focus

ON SPANISH SOCIETY

SEP **2026**

SPAIN **IN EUROPE**

Do Spanish teenagers expect **the social elevator to work?**

Mobility **expectations by autonomous communities**

PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS

Less burden, more return, deeper divide: how Spaniards' views on taxes have changed

FOLLOW UP **SOCIAL DATA**

Focus on Spanish Society is published by the Social Studies Office of **Funcas**. The aim of this publication is to depict the Spanish social situation and provide brief insights into some of its most relevant aspects. *Focus on Spanish Society* consists of three sections. The first section, **SPAIN IN EUROPE**, draws attention to recently published statistical data and puts the Spanish case in comparative perspective. The second section, **PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS**, examines in more detail one particular social issue as perceived by the Spanish public and manifested through opinion surveys. Finally, the third section **FOLLOW-UP SOCIAL DATA** presents several social indicators related to demography and families, labour market and education, health and welfare benefits and services.

ISSN: 3020-8211
Orders and information:
Funcas
Caballero de Gracia, 28
28013 Madrid (Spain)
Phone: +34 91 596 57 18
Fax: +34 91 596 57 96
publica@funcas.es
www.funcas.es

SPAIN **IN EUROPE**

Do Spanish teenagers expect **the social elevator to work?**

The debate about the social elevator tends to be trivialised in the rich countries. We rarely have a clear sense of what lies behind this buzzword in European public debate, but, behind lies a complex body of research on social mobility. Social mobility is usually studied retrospectively, by comparing individuals with their parents once they have entered stable occupations, often using the social status of those occupations. This allows us to see who has moved up, who has moved down and who has remained roughly where they started.

Spain is a country with very limited statistics on children, so the publication of PISA usually generates striking headlines about country averages or, within Spain, regional differences. Yet the study is much richer than this and it also offers an unusual way of looking at social mobility. In 2025, 15-year-old students were asked what occupation they expected to have at the age of 30. Since we also know their parents' occupations, we can study how much mobility they expect to experience. What kind of future do Spanish teenagers expect for themselves?

A reasonable starting point is to ask how many 15-year-old students have a fairly clear idea of what they expect to do professionally. Spain is among the European Union countries where the largest share of 15 year olds have a clear expectation about their future occupation: 87% say they do (**figure 1**). The figure is only slightly higher in Luxembourg and Malta. Spain is also above culturally similar countries such as France, Greece, Portugal and Italy. In a labour market that creates so much uncertainty and instability for young people, this figure is striking.

Spain is among the European Union countries where the largest share of 15 year olds have a clear expectation about their future occupation

The second question is more interesting and more directly related to expected social mobility. PISA makes it possible to place both the parents' occupation and the occupation the teenager expects to have around the age of 30 on the same occupational status scale, the ISEI (International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status). This scale assigns each occupation a position that

FIGURE 1

15-year-old students with a clear idea of their future occupation
EU selected countries. **Percentages**



Question: What kind of job do you expect to have when you are about 30 years old?
Source: PISA 2025, authors' calculations based on the microdata. Estimates use student weights.

captures its social and economic status, with occupations associated with higher levels of education, income and social standing placed higher on the scale and lower status occupations placed lower. This allows us to compare the teenagers' starting position (i.e. the highest-ranking occupation held by either parent, measured on the same ISEI scale) directly with the position they expect to reach in the future. To distinguish small changes from clear expectations of upward or downward mobility, we consider differences of up to five ISEI points to represent stability[1].

In Spain, 60% expect to be more than five points above their parents (**figure 2**). A further 19% expect to remain roughly in the same position, while only 21% expect to be below their parents. Put differently, almost six in ten Spanish teenagers expect to hold, by the age of 30, an occupation of higher status than that of their parents.

Almost six in ten Spanish teenagers expect to improve on their parents' occupational position by the age of 30, near on the top of the european table

Once again, Spain is near the top of the table, joining Italy (60%) and Portugal (63%) in the group with the largest shares of teenagers who name an occupation clearly above their parents'. In Germany the figure is 48%, compared with 54% in France, 46% in the Netherlands and 45% in Sweden. The same exercise also has another side. In Spain, 21% of teenagers expect to hold an occupation of lower status than that of their parents, a proportion that is substantially higher in Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and Denmark.

1 Note that students do not place themselves on the ISEI scale. They describe, in an open-ended question, the occupation they expect to hold at around age 30; PISA codes these answers into ISCO-08 categories and assigns each the corresponding ISEI score. Our 'expected position' is thus derived from the occupation named, not from a self-assessment of status.

