotes + market depth Post-trade: last price + accumulated volume Actual time Anonymous traders	Pre-trade: 5 best bid and ask quotes + market depth associated Post-trade: last price + last volume Actual time Anonymous traders

Table 2. Security characteristics

This table shows the main products characteristics for MEFF (Option) and SIBE (Warrant) markets. Both markets coexist in Spain trading similar securities.

	Option		Warrant
Underlying Asset	Spanish Equity Options	IBEX35 Mini-Future	No rules (Local and Foreign. Equities National and International Indexes, Exchange Rates, Interest Rates, Commodities, etc.)
Size Contract	100 underlying assets	1 underlying asset	No rules (Ratio)
Exercise Style	American	European	No rules (American)
Expiration Date	3 rd Friday in March-June-September-December	3 rd Friday Monthly. At least the three nearest	No rules
Last Trading Day	Expiration date	Expiration date	Expiration date or the day before
Introduction of new contracts	One call – One Put The three nearest maturities Five strike prices		No rules
Strike Tick	0.05€for 0.05-0.95 0.10€for 1.00-4.90 ... 10€for >200€	100 points if DtM>2 months 50 points if DtM<2 months	No rules

Table 3. Comparing Option and Warrant Markets: Trading Volume

The table shows total trading volume (in millions €) in option and warrant markets during 2003. We distinguish between the volume traded in call and put options for each market, as well as the underlying. Then, we check for the overlapping level between these two markets. To do this, we check trading volume over the same underlying asset, the same expiration date and the same product (in terms of underlying, expiration and strike).

	Option		Warrant	
Total	1043.9		1609.8	
Call	623.86	59.76%	1028	63.86%
Put	419.96	40.23%	581.79	36.14%
Stock	545.59	52.26%	1059.6	65.82%
(no. of underlying)	(20)		(27)	
Market Index	498.35	47.74%	424.87	26.39%
(no. of underlying)	(1)		(1)	
Same Underlying Asset				
All	1043.9	100.00%	1472.3	91.46%
Individual Stocks	545.59	100.00%	1047.5	98.85%
First Five Stocks	438.748	80.42%	936.167	88.35%
Same Expiration Date				
All	963.722	92.32%	1423.454	88.42%
Stock	545.461	100.00%	1014.622	96.86%
Market Index	418.134	83.90%	408.832	96.23%
Same Underlying, Expiration Date, and Strike Price				
All	234.54	22.47%	1339.6	83.21%
Stock	152.13	27.89%	932.14	88.99%
Market Index	82.413	16.54%	407.43	95.90%

Table 4. Equivalent Options and Warrants

This table shows the number of coincidences between contracts in option and warrant markets. We start from the total number of contracts in each market to extract the total number of coincidences. We analyse these coincidences by distinguishing between individual stocks and the underlying index, call and put options, and expiration dates.

All Underlying Assets and Option Types								
No. Option	No. Warrant		Coin. No. Option		Coin. No Warrant			
12490	1684		1007		1278			
			8.06%		75.89%			
Individual Stocks								
	CALL				PUT			
	No. O	No. W	Coin. O	Coin. W	No. O	No. W	Coin. O	Coin. W
21/03/2003	885	96	55	66	885	58	40	42
			6.21%	68.75%			4.52%	72.41%
20/06/2003	798	170	76	98	798	72	46	54
			9.52%	57.65%			5.76%	75.00%
19/09/2003	692	40	0	0	692	17	9	9
			0.00%	0.00%			1.30%	52.94%
19/12/2003	814	281	156	244	814	132	87	129
			19.16%	86.83%			10.69%	97.73%
19/03/2004	682	139	80	96	682	71	49	55
			11.73%	69.06%			7.18%	77.46%
18/06/2004	593	111	70	79	593	50	36	40
			11.80%	71.17%			6.07%	80.00%
17/09/2004	595	98	77	94	595	69	59	69
			12.94%	95.92%			9.92%	100.00%
17/12/2004	325	53	30	32	325	29	19	19
			9.23%	60.38%			5.85%	65.52%
All dates	5384	988	544	709	5384	498	345	417
			10.10%	71.76%			6.41%	83.73%
Market Index								
	CALL				PUT			
	No. O	No. W	No. O	No. W	No. O	No. W	No. O	No. W
17/01/2003	81	6	0	0	81	4	3	3
			0.00%	0.00%			3.70%	75.00%
21/03/2003	151	12	11	11	151	7	7	7
			7.28%	91.67%			4.64%	100.00%
20/06/2003	141	16	6	8	141	9	7	9
			4.26%	50.00%			4.96%	100.00%
19/09/2003	131	5	0	0	131	3	2	2
			0.00%	0.00%			1.53%	66.67%
19/12/2003	101	24	8	16	101	15	11	15
			7.92%	66.67%			10.89%	100.00%
19/03/2004	127	17	12	16	127	10	7	10
			9.45%	94.12%			5.51%	100.00%
18/06/2004	41	18	9	12	41	10	7	8
			21.95%	66.67%			17.07%	80.00%
17/09/2004	41	13	8	10	41	9	7	9
			19.51%	76.92%			17.07%	100.00%
17/12/2004	47	15	9	12	47	5	4	4
			19.15%	80.00%			8.51%	80.00%
All dates.	861	126	63	85	861	72	55	67
			7.32%	67.46%			6.39%	93.06%

Table 5. Relative Price Difference between Equivalent Warrants and Options

This table shows the differences in transaction prices over a matched sample of equivalent options and warrants. We use intraday data for options and warrants during the year 2003. P_w and P_o denote warrant and option transaction prices respectively. We compute the mean and median of the price difference and we test whether these differences are significantly different from zero by a t-test and Wilcoxon test, respectively. We also distinguish between call or put options, stocks or market index, and among the different warrant issuers. Panel A provides the statistics for price pairs with no more than one hour distance between transactions; in Panel B the price matching criterion is a maximum time of 7.5 minutes between transactions; the results in Panel C correspond to the criterion of matching transactions with the closest volume with a time difference of less than one hour. Finally, Panel D contains the results for transaction pairs with the same restriction as in Panel C but now the trading volume in the warrant contract is a multiple of 100 (only for options on stocks). All means and medians in this table are significantly different from zero at 1%.

Panel A: Maximum time between transactions of one hour						
	No. Pairs	$P_w = P_o$	$P_w > P_o$	$P_w < P_o$	Mean	Median
All	12363	192	11629	542	37.49%	25.00%
Call	7163	105	6618	440	38.60%	25.00%
Put	5200	87	5011	102	35.96%	25.00%
Stock	6052	158	5453	441	30.39%	19.45%
Market Index	6311	34	6176	101	44.29%	29.31%
Issuer 1	8436	174	7899	363	26.36%	19.05%
Issuer 4	356	8	329	19	20.68%	12.50%
Issuer 5	22	0	22	0	18.67%	17.27%
Issuer 6	273	0	258	15	101.03%	105.13%
Issuer 7	1032	0	1008	24	89.02%	71.43%
Issuer 9	2244	10	2113	121	50.74%	40.97%
Panel B: Maximum time between transactions of 7.5 minutes						
	No. Pairs	$P_w = P_o$	$P_w > P_o$	$P_w < P_o$	Mean	Median
All	4810	87	4537	186	29.73%	19.36%
Call	2609	43	2426	140	30.75%	19.23%
Put	2201	44	2111	46	28.53%	19.44%
Stock	2102	65	1902	135	25.04%	15.39%
Market Index	2708	22	2635	51	33.37%	22.64%
Issuer 1	3965	83	3736	146	23.42%	17.26%
Issuer 4	89	1	86	2	18.84%	12.47%
Issuer 5	7	0	7	0	27.56%	22.22%
Issuer 6	83	0	80	3	105.21%	114.29%
Issuer 7	182	0	172	10	94.45%	80.33%
Issuer 9	484	3	456	25	46.19%	40.00%
Panel C: Maximum time between transactions one hour and closest volume						
	No. Pairs	$P_w = P_o$	$P_w > P_o$	$P_w < P_o$	Mean	Median
All	9135	165	8521	449	33.37%	22.22%
Call	5203	96	4767	340	33.70%	22.22%
Put	3932	69	3754	109	32.93%	22.22%
Stock	4264	128	3783	353	26.73%	16.76%
Market Index	4871	37	4738	96	39.18%	26.54%
Issuer 1	6865	149	6380	336	24.78%	18.42%
Issuer 4	215	4	201	10	20.10%	12.75%
Issuer 5	14	0	14	0	18.57%	18.82%
Issuer 6	198	0	194	4	111.16%	115.38%
Issuer 7	498	1	483	14	89.11%	70.41%
Issuer 9	1345	11	1249	85	47.39%	39.93%
Panel D: One hour, closest volume, and multiples of 100 underlying assets for warrants						
	No. Pairs	$P_w = P_o$	$P_w > P_o$	$P_w < P_o$	Mean	Median
All	3447	120	3075	252	26.59%	17.16%
Call	2305	74	2020	211	25.86%	16.67%
Put	1142	46	1055	41	28.05%	17.86%
Issuer 1	2675	114	2339	222	20.08%	13.51%
Issuer 4	11	0	8	3	33.87%	40.13%
Issuer 5	14	0	14	0	18.57%	18.82%
Issuer 6	15	0	14	1	116.25%	66.67%
Issuer 7	173	0	166	7	62.23%	56.25%
Issuer 9	559	6	534	19	44.34%	39.13%

**Table 6. Relative Price Difference between Equivalent Warrants and Options:
Buy- and Sell-initiated Trades**

This table shows the differences in transaction prices over a matched sample of equivalent options and warrants. We use intraday data for options and warrants during the year 2003. P_w and P_o denote warrant and option transaction prices respectively. We compute the mean and median of the price difference and we test whether these differences are significantly different from zero by a t-test and Wilcoxon test, respectively. We also distinguish between call or put options, stocks or market index, and among the different warrant issuers. We now split trading between buy- and sell-initiated trades. The transactions are matched following the closest volume criterion with a time difference of less than one hour between the two trades. All means and medians in this table are significantly different from zero at 1%

Panel A: Buy-initiated						
	No. Pairs	$P_w = P_o$	$P_w > P_o$	$P_w < P_o$	Mean	Median
All	5153	83	4812	258	33.96%	22.55%
Call	3012	57	2761	194	34.18%	22.41%
Put	2141	26	2051	64	33.64%	22.73%
Stocks	2461	67	2192	202	26.88%	17.65%
Market Index	2692	16	2620	56	40.43%	27.12%
Issuer 1	3790	72	3543	175	24.99%	19.16%
Issuer 4	142	1	137	4	21.89%	13.76%
Issuer 5	4	0	4	0	24.79%	25.02%
Issuer 6	94	0	90	4	107.07%	108.37%
Issuer 7	315	0	309	6	91.67%	71.43%
Issuer 9	808	10	729	69	47.20%	40.97%
Panel B: Sell-initiated						
	No. Pairs	$P_w = P_o$	$P_w > P_o$	$P_w < P_o$	Mean	Median
All	3982	82	3709	191	32.60%	21.62%
Call	2191	39	2006	146	33.03%	21.62%
Put	1791	43	1703	45	32.07%	21.62%
Stocks	1803	61	1591	151	26.53%	15.39%
Market Index	2179	21	2118	40	37.62%	25.00%
Issuer 1	3075	77	2837	161	24.52%	17.65%
Issuer 4	73	3	64	6	16.63%	12.18%
Issuer 5	10	0	10	0	16.08%	14.05%
Issuer 6	104	0	104	0	114.86%	120.29%
Issuer 7	183	1	174	8	84.71%	69.23%
Issuer 9	537	1	520	16	47.68%	38.30%

Table 7. Difference in Relative Spread between Equivalent Warrants and Options

This table shows the differences in relative spreads over a matched sample of equivalent options and warrants. We use intraday data for options and warrants during the year 2003. SP_w and SP_o denote warrant and option pre-trade relative spreads respectively. We compute the mean and median of the difference between the two relative spreads (warrant minus option) and we test whether these differences are significantly different from zero by a t-test and Wilcoxon test, respectively. We also distinguish between call or put options, stocks or market index, and among the different warrant issuers. (*) and (**) denote that the corresponding test differs from zero at 1% and 5% of the significance level, respectively.

	No. Pairs	$SP_w = SP_o$	$SP_w > SP_o$	$SP_w < SP_o$	Mean	Median
All	6781	41	3318	3422	3.75%*	-0.04%*
Call	3776	28	1840	1908	5.58%*	-0.07%*
Put	3005	13	1478	1514	1.45%*	-0.03%
Stocks	2882	41	1216	1625	5.53%*	-0.47%
Market Index	3899	0	2102	1797	2.43%*	0.27%*
Issuer 1	5502	32	2674	2796	3.15%*	-0.06%*
Issuer 4	135	1	88	46	1.15%	1.00%
Issuer 5	10	0	3	7	-0.47%	-0.92%
Issuer 6	91	0	35	56	-0.49%	-1.82%*
Issuer 7	261	0	106	155	-1.77%*	-1.11%*
Issuer 9	782	8	412	362	10.75%*	0.36%*

**Table 8. Determinants of the Relative Price Difference
between Equivalent Options and Warrants**

This table reports the estimated OLS coefficients from a regression of the relative price difference between equivalent warrants and options on the variables displayed in the first column of the table. Heterokedasticity consistent standard errors. P-values are reported in parentheses. *MONEY* denotes the moneyness degree; *TTE* is the number of days to maturity; *RVOL* is the ratio between the trading volume of options and the matched warrant (in number of underlying assets) during the 15-day period preceding the transaction day; *RSP* is the ratio of the relative pre-trade spread of matching pairs of options to warrants; *CALL* is a dummy variable for the option type; *OPEN* is a dummy for transactions that take place from 09:00 to 11:00; *CLOSE* is a dummy for transactions that take place in the last two hours in the session; *D_i* records pairs in which the warrant issuer is the number *i*: 1, 4, 6, and 7.

	All	Stocks	Market Index
Constant	0.4385 (0.00)	0.3647 (0.00)	0.5411 (0.00)
MONEY	-3.1635 (0.00)	-2.5701 (0.00)	-3.5372 (0.00)
TTE	0.0008 (0.00)	0.0011 (0.00)	0.0005 (0.00)
RVOL	-0.0004 (0.08)	-0.0003 (0.11)	-0.0012 (0.03)
RSP	0.0082 (0.06)	0.0244 (0.00)	0.0044 (0.25)
CALL	0.0536 (0.00)	0.0214 (0.07)	0.1024 (0.00)
OPEN	0.0214 (0.02)	0.0022 (0.88)	0.0224 (0.03)
CLOSE	-0.0012 (0.87)	-0.0219 (0.06)	0.0129 (0.12)
D₁	-0.2984 (0.00)	-0.2686 (0.00)	-0.3889 (0.00)
D₄	-0.3691 (0.00)	-0.3554 (0.00)	-0.4534 (0.00)
D₆	0.5294 (0.00)	1.1853 (0.00)	0.3620 (0.00)
D₇	0.3423 (0.00)	0.1027 (0.02)	0.4659 (0.00)
No. Pairs	6781	2882	3899
R²	45%	37%	57%

Table 9. Comparing Warrant Issuers: Trading Volume

This table shows trading volume (in million €) in the warrant market during 2003 with the same underlying as in the option market (20 stocks + 1 index). We obtain the percentage of activities that have an identical product from another issuer (in terms of underlying, style and expiration). We distinguish between call and put, stock and index, and we compute separate statistics for the five most important stocks. Finally, we compute the same numbers for the three major warrant issuers in the market (1, 7 and 9)

Whole market				
	All issuers		Issuers 1, 7 and 9.	
Total	1472.3	100.00%	1401.4	95.18%
Call	939.3	63.80%	900.4	61.16%
Put	532.9	36.20%	501.0	34.03%
Same Underlying, Expiration Date, and Strike Price				
	All issuers		Issuers 1, 7 and 9.	
All	1146.0	77.84%	1123.7	76.32%
Call	920.1	62.49%	903.5	61.38%
Put	225.9	15.35%	220.2	14.95%
Market Index	340.8	23.14%	337.5	22.93%
Individual Stocks	805.3	54.70%	786.2	53.40%
First Five	767.3	52.11%	752.2	51.09%

Table 10. Relative Price Differences between Equivalent Warrants

This table shows the differences in transaction prices over a matched sample of equivalent warrants from different issuers. We use 2003 intraday data to obtain our matched sample. P_{wi} denotes i-warrant transaction price, while P_{wj} is the j-warrant transaction price. We compute the mean and median of the difference (i-warrant minus j-warrant) and we test whether these differences are significantly different from zero by a t-test and Wilcoxon test, respectively. We also distinguish between call or put options and stocks or market index. Panels A, B and C show price comparison between the different selected issuers. (*) and (**) denote that the corresponding test differs from zero at 1% and 5% of the significance level, respectively.