FIGURE 2

What teenagers expect compared with their parents

EU selected countries. **Percentage of 15-year-old students**



Question: What kind of job do you expect to have when you are about 30 years old?

Source: PISA 2025, authors' calculations based on the microdata. Estimates use student weights. Stability is defined as a difference of up to ±5 ISEI points relative to parents. The exercise could not be replicated for Cyprus and Luxembourg.

Methodological note: Cross country comparisons depend on the expected occupation question (BSMJ) and parents' highest level of occupation (HISEI) being answered by a similar share of students in each country. This is not the case. In Spain, 27% of students do not report an expected occupation, a substantially higher non response rate than in Finland, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands or Sweden, while the figure for Luxembourg is unusable because of complete missingness. This does not invalidate the result for Spain, but it does mean that comparisons with these countries, including those made in this article, should be interpreted with some caution. Part of the observed differences may reflect differences in who provides an answer rather than genuine differences in expectations of social mobility.

The comparison above classifies teenagers according to whether the occupation they expect to hold places them above, roughly level with or below their parents. But we can also measure the size of the expected change without setting any threshold, by calculating the average difference between the occupational status of the profession teenagers expect to have around the age of 30 and the highest occupational status of their parents, expressed in ISEI points. A positive value means that, on average, they expect to reach a higher occupational position than their parents, while a negative value would indicate the opposite. The result is also outstanding. The average expected change is positive in every country. In Spain, the expected gain is 14 ISEI points, below Portugal (+16.8) and Italy (+14.9), but above countries such as France (+9.6), Germany (+6.1), Sweden (+3.4) and Denmark (+1.1).

Mobility **expectations by autonomous communities**[2]

Madrid has the lowest share of teenagers expecting upward mobility, while 24.7% expect to be worse off occupationally than their parents

The differences across regions reflect both differences in expectations of social mobility and differences in families' starting social positions. Madrid has the lowest share of teenagers naming an occupation above their parents', at 49%, while the figure reaches 68% in Andalusia, 66% in the Canary Islands and 64% in Murcia (**figure 3**). There are also substantial differences in the opposite direction. In Madrid, 25% expect an occupation of lower status than their parents', compared with 17% in Andalusia and 18% in the Canary Islands. The average gap between the expected occupation and that of the parents also varies considerably, from just 8.1 ISEI points in Madrid to 18.7 in Andalusia and 17.3 in Murcia (**figure 4**).

FIGURE 3

What teenagers expect compared with their parents

Spain Autonomous Communities. **Percentages of 15-year-old students**



Question: What kind of job do you expect to have when you are about 30 years old?

Source: PISA 2025, authors' calculations based on the microdata. Estimates use student weights.

2 Catalonia is excluded from the regional comparisons because PISA 2025 reports an exceptionally high student exclusion rate in the region, which may compromise the representativeness of its results. For this reason, Catalonia is not reported separately.

FIGURE 4

Social mobility expectations

Spain Autonomous Communities. **Percentages of 15-year-old students**



Question: What kind of job do you expect to have when you are about 30 years old?

Source: PISA 2025, authors' calculations based on the microdata. Estimates use student weights.

FIGURE 5

Average HISEI and mobility expectations

Spain Autonomous Communities. **Percentages of 15-year-old students**



Question: What kind of job do you expect to have when you are about 30 years old?

Source: PISA 2025, authors' calculations based on the microdata. Estimates use student weights.

But these expectations of social mobility are closely related to the teenagers' starting social position (**figure 5**). Communities with a lower average families HISEI (Highest International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status) show higher expectations of upward mobility, while expectations of downward mobility generally increase with the occupational position of parents. Madrid is the clearest example. It combines the highest average HISEI with the lowest unadjusted expectations of upward mobility. These patterns are descriptive and refer to differences across regions, not individual level relationships.

Expectations are closely related to the teenagers' starting social position: Communities with a lower average HISEI show higher expectations of upward mobility

The average HISEI of families varies considerably across regions, reaching 62 points in Madrid, compared with 48 in Andalusia, 49 in Murcia and 50 in the Canary Islands. Other regions fall in between, such as the Basque Country (57) and the Valencian Community (55). These differences in families' social starting positions may therefore account for part of the variation in unadjusted expectations of social mobility.

To see which regional differences remain once this starting point is held constant, we compare expectations of social mobility while controlling for HISEI (**figure 6**).

FIGURE 6

Social mobility expectations

Spain Autonomous Communities. **Percentages of 15-year-old students, adjusted for parents' occupational status (HISEI)**



(*) Individual level regression models estimating the probability of expecting upward or downward mobility as a function of HISEI and autonomous community indicators. The figures reported are predicted probabilities for each community, holding HISEI constant.