Panel A: Issuer i – Issuer j ($i=7, j=1$)						
	No. Pairs	$P_{wi} = P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} > P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} < P_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	6496	176	3920	2400	17.58%*	6.87%*
Call	3177	55	2972	150	32.11%*	26.58%*
Put	3319	121	948	2250	3.67%*	-3.03%*
Stocks	1340	29	1253	58	31.30%*	27.59%*
Market Index	5156	147	2667	2342	14.02%*	1.08%*
Panel B: Issuer i – Issuer j ($i=9, j=1$)						
	No. Pairs	$P_{wi} = P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} > P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} < P_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	12246	254	11451	541	18.44%*	16.88%*
Call	7992	184	7354	454	19.00%*	18.37%*
Put	4254	70	4097	87	17.39%*	12.00%*
Stocks	7465	212	6830	423	19.59%*	17.71%*
Market Index	4781	42	4621	118	16.64%*	14.94%*
Panel C: Issuer i – Issuer j ($i=9, j=7$)						
	No. Pairs	$P_{wi} = P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} > P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} < P_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	573	18	202	353	-5.47%*	-7.41%*
Call	305	9	53	243	-9.60%*	-10.94%*
Put	268	9	149	110	-0.78%	3.57%
Stocks	306	6	51	249	-9.82%*	-10.87%*
Market Index	267	12	151	104	-0.50%	4.76%

**Table 11. Relative Price Difference between Equivalent Warrants:
Buy- and Sell-initiated Trades**

This table shows the differences in transaction prices over a matched sample of equivalent warrants from different issuers. We compare buy- and sell-initiated trades. We use 2003 intraday data to obtain our matched sample. P_{wi} denotes i-warrant transaction price, while P_{wj} is the j-warrant transaction price. We compute the mean and median of the difference (i-warrant minus j-warrant) and we test whether these differences are significantly different from zero by a t-test and Wilcoxon test, respectively. We also distinguish between call or put options and stocks or market index. Panels A, B and C show price comparison between the different selected issuers. (*) and (**) denote that the corresponding test differs from zero at 1% and 5% of the significance level, respectively.

Panel A: Issuer i – Issuer j ($i=7, j=1$)						
<i>Buy-initiated</i>	No. Pairs	$P_{wi} = P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} > P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} < P_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	3634	85	2274	1275	19.03%*	8.53%*
Call	1812	16	1720	76	33.05%*	27.27%*
Put	1822	69	554	1199	5.09%*	-2.93%*
Stocks	775	14	717	44	31.43%*	27.27%*
Market Index	2859	71	1557	1231	15.68%*	2.33%*
<i>Sell-initiated</i>	No. Pairs	$P_{wi} = P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} > P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} < P_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	2862	91	1646	1125	15.73%*	5.16%*
Call	1365	39	1252	74	30.87%*	25.62%*
Put	1497	52	394	1051	1.94%*	-3.45%*
Stocks	565	15	536	14	31.12%*	28.95%*
Market Index	2297	76	1110	1111	11.95%*	0.00%*
Panel B: Issuer i – Issuer j ($i=9, j=1$)						
<i>Buy-initiated</i>	No. Pairs	$P_{wi} = P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} > P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} < P_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	6991	133	6593	265	19.15%*	17.39%*
Call	4619	96	4305	218	19.89%*	18.70%*
Put	2372	37	2288	47	17.71%*	12.48%*
Stocks	4280	105	3961	214	20.46%*	18.52%*
Market Index	2711	28	2632	51	17.09%*	15.25%*
<i>Sell-initiated</i>	No. Pairs	$P_{wi} = P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} > P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} < P_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	5255	121	4858	276	17.50%*	16.17%*
Call	3373	88	3049	236	17.78%*	17.95%*
Put	1882	33	1809	40	16.98%*	11.43%*
Stocks	3185	107	2869	209	18.43%*	16.67%*
Market Index	2070	14	1989	67	16.06%*	14.56%*
Panel C: Issuer i – Issuer j ($i=9, j=7$)						
<i>Buy-initiated</i>	No. Pairs	$P_{wi} = P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} > P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} < P_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	328	11	113	204	-5.97%*	-7.82%*
Call	172	7	28	137	-10.37%*	-11.87%*
Put	156	4	85	67	-1.11%	3.25%
Stocks	172	3	27	142	-10.92%*	-11.97%*
Market Index	156	8	86	62	-0.51%	4.20%
<i>Sell-initiated</i>	No. Pairs	$P_{wi} = P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} > P_{wj}$	$P_{wi} < P_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	245	7	89	149	-4.81%*	-5.59%*
Call	133	2	25	106	-8.59%*	-10.18%*
Put	112	5	64	43	-0.32%	5.95%
Stocks	134	3	24	107	-8.40%*	-9.79%*
Market Index	111	4	65	42	-0.47%	5.26%

Table 12. Difference in Relative Spread between Equivalent Warrants

This table shows the differences in relative spread over a matched sample of equivalent warrants from different issuers. We use intraday data for warrants during the year 2003. SP_{wi} and SP_{wj} denote i-warrant and j-warrant pre-trade relative spread, respectively. We compute the mean and median of the difference (i-warrant minus j-warrant) and we test whether these differences are significantly different from zero by a t-test and Wilcoxon test, respectively. We also distinguish between call or put, stocks or market index. Panels A, B and C show price comparison between the different selected issuers. (*) and (**) denote that the corresponding test differs from zero at 1% and 5% of the significance level, respectively

Panel A: Issuer i – Issuer j ($i=7, j=1$)						
	No. Pairs	$SP_{wi} = SP_{wj}$	$SP_{wi} > SP_{wj}$	$SP_{wi} < SP_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	5126	33	3454	1639	-0.68*	0.64*
Call	2381	18	1321	1042	-1.56*	0.45**
Put	2745	15	2133	597	0.08	0.70*
Stocks	1033	21	160	852	-2.84*	-0.64*
Market Index	4093	12	3294	787	-0.14	0.72*
Panel B: Issuer i – Issuer j ($i=9, j=1$)						
	No. Pairs	$SP_{wi} = SP_{wj}$	$SP_{wi} > SP_{wj}$	$SP_{wi} < SP_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	9538	79	5537	3922	4.09*	0.61*
Call	6217	47	3362	2808	5.12*	0.60*
Put	3321	32	2175	1114	2.17*	0.62*
Stocks	5634	76	2386	3172	4.62*	-0.17*
Market Index	3904	3	3151	750	3.33*	0.75*
Panel C: Issuer i – Issuer j ($i=9, j=7$)						
	No. Pairs	$SP_{wi} = SP_{wj}$	$SP_{wi} > SP_{wj}$	$SP_{wi} < SP_{wj}$	Mean	Median
All	411	17	233	161	3.27*	0.14*
Call	213	9	129	75	5.19*	0.14*
Put	198	8	104	86	1.21*	0.15*
Stocks	228	8	140	80	4.64*	0.15*
Market Index	183	9	93	81	1.56*	0.08*

**Table 13. Determinants of the Relative Price Difference
between Equivalent Warrants.**

This table reports the estimated OLS coefficients from a regression of the relative price difference between equivalent warrants from different issuers on the variables displayed in the first column of the table. Heterokedasticity consistent standard errors. P-values are reported in parentheses. *MONEY* denotes the moneyness degree; *TTE* is the number of days to maturity; *RVOL* is the ratio between the trading volume of options and the matched warrant (in number of underlying assets) during the 15 days preceding the transaction day; *RSP* represents the ratio of the relative spread of matching pairs of options to warrants just before transaction; *CALL* is a dummy variable for the option type; *OPEN* is a dummy for transactions that take place from 09:00 to 11:00; *CLOSE* is a dummy for transactions that take place in the last two hours in the session.

	Issuer 7 – Issuer 1			Issuer 9 – Issuer 1			Issuer 9 – Issuer 7		
	All	Stocks	Market Index	All	Stocks	Market Index	All	Stocks	Market Index
Constant	0.6861 (0.00)	0.5003 (0.00)	0.8094 (0.00)	0.3123 (0.00)	0.3217 (0.00)	0.2490 (0.00)	-0.1161 (0.00)	-0.0307 (0.29)	-0.3275 (0.00)
MONEY	-1.0055 (0.00)	-2.2603 (0.00)	-0.5498 (0.00)	-0.9618 (0.00)	-0.8662 (0.00)	-1.2497 (0.00)	0.6806 (0.00)	0.5310 (0.00)	1.0203 (0.00)
TTE	-0.0024 (0.00)	-0.0014 (0.00)	-0.0028 (0.00)	-0.0006 (0.00)	-0.0008 (0.00)	-0.0003 (0.00)	0.0003 (0.00)	-0.0001 (0.25)	0.0014 (0.00)
RVOL	-1.9E-5 (0.00)	-0.0004 (0.00)	-1.8E-5 (0.00)	0.0003 (0.00)	0.0011 (0.00)	-0.0001 (0.00)	0.0290 (0.00)	0.0591 (0.00)	-0.0060 (0.12)
RSP	0.0005 (0.29)	-0.0005 (0.25)	0.0010 (0.40)	0.0005 (0.00)	0.0009 (0.00)	-2.8E-5 (0.84)	0.0062 (0.07)	0.0085 (0.54)	0.0000 (0.99)
CALL	0.1370 (0.00)	0.1911 (0.00)	0.1262 (0.00)	-0.0109 (0.00)	-0.0059 (0.15)	0.0387 (0.00)	-0.0759 (0.00)	-0.0986 (0.00)	0.0272 (0.09)
OPEN	-0.0234 (0.00)	0.0082 (0.57)	-0.0332 (0.00)	-0.0215 (0.00)	-0.0237 (0.00)	-0.0081 (0.02)	-0.0204 (0.07)	-0.0162 (0.17)	-0.0051 (0.71)
CLOSE	0.0014 (0.83)	-0.0005 (0.97)	-0.0020 (0.78)	-0.0213 (0.00)	-0.0269 (0.00)	-0.0117 (0.00)	-0.0242 (0.05)	-0.0090 (0.54)	-0.0255 (0.08)
No. Pairs	5126	1033	4093	9540	5636	3904	411	228	183
R²	56%	53%	59%	35%	34%	53%	41%	35%	72%

Figure I. Traded Contracts




Figure II. Price Pairs Distribution






Figure III. Time to Expiration and Moneyness of Transaction Pairs



APPENDIX: MCO Variables Description

This table summarises MCO regression variables. We include a brief description of each variable and the units in which they are measured.

Variable	Description	Units
<i>RP</i>	Dependent variable. Relative price difference for matched trades.	No units
<i>RSP</i>	Independent variable. Ratio between the relative spread just before each trade. Liquidity measure.	No units
<i>RVOL</i>	Independent variable. Ratio between trading volume during the 15 days preceding each trade. Liquidity measure.	No units.
<i>MONEY</i>	Independent variable. Moneyness degree, that is, the comparison (ratio) between the strike and the underlying price. Control Variable.	No units.
<i>TTE</i>	Independent variable. Time to expiration. Control Variable.	Number of days
<i>OPEN</i>	Independent dummy variable controlling for the beginning of the trading session.	1/0
<i>CLOSE</i>	Independent dummy variable controlling for the end of the trading session	1/0
<i>CALL</i>	Independent dummy variable considering the type of option	1/0
<i>D_j</i>	Independent dummy variable controlling for warrant issuer. Only in option-warrant MCO regression.	1/0

Footnotes

-
- ¹ Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005) provide an excellent survey of the market microstructure literature.
- ² See Kaul, Nimalendran and Zhang (2004) for a recent study on the components of the bid-ask spread on derivative markets.
- ³ Interestingly, since 2003, both markets, the regular stock exchange operating under SIBE and MEFF, belong to the same holding corporation known as BME (*Bolsas y Mercados Españoles*).
- ⁴ See Fehle (2006) for a theoretical discussion on the option exchange design.
- ⁵ The scale in both graphs is not comparable given that the size contract in options is larger than in warrants.
- ⁶ Ratio refers to the size of the contract: the number of underlying assets associated to one warrant.
- ⁷ Chan and Pinder (2000), Bartram and Fehle (2006), or Petrella (2006) are some examples.
- ⁸ We only report the results referring to these two temporal criteria, but we also analysed the price differences with half an hour and 15 minutes as the maximum temporal distance.
- ⁹ Petrella (2006) for the Italian case is another example. Horst and Veld (2003) report an average overvaluation in the Euronext Amsterdam exchange between 25 and 30 per cent for warrants when they compare market prices with theoretical prices given by three popular option pricing models. This is, of course, a different exercise.
- ¹⁰ In the case of the German market, Bartram and Felhe (2006) find an average bid-ask spread of 2.8 percent in Euwax while the bid-ask spread in Eurex is 7.1percent.
- ¹¹ Because of this high correlation, we use the residual from *MONEY* on *TTE* when including the two variables in the regression below.
- ¹² See McInish and Wood (1992) and Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) for the US market and Rubio and Tapia (1996) for the Spanish market.
- ¹³ For that reason, we limit our posterior analysis to these three issuers.
- ¹⁴ See Hull and White (1995), Klein (1999) or Chen (2003) as examples.
- ¹⁵ Given the inconsistencies in the estimates associated to the liquidity variables and the possible relationship among these variables and others such as the moment of the trading session when the transaction takes place, we carry a new regression that includes the interactions between the two liquidity variables and the three dummies: call, open and close. Once again, it is not possible to extract clear

conclusions of these new results. For space reasons, we do not present these results although they are available upon request.

FUNDACIÓN DE LAS CAJAS DE AHORROS

DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO

Últimos números publicados

- 159/2000 Participación privada en la construcción y explotación de carreteras de peaje
Ginés de Rus, Manuel Romero y Lourdes Trujillo
- 160/2000 Errores y posibles soluciones en la aplicación del *Value at Risk*
Mariano González Sánchez
- 161/2000 Tax neutrality on saving assets. The spanish case before and after the tax reform
Cristina Ruza y de Paz-Curbera
- 162/2000 Private rates of return to human capital in Spain: new evidence
F. Barceinas, J. Oliver-Alonso, J.L. Raymond y J.L. Roig-Sabaté
- 163/2000 El control interno del riesgo. Una propuesta de sistema de límites
riesgo neutral
Mariano González Sánchez
- 164/2001 La evolución de las políticas de gasto de las Administraciones Públicas en los años 90
Alfonso Utrilla de la Hoz y Carmen Pérez Esparrells
- 165/2001 Bank cost efficiency and output specification
Emili Tortosa-Ausina
- 166/2001 Recent trends in Spanish income distribution: A robust picture of falling income inequality
Josep Oliver-Alonso, Xavier Ramos y José Luis Raymond-Bara
- 167/2001 Efectos redistributivos y sobre el bienestar social del tratamiento de las cargas familiares en
el nuevo IRPF
Nuria Badenes Plá, Julio López Laborda, Jorge Onrubia Fernández
- 168/2001 The Effects of Bank Debt on Financial Structure of Small and Medium Firms in some Euro-
pean Countries
Mónica Melle-Hernández
- 169/2001 La política de cohesión de la UE ampliada: la perspectiva de España
Ismael Sanz Labrador
- 170/2002 Riesgo de liquidez de Mercado
Mariano González Sánchez
- 171/2002 Los costes de administración para el afiliado en los sistemas de pensiones basados en cuentas
de capitalización individual: medida y comparación internacional.
José Enrique Devesa Carpio, Rosa Rodríguez Barrera, Carlos Vidal Meliá
- 172/2002 La encuesta continua de presupuestos familiares (1985-1996): descripción, representatividad
y propuestas de metodología para la explotación de la información de los ingresos y el gasto.
Llorenç Pou, Joaquín Alegre
- 173/2002 Modelos paramétricos y no paramétricos en problemas de concesión de tarjetas de credito.
Rosa Puertas, María Bonilla, Ignacio Olmeda