Question: What kind of job do you expect to have when you are about 30 years old?

Source: PISA 2025, authors' calculations based on the microdata. Estimates use student weights.

Once regional differences in families' starting social positions are taken into account, the differences across regions become smaller, although they do not disappear

Once regional differences in the families' starting social positions are taken into account, the differences across regions become smaller, although they do not disappear. Adjusted expectations of upward mobility range from 57% in the Valencian Community to 63% in the Basque Country, while Madrid reaches 60%, well above its observed figure of 49%. There are also differences in expectations of downward mobility, which are highest in Castilla y León and Navarre, at 24%, and lowest in Madrid, at 18%. Overall, adjusting for HISEI substantially changes the relative position of some regions, showing that part of the observed variation is associated with differences in families' social starting positions.

The debate over the so-called social elevator is far from over. In fact, the PISA 2025 results suggest that it is likely to remain contentious. But these results have a downside. PISA allows us to observe what teenagers expect, not what they will ultimately achieve. This matters because the debate over social mobility exists precisely because intergenerational mobility is far from unlimited. If teenagers' expectations are consistently higher than their families' social starting position, but some of those expectations are not fulfilled, the optimism we observe today may become a source of frustration tomorrow. The data cannot tell us how many of these expectations will eventually be realised, but they do show that, at age 15, a majority of Spanish teenagers expect their future working lives to take them further than their parents.

Perhaps this is the central point. The social elevator is likely to remain a contested issue not only because people start from different positions, but also because expectations about how far each generation can go appear to be more similar than their family starting positions would suggest. The crucial question is how much of the social elevator they expect at 15 will actually work when the time comes to use it.

PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS

Less burden, more return, deeper divide: how Spaniards' views on taxes have changed

Few questions reveal more about the relationship between citizens and the state than those concerning taxes. What people believe they pay, and what they believe they receive in return, shapes the legitimacy of the welfare state, the room for manoeuvre of any government considering fiscal reform and, ultimately, the willingness to comply. The Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas has been asking Spaniards about these matters since the mid-1980s, which makes it possible to follow the evolution of four indicators over four decades and to observe how they respond to economic and political cycles.

These questions capture distinct dimensions of what can be called the fiscal contract. The first measures the perceived tax burden, that is, whether respondents believe that the amount the Spaniards pay in taxes is high, moderate or low. The second and third measure perceived reciprocity, at the collective level (does society as a whole benefit a great deal, quite a lot, a little or not at all from what it pays?) and at the personal level (do respondents and their families receive more, roughly the same or less than they pay?). The fourth measures perceived fairness, asking whether taxes are collected fairly, in the sense that those who have more pay more. Together they describe whether citizens experience taxation as a heavy load, whether they see it is worth it, and whether they regard the distribution of the load as equitable.

The average stance on personal reciprocity reflects a harsh judgement, with more than half saying they receive less than they pay

In July 2026 the picture is one of moderate and unusually mild discontent (**figure 1**). On the perceived tax burden, 44% of respondents think that the amount the Spaniards pay in taxes is high, 7% think that it is low, and 48%, that it is moderate. On collective reciprocity, 54% believe that society benefits a little or not at all from taxes, against 44% who believe it benefits a great deal or quite a lot. The average stance on personal reciprocity reflects a harsh judgement, with more than half (57%) saying they receive less than they pay, 30% about the same, and 10%, more. Finally, perceived unfairness appears to be

FIGURE 1

Main opinions on taxes
Spain, July 2026. **Percentages**



Percentages do not add up to 100 because the options “doesn’know” and “no answer” are not included.
Source: CIS, Study no. 3572.

overwhelmingly high, with 77% believing that taxes are not collected fairly, although the 20% who take the opposite view may be one of the highest shares since the late 1980s.

Seen over the long run, these figures question the continuity of a remarkably stable pattern (**figures 2-5**).[1] From 1985 until the end of the last decade, between 53% and 77% of the public believed that the amount the Spaniards paid in taxes was high, and the series moved in a recognisable cyclical trend. The perception of an excessive tax burden peaked at 77% in 1992, when the start of a recession coincided with increases in income tax and VAT, eased to 55% at the end of the 1990s during the recovery, rose again in the early 2000s, when the introduction of the euro and the sensation of rising prices may have contaminated fiscal perceptions, and fell back to 54% during the credit boom. The financial crisis initially left it untouched, since the first policy response was expansionary, but the austerity measures of 2012 to 2014 produced the second largest spike of the series, with 69% perceiveng a heavy tax burden in 2014. This episode may illustrate the visible effect of cuts in services, so that citizens feel they are paying more and receiving less. The reciprocity indicators confirm this reading, as the share believing that society benefits (a great deal / quite a lot) from taxes fell from

From 1985 until the end of the last decade, between 53% and 77% of the public believed that the amount the Spaniards paid in taxes was high. The series moved in a recognisable cyclical trend

1 Please take into account the methodological breaks in the series, as detailed in the figures. These breaks counsel cautiousness in the interpretation of the trends, which explains the tone of the following text.