- 174/2002 Mercado único, comercio intra-industrial y costes de ajuste en las manufacturas españolas.
José Vicente Blanes Cristóbal
- 175/2003 La Administración tributaria en España. Un análisis de la gestión a través de los ingresos y de los gastos.
Juan de Dios Jiménez Aguilera, Pedro Enrique Barrilao González
- 176/2003 The Falling Share of Cash Payments in Spain.
Santiago Carbó Valverde, Rafael López del Paso, David B. Humphrey
Publicado en "Moneda y Crédito" nº 217, pags. 167-189.
- 177/2003 Effects of ATMs and Electronic Payments on Banking Costs: The Spanish Case.
Santiago Carbó Valverde, Rafael López del Paso, David B. Humphrey
- 178/2003 Factors explaining the interest margin in the banking sectors of the European Union.
Joaquín Maudos y Juan Fernández Guevara
- 179/2003 Los planes de stock options para directivos y consejeros y su valoración por el mercado de valores en España.
Mónica Melle Hernández
- 180/2003 Ownership and Performance in Europe and US Banking – A comparison of Commercial, Co-operative & Savings Banks.
Yener Altunbas, Santiago Carbó y Phil Molyneux
- 181/2003 The Euro effect on the integration of the European stock markets.
Mónica Melle Hernández
- 182/2004 In search of complementarity in the innovation strategy: international R&D and external knowledge acquisition.
Bruno Cassiman, Reinhilde Veugelers
- 183/2004 Fijación de precios en el sector público: una aplicación para el servicio municipal de suministro de agua.
M^a Ángeles García Valiñas
- 184/2004 Estimación de la economía sumergida en España: un modelo estructural de variables latentes.
Ángel Alañón Pardo, Miguel Gómez de Antonio
- 185/2004 Causas políticas y consecuencias sociales de la corrupción.
Joan Oriol Prats Cabrera
- 186/2004 Loan bankers' decisions and sensitivity to the audit report using the belief revision model.
Andrés Guiral Contreras and José A. Gonzalo Angulo
- 187/2004 El modelo de Black, Derman y Toy en la práctica. Aplicación al mercado español.
Marta Tolentino García-Abadillo y Antonio Díaz Pérez
- 188/2004 Does market competition make banks perform well?.
Mónica Melle
- 189/2004 Efficiency differences among banks: external, technical, internal, and managerial
Santiago Carbó Valverde, David B. Humphrey y Rafael López del Paso

- 190/2004 Una aproximación al análisis de los costes de la esquizofrenia en España: los modelos jerárquicos bayesianos
F. J. Vázquez-Polo, M. A. Negrín, J. M. Cavasés, E. Sánchez y grupo RIRAG
- 191/2004 Environmental proactivity and business performance: an empirical analysis
Javier González-Benito y Óscar González-Benito
- 192/2004 Economic risk to beneficiaries in notional defined contribution accounts (NDCs)
Carlos Vidal-Meliá, Inmaculada Domínguez-Fabian y José Enrique Devesa-Carpio
- 193/2004 Sources of efficiency gains in port reform: non parametric malmquist decomposition tfp index for Mexico
Antonio Estache, Beatriz Tovar de la Fé y Lourdes Trujillo
- 194/2004 Persistencia de resultados en los fondos de inversión españoles
Alfredo Ciriaco Fernández y Rafael Santamaría Aquilué
- 195/2005 El modelo de revisión de creencias como aproximación psicológica a la formación del juicio del auditor sobre la gestión continuada
Andrés Guiral Contreras y Francisco Esteso Sánchez
- 196/2005 La nueva financiación sanitaria en España: descentralización y prospectiva
David Cantarero Prieto
- 197/2005 A cointegration analysis of the Long-Run supply response of Spanish agriculture to the common agricultural policy
José A. Mendez, Ricardo Mora y Carlos San Juan
- 198/2005 ¿Refleja la estructura temporal de los tipos de interés del mercado español preferencia por la liquidez?
Magdalena Massot Perelló y Juan M. Nave
- 199/2005 Análisis de impacto de los Fondos Estructurales Europeos recibidos por una economía regional: Un enfoque a través de Matrices de Contabilidad Social
M. Carmen Lima y M. Alejandro Cardenete
- 200/2005 Does the development of non-cash payments affect monetary policy transmission?
Santiago Carbó Valverde y Rafael López del Paso
- 201/2005 Firm and time varying technical and allocative efficiency: an application for port cargo handling firms
Ana Rodríguez-Álvarez, Beatriz Tovar de la Fe y Lourdes Trujillo
- 202/2005 Contractual complexity in strategic alliances
Jeffrey J. Reuer y Africa Ariño
- 203/2005 Factores determinantes de la evolución del empleo en las empresas adquiridas por opa
Nuria Alcalde Fradejas y Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar
- 204/2005 Nonlinear Forecasting in Economics: a comparison between Comprehension Approach versus Learning Approach. An Application to Spanish Time Series
Elena Olmedo, Juan M. Valderas, Ricardo Gimeno and Lorenzo Escot

- 205/2005 Precio de la tierra con presión urbana: un modelo para España
Esther Decimavilla, Carlos San Juan y Stefan Sperlich
- 206/2005 Interregional migration in Spain: a semiparametric analysis
Adolfo Maza y José Villaverde
- 207/2005 Productivity growth in European banking
Carmen Murillo-Melchor, José Manuel Pastor y Emili Tortosa-Ausina
- 208/2005 Explaining Bank Cost Efficiency in Europe: Environmental and Productivity Influences.
Santiago Carbó Valverde, David B. Humphrey y Rafael López del Paso
- 209/2005 La elasticidad de sustitución intertemporal con preferencias no separables intratemporalmente: los casos de Alemania, España y Francia.
Elena Márquez de la Cruz, Ana R. Martínez Cañete y Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar
- 210/2005 Contribución de los efectos tamaño, book-to-market y momentum a la valoración de activos: el caso español.
Begoña Font-Belaire y Alfredo Juan Grau-Grau
- 211/2005 Permanent income, convergence and inequality among countries
José M. Pastor and Lorenzo Serrano
- 212/2005 The Latin Model of Welfare: Do 'Insertion Contracts' Reduce Long-Term Dependence?
Luis Ayala and Magdalena Rodríguez
- 213/2005 The effect of geographic expansion on the productivity of Spanish savings banks
Manuel Illueca, José M. Pastor and Emili Tortosa-Ausina
- 214/2005 Dynamic network interconnection under consumer switching costs
Ángel Luis López Rodríguez
- 215/2005 La influencia del entorno socioeconómico en la realización de estudios universitarios: una aproximación al caso español en la década de los noventa
Marta Rahona López
- 216/2005 The valuation of spanish ipos: efficiency analysis
Susana Álvarez Otero
- 217/2005 On the generation of a regular multi-input multi-output technology using parametric output distance functions
Sergio Perelman and Daniel Santin
- 218/2005 La gobernanza de los procesos parlamentarios: la organización industrial del congreso de los diputados en España
Gonzalo Caballero Miguez
- 219/2005 Determinants of bank market structure: Efficiency and political economy variables
Francisco González
- 220/2005 Agresividad de las órdenes introducidas en el mercado español: estrategias, determinantes y medidas de performance
David Abad Díaz