FIGURE 2

The amount paid in taxes
Spain, 1985-2026. **Percentages**



Question: Would you say that the amount we Spaniards pay in taxes is high, moderate, or low?

Changes in methodology and weighting: [1] up to July 2019, personal interview; [2] July 2020 to July 2023, Computer Assisted Telephone Interview, first weighting; [3] July 2024 to July 2026, second weighting that includes educational attainment level.

Source: K.3.02.03.001 series in the CIS database.

FIGURE 3

How much society benefits from taxes, considering public services and social benefits
Spain, 1994-2026. **Percentages**



Question: Overall, considering the actual public services and social benefits, would you say that society as a whole benefits a great deal, quite a lot, a little, or not at all from what we pay in taxes and social security contributions?

Changes in methodology and weighting: [1] up to July 2019, personal interview; [2] July 2020 to July 2023, Computer Assisted Telephone Interview, first weighting; [3] July 2024 to July 2026, second weighting that includes educational attainment level.

Source: K.3.01.02.012 series in the CIS database.

48% in 2006 to 27% in 2013, and the share believing taxes are collected fairly reached its historical minimum of 7% in 2014.

After the change of government in 2018, the decline in the perception of a heavy tax burden continued, from 61% in 2017 to 53% in 2019. After the

FIGURE 4

The balance between the taxes paid and the services received

Spain, 1985-2026. **Percentages**



Question: And more specifically, taking into account what you and your family receive from the various branches of public administration, would you say that they provide you with more than what you pay in taxes and social security contributions, more or less the same amount, or less than what you pay in taxes and social security contributions?

Changes in methodology and weighting: [1] up to July 2019, personal interview; [2] July 2020 to July 2023, Computer Assisted Telephone Interview, first weighting; [3] July 2024 to July 2026, second weighting that includes educational attainment level.

Source: K.3.01.02.011 series in the CIS database.

FIGURE 5

Fairness in tax collection

Spain, 1984-2026. **Percentages**



Question: And do you think that, in general, taxes are collected fairly—that is, those who have more pay more—or do you not think so?

Changes in methodology and weighting: [1] up to July 2019, personal interview; [2] July 2020 to July 2023, Computer Assisted Telephone Interview, first weighting; [3] July 2024 to July 2026, second weighting that includes educational attainment level.

Source: K.3.01.02.003 series in the CIS database.

pandemic (and the methodological change in the series in July 2020), the share perceiving a heavy tax burden remained rather stable. With the new methodology, the intermediate option became the most frequent for the first time in the series, and the "low" answer doubled to 10%. The perception of collective reciprocity remained rather stable in the post-pandemic years, and the perception of fairness went from 9% to 20%.

2026 values of the tax burden indicator remain well below anything observed before 2020

The data suggest that during the post-pandemic years, in spite of inflation, the perception of a heavy tax burden continued to fall to a historial low of 38% in 2023. The subsequent rebound of the tax burden indicator, to 48% in 2025, coincides with the erosion of real incomes, the record levels of tax revenue driven by the non-indexation of income tax brackets and a public debate increasingly focused on the fiscal squeeze of the middle classes. Yet, even after this rebound, 2026 values remain well below anything observed before 2020.

The comparison of the ideological gradients in the surveys of 2017 and 2026 may help us understand what lies beneath the aggregate movement (**figure 6**). In 2017 the perception of a heavy tax burden was shared across the political spectrum: between 55% and 63% of respondents in every ideological segment from the left to the centre-right gave that answer. In 2026 the gradient has a steep slope. Among those at positions 1 to 4 on the ten-point left-right scale, only 16% to 19% think that the amount the Spaniards pay in taxes is high, whereas the figure reaches 63% among those at the 7-8 segment and 79% at the 9-10 positions. The reciprocity indicators have mirrored that change. The share of those furthest to the left (1-2 segment) who believe that society benefits from taxes has doubled, from 28% to 57%, while it has fallen among the most right (9-10), from 31% to 20%. Even personal reciprocity, which usually resists ideological framing because it refers to one's own household, has tripled in the left, from 6% to 20% saying they receive more than they pay, and declined in the right. Only the fairness question shows a parallel movement across the spectrum, with a modest decline in perceived injustice in every segment except the 9-10 one.

The data suggest that tax legitimacy has never been higher in the aggregate, but it now rests on a more partisan base than at any point in the past four decades

The aggregate decline in fiscal discontent is therefore largely a change of opinion on the left, which has abandoned the idea of the excessive weight of taxation when compared to 2017, while the right has intensified its adherence to it. This is consistent with research showing that citizens use the partisanship of the incumbent government as a shortcut when judging fiscal and social policy, so that supporters of the governing coalition perceive the tax burden as more acceptable and the return as more generous, and opponents perceive the opposite. What once functioned as a valence issue, on which Spaniards broadly agreed whatever their politics, now behaves as a positional one, aligned with the ideological cleavage. With the caution that methodological changes call for, the data suggest that tax legitimacy has never been higher in the aggregate, but it now rests on a more partisan base than at any point in the past four decades, which makes it more exposed to changes in government than the figures alone would suggest.

FIGURE 6

Main opinions on taxes

Spain, July 2017 and July 2026. **Percentages, by ideological placement in the left (1) to right (10) scale**



Questions: a. Would you say that the amount we Spaniards pay in taxes is high, moderate, or low? **b.** Overall, considering the actual public services and social benefits, would you say that society as a whole benefits a great deal, quite a lot, a little, or not at all from what we pay in taxes and social security contributions? **c.** And more specifically, taking into account what you and your family receive from the various branches of public administration, would you say that they provide you with more than what you pay in taxes and social security contributions, more or less the same amount, or less than what you pay in taxes and social security contributions? **d.** And do you think that, in general, taxes are collected fairly—that is, those who have more pay more—or do you not think so?

(*) In 2026 it also includes the option "none", a spontaneous answer not collected in 2017. Results for the 9-10 segment in 2017 should be interpreted cautiously, given its low N (51).

Source: CIS, studies nos. 3184 and 3572.

FOLLOW UP **SOCIAL DATA**

POPULATION

Population. life expectancy and dependency

	Total population	Average age	67 and older (%)	Life expectancy at birth (men)	Life expectancy at birth (women)	Life expectancy at 65 (men)	Life expectancy at 65 (women)	Dependency rate (older than 66)	Dependency rate
2015	46,425,722	42.5	16.3	79.9	85.4	18.8	22.6	24.1	47.9
2016	46,418,884	42.7	16.6	80.3	85.8	19.1	23.0	24.7	48.5
2017	46,497,393	43.0	16.9	80.3	85.7	19.1	23.0	25.1	48.9
2018	46,645,070	43.2	17.0	80.4	85.8	19.2	23.0	25.4	49.0
2019	46,918,951	43.4	17.2	80.8	86.2	19.4	23.4	25.5	48.9
2020	47,318,050	43.6	17.3	79.5	85.0	18.3	22.3	25.8	48.8
2021	47,400,798	43.8	17.5	80.2	85.8	18.9	23.1	26.0	48.5
2022	47,486,727	44.1	17.7	80.4	85.7	19.1	23.0	26.3	48.5
2023	48,085,361	44.2	17.8	81.1	86.3	19.7	23.5	26.4	48.1
2024	48,619,695	44.4	18.0	81.4	86.5	19.9	23.6	26.6	47.8
2025	49,128,297	44.6	18.3					26.9	47.6
2026**	49,596,376		18.5					27.3	47.4
Source	ECP	IDB	ECP	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	ECP	ECP

Migration

	Foreign population (%)	Foreign-born population (%)	Foreign-born with Spanish nationality (% over total foreign born)	Immigration	Emigration
2015	12.7	9.6	31.8	342,114	343,875
2016	12.7	9.5	33.0	414,746	327,325
2017	12.9	9.5	34.4	532,132	368,860
2018	13.3	9.8	34.2	643,684	309,526
2019	14.0	10.3	33.8	750,480	296,248
2020	14.8	11.1	32.9	467,918	248,561
2021	15.3	11.4	33.1	887,960[b]	696,866[b]
2022	15.7	11.6	33.6	1,258,894	531,889
2023	17.1	12.7	32.2	1,250,991	608,695
2024	18.2	13.4	32.1	1,288,562	662,294
2025	19.3	14.1	32.2		
2026**	14.6	20.2	32.8		
Source	ECP	ECP	ECP	EMCR and EM*	EMCR and EM*

ECP: Estadística Continua de Población. **IDB:** Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. **EM:** Estadística de Migraciones. **EMCR:** Estadística de Migraciones y Cambios de Residencia

[a] Break in the series.