- 221/2005 Tendencia post-anuncio de resultados contables: evidencia para el mercado español
Carlos Forner Rodríguez, Joaquín Marhuenda Fructuoso y Sonia Sanabria García
- 222/2005 Human capital accumulation and geography: empirical evidence in the European Union
Jesús López-Rodríguez, J. Andrés Faña y Jose Lopez Rodríguez
- 223/2005 Auditors' Forecasting in Going Concern Decisions: Framing, Confidence and Information Processing
Waymond Rodgers and Andrés Guiral
- 224/2005 The effect of Structural Fund spending on the Galician region: an assessment of the 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 Galician CSFs
José Ramón Cancelo de la Torre, J. Andrés Faña and Jesús López-Rodríguez
- 225/2005 The effects of ownership structure and board composition on the audit committee activity: Spanish evidence
Carlos Fernández Méndez and Rubén Arrondo García
- 226/2005 Cross-country determinants of bank income smoothing by managing loan loss provisions
Ana Rosa Fonseca and Francisco González
- 227/2005 Incumplimiento fiscal en el irpf (1993-2000): un análisis de sus factores determinantes
Alejandro Estellér Moré
- 228/2005 Region versus Industry effects: volatility transmission
Pilar Soriano Felipe and Francisco J. Climent Diranzo
- 229/2005 Concurrent Engineering: The Moderating Effect Of Uncertainty On New Product Development Success
Daniel Vázquez-Bustelo and Sandra Valle
- 230/2005 On zero lower bound traps: a framework for the analysis of monetary policy in the 'age' of central banks
Alfonso Palacio-Vera
- 231/2005 Reconciling Sustainability and Discounting in Cost Benefit Analysis: a methodological proposal
M. Carmen Almansa Sáez and Javier Calatrava Requena
- 232/2005 Can The Excess Of Liquidity Affect The Effectiveness Of The European Monetary Policy?
Santiago Carbó Valverde and Rafael López del Paso
- 233/2005 Inheritance Taxes In The Eu Fiscal Systems: The Present Situation And Future Perspectives.
Miguel Angel Barberán Lahuerta
- 234/2006 Bank Ownership And Informativeness Of Earnings.
V́ctor M. González
- 235/2006 Developing A Predictive Method: A Comparative Study Of The Partial Least Squares Vs Maximum Likelihood Techniques.
Waymond Rodgers, Paul Pavlou and Andres Guiral.
- 236/2006 Using Compromise Programming for Macroeconomic Policy Making in a General Equilibrium Framework: Theory and Application to the Spanish Economy.
Francisco J. André, M. Alejandro Cardenete y Carlos Romero.

- 237/2006 Bank Market Power And Sme Financing Constraints.
Santiago Carbó-Valverde, Francisco Rodríguez-Fernández y Gregory F. Udell.
- 238/2006 Trade Effects Of Monetary Agreements: Evidence For Oecd Countries.
Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero y José Antonio Martínez-Serrano.
- 239/2006 The Quality Of Institutions: A Genetic Programming Approach.
Marcos Álvarez-Díaz y Gonzalo Caballero Miguez.
- 240/2006 La interacción entre el éxito competitivo y las condiciones del mercado doméstico como determinantes de la decisión de exportación en las Pymes.
Francisco García Pérez.
- 241/2006 Una estimación de la depreciación del capital humano por sectores, por ocupación y en el tiempo.
Inés P. Murillo.
- 242/2006 Consumption And Leisure Externalities, Economic Growth And Equilibrium Efficiency.
Manuel A. Gómez.
- 243/2006 Measuring efficiency in education: an analysis of different approaches for incorporating non-discretionary inputs.
Jose Manuel Cordero-Ferrera, Francisco Pedraja-Chaparro y Javier Salinas-Jiménez
- 244/2006 Did The European Exchange-Rate Mechanism Contribute To The Integration Of Peripheral Countries?.
Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero y José Antonio Martínez-Serrano
- 245/2006 Intergenerational Health Mobility: An Empirical Approach Based On The Echp.
Marta Pascual and David Cantarero
- 246/2006 Measurement and analysis of the Spanish Stock Exchange using the Lyapunov exponent with digital technology.
Salvador Rojí Ferrari and Ana Gonzalez Marcos
- 247/2006 Testing For Structural Breaks In Variance With additive Outliers And Measurement Errors.
Paulo M.M. Rodrigues and Antonio Rubia
- 248/2006 The Cost Of Market Power In Banking: Social Welfare Loss Vs. Cost Inefficiency.
Joaquín Maudos and Juan Fernández de Guevara
- 249/2006 Elasticidades de largo plazo de la demanda de vivienda: evidencia para España (1885-2000).
Desiderio Romero Jordán, José Félix Sanz Sanz y César Pérez López
- 250/2006 Regional Income Disparities in Europe: What role for location?.
Jesús López-Rodríguez and J. Andrés Faña
- 251/2006 Funciones abreviadas de bienestar social: Una forma sencilla de simultanear la medición de la eficiencia y la equidad de las políticas de gasto público.
Nuria Badenes Plá y Daniel Santín González
- 252/2006 "The momentum effect in the Spanish stock market: Omitted risk factors or investor behaviour?".
Luis Muga and Rafael Santamaría
- 253/2006 Dinámica de precios en el mercado español de gasolina: un equilibrio de colusión tácita.
Jordi Perdiguero García

- 254/2006 Desigualdad regional en España: renta permanente versus renta corriente.
José M. Pastor, Empar Pons y Lorenzo Serrano
- 255/2006 Environmental implications of organic food preferences: an application of the impure public goods model.
Ana Maria Aldanondo-Ochoa y Carmen Almansa-Sáez
- 256/2006 Family tax credits versus family allowances when labour supply matters: Evidence for Spain.
José Felix Sanz-Sanz, Desiderio Romero-Jordán y Santiago Álvarez-García
- 257/2006 La internacionalización de la empresa manufacturera española: efectos del capital humano genérico y específico.
José López Rodríguez
- 258/2006 Evaluación de las migraciones interregionales en España, 1996-2004.
María Martínez Torres
- 259/2006 Efficiency and market power in Spanish banking.
Rolf Färe, Shawna Grosskopf y Emili Tortosa-Ausina.
- 260/2006 Asimetrías en volatilidad, beta y contagios entre las empresas grandes y pequeñas cotizadas en la bolsa española.
Helena Chuliá y Hipòlit Torró.
- 261/2006 Birth Replacement Ratios: New Measures of Period Population Replacement.
José Antonio Ortega.
- 262/2006 Accidentes de tráfico, víctimas mortales y consumo de alcohol.
José M^a Arranz y Ana I. Gil.
- 263/2006 Análisis de la Presencia de la Mujer en los Consejos de Administración de las Mil Mayores Empresas Españolas.
Ruth Mateos de Cabo, Lorenzo Escot Mangas y Ricardo Gimeno Nogués.
- 264/2006 Crisis y Reforma del Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento. Las Limitaciones de la Política Económica en Europa.
Ignacio Álvarez Peralta.
- 265/2006 Have Child Tax Allowances Affected Family Size? A Microdata Study For Spain (1996-2000).
Jaime Vallés-Giménez y Anabel Zárate-Marco.
- 266/2006 Health Human Capital And The Shift From Foraging To Farming.
Paolo Rungo.
- 267/2006 Financiación Autonómica y Política de la Competencia: El Mercado de Gasolina en Canarias.
Juan Luis Jiménez y Jordi Perdiguero.
- 268/2006 El cumplimiento del Protocolo de Kyoto para los hogares españoles: el papel de la imposición sobre la energía.
Desiderio Romero-Jordán y José Félix Sanz-Sanz.
- 269/2006 Banking competition, financial dependence and economic growth
Joaquín Maudos y Juan Fernández de Guevara
- 270/2006 Efficiency, subsidies and environmental adaptation of animal farming under CAP
Werner Kleinhanß, Carmen Murillo, Carlos San Juan y Stefan Sperlich

- 271/2006 Interest Groups, Incentives to Cooperation and Decision-Making Process in the European Union
A. Garcia-Lorenzo y Jesús López-Rodríguez
- 272/2006 Riesgo asimétrico y estrategias de momentum en el mercado de valores español
Luis Muga y Rafael Santamaría
- 273/2006 Valoración de capital-riesgo en proyectos de base tecnológica e innovadora a través de la teoría de opciones reales
Gracia Rubio Martín
- 274/2006 Capital stock and unemployment: searching for the missing link
Ana Rosa Martínez-Cañete, Elena Márquez de la Cruz, Alfonso Palacio-Vera and Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar
- 275/2006 Study of the influence of the voters' political culture on vote decision through the simulation of a political competition problem in Spain
Sagrario Lantarón, Isabel Lillo, M^a Dolores López and Javier Rodrigo
- 276/2006 Investment and growth in Europe during the Golden Age
Antonio Cubel and M^a Teresa Sanchis
- 277/2006 Efectos de vincular la pensión pública a la inversión en cantidad y calidad de hijos en un modelo de equilibrio general
Robert Meneu Gaya
- 278/2006 El consumo y la valoración de activos
Elena Márquez y Belén Nieto
- 279/2006 Economic growth and currency crisis: A real exchange rate entropic approach
David Matesanz Gómez y Guillermo J. Ortega
- 280/2006 Three measures of returns to education: An illustration for the case of Spain
María Arrazola y José de Hevia
- 281/2006 Composition of Firms versus Composition of Jobs
Antoni Cunyat
- 282/2006 La vocación internacional de un holding tranviario belga: la Compagnie Mutuelle de Tramsways, 1895-1918
Alberte Martínez López
- 283/2006 Una visión panorámica de las entidades de crédito en España en la última década.
Constantino García Ramos
- 284/2006 Foreign Capital and Business Strategies: a comparative analysis of urban transport in Madrid and Barcelona, 1871-1925
Alberte Martínez López
- 285/2006 Los intereses belgas en la red ferroviaria catalana, 1890-1936
Alberte Martínez López
- 286/2006 The Governance of Quality: The Case of the Agrifood Brand Names
Marta Fernández Barcala, Manuel González-Díaz y Emmanuel Raynaud
- 287/2006 Modelling the role of health status in the transition out of malthusian equilibrium
Paolo Rungo, Luis Currais and Berta Rivera
- 288/2006 Industrial Effects of Climate Change Policies through the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
Xavier Labandeira and Miguel Rodríguez

- 289/2006 Globalisation and the Composition of Government Spending: An analysis for OECD countries
Norman Gemmell, Richard Kneller and Ismael Sanz
- 290/2006 La producción de energía eléctrica en España: Análisis económico de la actividad tras la liberalización del Sector Eléctrico
Fernando Hernández Martínez
- 291/2006 Further considerations on the link between adjustment costs and the productivity of R&D investment: evidence for Spain
Desiderio Romero-Jordán, José Félix Sanz-Sanz and Inmaculada Álvarez-Ayuso
- 292/2006 Una teoría sobre la contribución de la función de compras al rendimiento empresarial
Javier González Benito
- 293/2006 Agility drivers, enablers and outcomes: empirical test of an integrated agile manufacturing model
Daniel Vázquez-Bustelo, Lucía Avella and Esteban Fernández
- 294/2006 Testing the parametric vs the semiparametric generalized mixed effects models
María José Lombardía and Stefan Sperlich
- 295/2006 Nonlinear dynamics in energy futures
Mariano Matilla-García
- 296/2006 Estimating Spatial Models By Generalized Maximum Entropy Or How To Get Rid Of W
Esteban Fernández Vázquez, Matías Mayor Fernández and Jorge Rodríguez-Valez
- 297/2006 Optimización fiscal en las transmisiones lucrativas: análisis metodológico
Félix Domínguez Barrero
- 298/2006 La situación actual de la banca online en España
Francisco José Climent Diranzo y Alexandre Momparler Pechuán
- 299/2006 Estrategia competitiva y rendimiento del negocio: el papel mediador de la estrategia y las capacidades productivas
Javier González Benito y Isabel Suárez González
- 300/2006 A Parametric Model to Estimate Risk in a Fixed Income Portfolio
Pilar Abad and Sonia Benito
- 301/2007 Análisis Empírico de las Preferencias Sociales Respecto del Gasto en Obra Social de las Cajas de Ahorros
Alejandro Esteller-Moré, Jonathan Jorba Jiménez y Albert Solé-Ollé
- 302/2007 Assessing the enlargement and deepening of regional trading blocs: The European Union case
Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero y José Antonio Martínez-Serrano
- 303/2007 ¿Es la Franquicia un Medio de Financiación?: Evidencia para el Caso Español
Vanessa Solís Rodríguez y Manuel González Díaz
- 304/2007 On the Finite-Sample Biases in Nonparametric Testing for Variance Constancy
Paulo M.M. Rodrigues and Antonio Rubia
- 305/2007 Spain is Different: Relative Wages 1989-98
José Antonio Carrasco Gallego

- 306/2007 Poverty reduction and SAM multipliers: An evaluation of public policies in a regional framework
Francisco Javier De Miguel-Vélez y Jesús Pérez-Mayo
- 307/2007 La Eficiencia en la Gestión del Riesgo de Crédito en las Cajas de Ahorro
Marcelino Martínez Cabrera
- 308/2007 Optimal environmental policy in transport: unintended effects on consumers' generalized price
M. Pilar Socorro and Ofelia Betancor
- 309/2007 Agricultural Productivity in the European Regions: Trends and Explanatory Factors
Roberto Ezcurra, Belen Iraizoz, Pedro Pascual and Manuel Rapún
- 310/2007 Long-run Regional Population Divergence and Modern Economic Growth in Europe: a Case Study of Spain
María Isabel Ayuda, Fernando Collantes and Vicente Pinilla
- 311/2007 Financial Information effects on the measurement of Commercial Banks' Efficiency
Borja Amor, María T. Tascón and José L. Fanjul
- 312/2007 Neutralidad e incentivos de las inversiones financieras en el nuevo IRPF
Félix Domínguez Barrero
- 313/2007 The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility Perceptions on The Valuation of Common Stock
Waymond Rodgers , Helen Choy and Andres Guiral-Contreras
- 314/2007 Country Creditor Rights, Information Sharing and Commercial Banks' Profitability Persistence across the world
Borja Amor, María T. Tascón and José L. Fanjul
- 315/2007 ¿Es Relevante el Déficit Corriente en una Unión Monetaria? El Caso Español
Javier Blanco González y Ignacio del Rosal Fernández
- 316/2007 The Impact of Credit Rating Announcements on Spanish Corporate Fixed Income Performance: Returns, Yields and Liquidity
Pilar Abad, Antonio Díaz and M. Dolores Robles
- 317/2007 Indicadores de Lealtad al Establecimiento y Formato Comercial Basados en la Distribución del Presupuesto
Cesar Augusto Bustos Reyes y Óscar González Benito
- 318/2007 Migrants and Market Potential in Spain over The XXth Century: A Test Of The New Economic Geography
Daniel A. Tirado, Jordi Pons, Elisenda Paluzie and Javier Silvestre
- 319/2007 El Impacto del Coste de Oportunidad de la Actividad Emprendedora en la Intención de los Ciudadanos Europeos de Crear Empresas
Luis Miguel Zapico Aldeano
- 320/2007 Los belgas y los ferrocarriles de vía estrecha en España, 1887-1936
Alberte Martínez López
- 321/2007 Competición política bipartidista. Estudio geométrico del equilibrio en un caso ponderado
Isabel Lillo, M^a Dolores López y Javier Rodrigo
- 322/2007 Human resource management and environment management systems: an empirical study
M^a Concepción López Fernández, Ana M^a Serrano Bedía and Gema García Piqueres

- 323/2007 Wood and industrialization. evidence and hypotheses from the case of Spain, 1860-1935.
Iñaki Iriarte-Goñi and María Isabel Ayuda Bosque
- 324/2007 New evidence on long-run monetary neutrality.
J. Cunado, L.A. Gil-Alana and F. Perez de Gracia
- 325/2007 Monetary policy and structural changes in the volatility of us interest rates.
Juncal Cuñado, Javier Gomez Biscarri and Fernando Perez de Gracia
- 326/2007 The productivity effects of intrafirm diffusion.
Lucio Fuentelsaz, Jaime Gómez and Sergio Palomas
- 327/2007 Unemployment duration, layoffs and competing risks.
J.M. Arranz, C. García-Serrano and L. Toharia
- 328/2007 El grado de cobertura del gasto público en España respecto a la UE-15
Nuria Rueda, Begoña Barruso, Carmen Calderón y M^a del Mar Herrador
- 329/2007 The Impact of Direct Subsidies in Spain before and after the CAP'92 Reform
Carmen Murillo, Carlos San Juan and Stefan Sperlich
- 330/2007 Determinants of post-privatisation performance of Spanish divested firms
Laura Cabeza García and Silvia Gómez Ansón
- 331/2007 ¿Por qué deciden diversificar las empresas españolas? Razones oportunistas versus razones económicas
Almudena Martínez Campillo
- 332/2007 Dynamical Hierarchical Tree in Currency Markets
Juan Gabriel Brida, David Matesanz Gómez and Wiston Adrián Risso
- 333/2007 Los determinantes sociodemográficos del gasto sanitario. Análisis con microdatos individuales
Ana María Angulo, Ramón Barberán, Pilar Egea y Jesús Mur
- 334/2007 Why do companies go private? The Spanish case
Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar
- 335/2007 The use of gis to study transport for disabled people
Verónica Cañal Fernández
- 336/2007 The long run consequences of M&A: An empirical application
Cristina Bernad, Lucio Fuentelsaz and Jaime Gómez
- 337/2007 Las clasificaciones de materias en economía: principios para el desarrollo de una nueva clasificación
Valentín Edo Hernández
- 338/2007 Reforming Taxes and Improving Health: A Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform to Eliminate Medical and Pharmaceutical VAT
Santiago Álvarez-García, Carlos Pestana Barros y Juan Prieto-Rodríguez
- 339/2007 Impacts of an iron and steel plant on residential property values
Celia Bilbao-Terol
- 340/2007 Firm size and capital structure: Evidence using dynamic panel data
Víctor M. González and Francisco González