* Estadística de Migraciones y Cambios de Residencia (2021 onwards), Estadística de Migraciones (up to 2020). Series not comparable.

** Provisional Data

Dependency rate: (15 or less years old population + 67 or more years old population)/ 16-66 years old population, as a percentage. **Dependency rate (older than 66):** 67 or more years old population / 16-66 years old population, as a percentage.

HOUSEHOLDS & FAMILIES

Households

	Households (thousands)	Average household size	Households with one person younger than 65 (%)	Households with one person older than 65 (%)	Single-parent households (%)	Emancipation rate 25-29 years old (%)
2015	18,376	2.51	14.6	10.7	8.2	48.2
2016	18,444	2.50	14.6	10.9	8.3	47.2
2017	18,513	2.49	14.2	11.4	8.6	46.1
2018	18,581	2.49	14.3	11.5	8.3	46.1
2019	18,697	2.49	14.9	11.2	9.0	45.9
2020	18,794	2.49	15.0	11.4	9.1	43.2
2021	18,746	2.51	15.6	11.0	9.0	37.9
2022	19,078	2.49	15.4	11.7	8.8	40.4
2023	19,369	2.48	16.4	12.0	8.4	42.5
2024	19,537	2.48	16.3	11.9	9.5	42.3
2025	19,760	2.48	16.5	11.8	9.6	43.5
2026*	19,958	2.47				43.8
Source	EPA	EPA	EPF	EPF	EPF	EPA

EPF: Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares. **EPA:** Encuesta de Población Activa.

* First & second quarter data
Note: The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base. The EPF data in 2023 are not strictly comparable with previous ones, as they are based on new population estimates.
Single-parent households (%): One adult with a child /children
Emancipation rate 25-29 years old (%): Percentage of persons (25-29 years old) living in households in which they are not children of the reference person.

Nuptiality & divorces

	Marriages per inhabitant	Marriages per inhabitant (Spanish)	Marriages per inhabitant (foreigners)	First marriages over total marriages (%)	Mean age at first marriage, (men)	Mean age at first marriage, (women)	Same sex marriages, (men) (%)	Same sex marriages, (women) (%)	Mixed marriages (%)	Divorces per inhabitant
2014	0.49	0.52	0.34	84.3	34.4	32.3	1.03	0.98	13.7	0.29
2015	0.52	0.55	0.34	83.7	34.8	32.7	1.14	1.07	13.1	0.28
2016	0.54	0.58	0.37	83.1	35.1	32.9	1.25	1.22	13.2	0.28
2017	0.55	0.58	0.38	82.4	35.3	33.2	1.34	1.33	14.0	0.29
2018	0.53	0.57	0.36	81.5	35.6	33.4	1.41	1.50	14.2	0.28
2019	0.53	0.57	0.37	80.5	36.0	33.9	1.50	1.59	15.1	0.27
2020	0.28	0.30	0.22	76.6	37.1	34.9	1.66	1.86	17.3	0.23
2021	0.47	0.52	0.30	80.4	36.8	34.6	1.48	1.93	14.8	0.25
2022	0.58	0.63	0.37	81.4	36.7	34.6	1.59	1.89	15.3	0.24
2023	0.55	0.60	0.35	81.5	36.9	34.9	1.84	2.09	16.7	0.22
2024	0.55	0.61	0.36	81.4	37.3	35.2	2.02	2.16	16.7	0.24
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	MNP	MNP	MNP	IDB

IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. **MNP:** Movimiento Natural de la Población.

Marriages per inhabitant: Average number of times an individual would marry in his or her lifetime, if the same age-specific nuptiality intensity were to be maintained as observed in the current year. **Mixed marriage:** Marriage of a Spaniard to a foreigner. **Divorces per inhabitant:** Average number of times an individual would divorce in his or her lifetime, if the same intensity of divorce by age as observed in the current year were to be maintained.