- 341/2007 ¿Cómo organizar una cadena hotelera? La elección de la forma de gobierno
Marta Fernández Barcala y Manuel González Díaz
- 342/2007 Análisis de los efectos de la decisión de diversificar: un contraste del marco teórico “Agencia-
Stewardship”
Almudena Martínez Campillo y Roberto Fernández Gago
- 343/2007 Selecting portfolios given multiple eurostoxx-based uncertainty scenarios: a stochastic goal pro-
gramming approach from fuzzy betas
Enrique Ballester, Blanca Pérez-Gladish, Mar Arenas-Parra and Amelia Bilbao-Terol
- 344/2007 “El bienestar de los inmigrantes y los factores implicados en la decisión de emigrar”
Anastasia Hernández Alemán y Carmelo J. León
- 345/2007 Governance Decisions in the R&D Process: An Integrative Framework Based on TCT and Know-
ledge View of The Firm.
Andrea Martínez-Noya and Esteban García-Canal
- 346/2007 Diferencias salariales entre empresas públicas y privadas. El caso español
Begoña Cueto y Nuria Sánchez- Sánchez
- 347/2007 Effects of Fiscal Treatments of Second Home Ownership on Renting Supply
Celia Bilbao Terol and Juan Prieto Rodríguez
- 348/2007 Auditors’ ethical dilemmas in the going concern evaluation
Andres Guiral, Waymond Rodgers, Emiliano Ruiz and Jose A. Gonzalo
- 349/2007 Convergencia en capital humano en España. Un análisis regional para el periodo 1970-2004
Susana Morales Sequera y Carmen Pérez Esparrells
- 350/2007 Socially responsible investment: mutual funds portfolio selection using fuzzy multiobjective pro-
gramming
Blanca M^a Pérez-Gladish, Mar Arenas-Parra , Amelia Bilbao-Terol and M^a Victoria Rodríguez-
Uría
- 351/2007 Persistencia del resultado contable y sus componentes: implicaciones de la medida de ajustes por
devengo
Raúl Iñiguez Sánchez y Francisco Poveda Fuentes
- 352/2007 Wage Inequality and Globalisation: What can we Learn from the Past? A General Equilibrium
Approach
Concha Betrán, Javier Ferri and Maria A. Pons
- 353/2007 Eficacia de los incentivos fiscales a la inversión en I+D en España en los años noventa
Desiderio Romero Jordán y José Félix Sanz Sanz
- 354/2007 Convergencia regional en renta y bienestar en España
Robert Meneu Gaya
- 355/2007 Tributación ambiental: Estado de la Cuestión y Experiencia en España
Ana Carrera Poncela
- 356/2007 Salient features of dependence in daily us stock market indices
Luis A. Gil-Alana, Juncal Cuñado and Fernando Pérez de Gracia
- 357/2007 La educación superior: ¿un gasto o una inversión rentable para el sector público?
Inés P. Murillo y Francisco Pedraja

- 358/2007 Effects of a reduction of working hours on a model with job creation and job destruction
Emilio Domínguez, Miren Ullibarri y Idoya Zabaleta
- 359/2007 Stock split size, signaling and earnings management: Evidence from the Spanish market
José Yagüe, J. Carlos Gómez-Sala and Francisco Poveda-Fuentes
- 360/2007 Modelización de las expectativas y estrategias de inversión en mercados de derivados
Begoña Font-Belaire
- 361/2008 Trade in capital goods during the golden age, 1953-1973
M^a Teresa Sanchis and Antonio Cubel
- 362/2008 El capital económico por riesgo operacional: una aplicación del modelo de distribución de pérdidas
Enrique José Jiménez Rodríguez y José Manuel Fera Domínguez
- 363/2008 The drivers of effectiveness in competition policy
Joan-Ramon Borrell and Juan-Luis Jiménez
- 364/2008 Corporate governance structure and board of directors remuneration policies: evidence from Spain
Carlos Fernández Méndez, Rubén Arrondo García and Enrique Fernández Rodríguez
- 365/2008 Beyond the disciplinary role of governance: how boards and donors add value to Spanish foundations
Pablo De Andrés Alonso, Valentín Azofra Palenzuela y M. Elena Romero Merino
- 366/2008 Complejidad y perfeccionamiento contractual para la contención del oportunismo en los acuerdos de franquicia
Vanessa Solís Rodríguez y Manuel González Díaz
- 367/2008 Inestabilidad y convergencia entre las regiones europeas
Jesús Mur, Fernando López y Ana Angulo
- 368/2008 Análisis espacial del cierre de explotaciones agrarias
Ana Aldanondo Ochoa, Carmen Almansa Sáez y Valero Casanovas Oliva
- 369/2008 Cross-Country Efficiency Comparison between Italian and Spanish Public Universities in the period 2000-2005
Tommaso Agasisti and Carmen Pérez Esparrells
- 370/2008 El desarrollo de la sociedad de la información en España: un análisis por comunidades autónomas
María Concepción García Jiménez y José Luis Gómez Barroso
- 371/2008 El medioambiente y los objetivos de fabricación: un análisis de los modelos estratégicos para su consecución
Lucía Avella Camarero, Esteban Fernández Sánchez y Daniel Vázquez-Bustelo
- 372/2008 Influence of bank concentration and institutions on capital structure: New international evidence
Víctor M. González and Francisco González
- 373/2008 Generalización del concepto de equilibrio en juegos de competición política
M^a Dolores López González y Javier Rodrigo Hitos
- 374/2008 Smooth Transition from Fixed Effects to Mixed Effects Models in Multi-level regression Models
María José Lombardía and Stefan Sperlich

- 375/2008 A Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform to Increase Demand for Public Transport Services
Carlos Pestana Barros and Juan Prieto-Rodriguez
- 376/2008 Measurement of intra-distribution dynamics: An application of different approaches to the European regions
Adolfo Maza, María Hierro and José Villaverde
- 377/2008 Migración interna de extranjeros y ¿nueva fase en la convergencia?
María Hierro y Adolfo Maza
- 378/2008 Efectos de la Reforma del Sector Eléctrico: Modelización Teórica y Experiencia Internacional
Ciro Eduardo Bazán Navarro
- 379/2008 A Non-Parametric Independence Test Using Permutation Entropy
Mariano Matilla-García and Manuel Ruiz Marín
- 380/2008 Testing for the General Fractional Unit Root Hypothesis in the Time Domain
Uwe Hassler, Paulo M.M. Rodrigues and Antonio Rubia
- 381/2008 Multivariate gram-charlier densities
Esther B. Del Brio, Trino-Manuel Níguez and Javier Perote
- 382/2008 Analyzing Semiparametrically the Trends in the Gender Pay Gap - The Example of Spain
Ignacio Moral-Arce, Stefan Sperlich, Ana I. Fernández-Saínz and Maria J. Roca
- 383/2008 A Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Two-Sided Card Market
Santiago Carbó Valverde, David B. Humphrey, José Manuel Liñares Zegarra and Francisco Rodríguez Fernandez
- 384/2008 A Fuzzy Bicriteria Approach for Journal Deselection in a Hospital Library
M. L. López-Avello, M. V. Rodríguez-Uría, B. Pérez-Gladish, A. Bilbao-Terol, M. Arenas-Parra
- 385/2008 Valoración de las grandes corporaciones farmacéuticas, a través del análisis de sus principales intangibles, con el método de opciones reales
Gracia Rubio Martín y Prosper Lamothe Fernández
- 386/2008 El marketing interno como impulsor de las habilidades comerciales de las pyme españolas: efectos en los resultados empresariales
M^a Leticia Santos Vijande, M^a José Sanzo Pérez, Nuria García Rodríguez y Juan A. Trespalacios Gutiérrez
- 387/2008 Understanding Warrants Pricing: A case study of the financial market in Spain
David Abad y Belén Nieto