HOUSEHOLDS & FAMILIES

Fertility (I)

	Average age at first child, total women	Average age at first child, Spanish women	Average age at first child, foreign women	Total fertility rate	Total fertility rate (Spanish women)	Total fertility rate (foreign women)
2014	30.6	31.1	27.5	1.32	1.27	1.61
2015	30.7	31.2	27.6	1.33	1.28	1.65
2016	30.8	31.3	27.6	1.33	1.28	1.71
2017	30.9	31.5	27.6	1.31	1.25	1.70
2018	31.0	31.6	27.8	1.26	1.20	1.64
2019	31.1	31.7	28.1	1.23	1.17	1.58
2020	31.2	31.8	28.3	1.18	1.13	1.45
2021	31.5	32.1	28.8	1.18	1.15	1.35
2022	31.6	32.2	28.5	1.16	1.12	1.35
2023	31.5	32.2	28.5	1.12	1.09	1.28
2024	31.5	32.3	28.4	1.10	1.07	1.27
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB

Fertility (II)

	Births to unmarried mothers (%)	Births to unmarried Spanish mothers (%)	Births to unmarried foreign mothers (%)	Abortion rate	Abortions by women born in Spain (%)
2014	42.5	43.1	39.7	10.5	63.3
2015	44.5	45.5	39.6	10.4	63.9
2016	45.9	47.0	40.7	10.4	64.5
2017	46.8	48.1	41.1	10.5	64.6
2018	47.3	48.9	41.2	11.1	63.7
2019	48.4	50.1	42.4	11.5	62.6
2020	47.6	50.0	39.3	10.3	64.1
2021	49.3	52.0	39.2	10.7	65.1
2022	50.1	53.1	40.3	11.7	66.7
2023	50.0	52.7	41.5	12.2	63.1
2024	50.0	52.4	42.9	12.4	62.2
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	MS	MS

IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. **MS:** Ministerio Sanidad.

Total fertility rate: Average number of children a woman would have during her childbearing life if she were to maintain the same age-specific fertility intensity as observed in the current year. **Abortion rate:** Number of abortions / women between 15 and 44 years old x 1,000. **Abortions by women born in Spain (%):** Abortions by women born in Spain as percentage of all abortions by women living in Spain.

EDUCATION

Educational attainment

	Population 25 years and older with primary education (%)	Population 25 years and older with tertiary education (%)	Population 25-34 years old with primary education (%)	Population 25-34 years old with tertiary education (%)
2015	25.2	29.3	7.3	41.0
2016	24.2	29.8	7.2	41.0
2017	23.2	30.4	6.7	42.6
2018	22.3	31.1	6.3	44.3
2019	20.9	32.3	5.8	46.5
2020	19.2	33.4	5.5	47.4
2021	18.4	34.1	5.6	48.5
2022	18.0	34.4	5.6	50.2
2023	17.8	34.9	5.3	52.0
2024	17.0	35.4	5.0	52.6
2025	16.8	35.8	4.7	52.4
2026*	16.3	36.6	4.4	52.9
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA

Educational enrollment ratios

	Gross enrollment rate in pre-primary education, first cycle	Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (general)	Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (vocational)	Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (vocational)	Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (university: undergraduate and postgraduate)
2015	35.1	80.2	40.3	41.0	47.4
2016	36.7	76.9	38.5	43.6	47.7
2017	38.5	74.3	37.8	45.1	47.6
2018	39.9	72.5	38.1	44.9	47.1
2019	41.3	71.0	38.8	47.3	46.7
2020	36.0	70.4	41.1	53.6	47.6
2021	42.0	69.5	42.3	54.6	47.3
2022	46.0	67.1	42.6	55.4	46.1
2023	47.9	63.6	43.0	57.0	45.4
2024	49.3	62.7	43.3	58.0	45.8
2025	50.2	61.5	43.1	57.7	
Source	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MCIU and ECP

EDUCATION

Educational outcomes and expenditure

	Graduation rate in 4-year university degrees (%)	Drop-out rate in undergraduate studies (%)	Early school leavers from education and training (%)	Public expenditure (%GDP)	Private expenditure (%GDP)	Private expenditure (% total expenditure in education)
2015	51.8	33.2	20.0	4.29	1.36	24.1
2016	52.8	33.2	19.0	4.24	1.34	24.1
2017	53.4	31.7	18.3	4.22	1.30	23.7
2018	54.8	31.4	17.9	4.18	1.33	24.2
2019	55.5	30.6	17.3	4.24	1.31	23.7
2020			16.0	4.89	1.43	22.7
2021			13.3	4.84	1.28	20.4
2022			13.9	4.62		
2023			13.7	4.54		
2024			13.0	4.48		
2025			12.8			
Source	MCIU	MCIU	MEFPD	MEFPD	OECD	OECD

EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa. **MEFPD:** Ministerio de Educación, Formación Profesional y Deporte. **ECP:** Estadística Continua de Población. **MCIU:** Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades. **OECD:** Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

* EPA data are for the first and second quarter. MEFPD and MCIU are provisional.
Note: The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base.
Gross enrollment rate in pre-primary education, first cycle: Enrolled in early childhood education as a percentage of the population aged 0 to 2 years. **Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (general):** Enrollment in Bachillerato as a percentage of the population aged 16 to 17. **Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (vocational)**. Enrollment in Ciclos Formativos de Grado Medio (on-site and distance learning) as a percentage of the population aged 16 to 17. **Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (vocational):** Enrollment in Ciclos Formativos de Grado Superior (on-site and distance learning) as a percentage of the population aged 18 to 19. **Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (university: undergraduate or postgraduate studies):** Enrolled in official bachelor's or master's degrees as a percentage of the population aged 18 to 24. **Graduation rate in 4-year university degrees (%):** Percentage of students who complete the degree in the theoretical time foreseen or in one additional academic year. **Drop-out rate in undergraduate studies (%):**
New entrants in an academic year who stop studying in one of the following 3 years. **Early school leavers from education and training (%):** Percentage of the population aged 18-24 who have not completed upper secondary education and are not in any form of education or training.

LABOUR MARKET

Employment and unemployment

	Employed population (thousands)	Unemployed population (thousands)	Employment rate (16-64, men)	Employment rate (16-64, women)	Unemployment rate (men)	Unemployment rate (women)
2015	17,866	5,056	64.0	53.4	20.8	23.5
2016	18,342	4,481	65.8	55.1	18.1	21.4
2017	18,825	3,917	67.6	56.5	15.7	19.0
2018	19,328	3,479	69.0	57.8	13.7	17.0
2019	19,779	3,248	69.9	58.8	12.4	16.0
2020	19,202	3,531	67.3	56.6	13.9	17.4
2021	19,834	3,476	68.7	58.6	13.2	16.8
2022	20,548	3,079	70.5	60.2	11.4	14.9
2023	21,182	2,938	71.3	61.7	10.7	13.9
2024	21,654	2,771	71.8	62.6	10.2	12.7
2025	22,221	2,608	72.2	63.3	9.6	12.0
2026*	22,536	2,602	72.8	64.0	9.2	11.7
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA

LABOUR MARKET

Public employment, temporary contracts & part-time employment

	Public employees (% total employed)	Employees with temporary contracts, private sector (% total employees)	Employees with temporary contracts, public sector (% total employees)	Part-time employed (%)
2015	16.7	26.0	21.6	15.7
2016	16.4	26.9	22.5	15.2
2017	16.1	27.4	23.7	15.0
2018	16.3	27.1	25.4	14.6
2019	16.3	25.9	27.7	14.6
2020	17.2	23.0	28.1	14.0
2021	17.3	23.7	31.2	13.9
2022	16.9	18.8	31.6	13.6
2023	16.6	14.0	30.6	13.3
2024	16.4	12.8	28.8	13.6
2025	16.0	12.5	27.4	13.7
2026*	16.2	12.1	27.1	13.7
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA

EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa.

* First and second quarter data
Note: The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base. Employment rate calculated for the 16-64 population. Unemploment rate calculated over the active population (16 and more).

INEQUALITY & POVERTY

Inequality & poverty

	Gini index of equivalised disposable income	At-risk-of-poverty rate (%)	At-risk-of-poverty rate, 2008 fixed threshold (%)	Severe material deprivation (%)
2014	34.6	22.1	29.9	7.1
2015	34.5	22.3	29.2	6.4
2016	34.1	21.6	26.5	5.8
2017	33.2	21.5	25.5	5.1
2018	33.0	20.7	24.9	5.4
2019	32.1	21.0	21.8	4.7
2020	33.0	21.7	22.8	7.0
2021	32.0	20.4	20.5	7.3
2022	31.5	20.2	20.1	8.1
2023	31.2	19.7	18.7	8.9
2024	30.8	19.5	16.3	8.4
2025				7.6
Source	ECV	ECV	ECV	ECV

ECV: Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida.

Gini index of equivalised disposable income: The extent to which the distribution of equivalised disposable income (net income divided by unit of consumption; modified OECD scale) deviates from a distribution of perfect equity (all individuals obtain the same income). **At-risk-of-poverty rate (%):** Population below the poverty line. Poverty threshold: 60% of median equivalised disposable income (annual net income per unit of consumption; modified OECD scale) in each year. **At-risk-of-poverty rate, 2008 fixed threshold (%):** Population below the poverty line. Poverty threshold: 60% of median equivalised disposable income (annual net income per unit of consumption; modified OECD scale). In this case, the threshold used is the 2008 one. **Severe material deprivation (%):** People with material deprivation in at least 4 items (Europe 2020 Strategy).

SOCIAL PROTECTION

Public expenditure & contributory benefits

	Public expenditure on minimum income benefits (% GDP)	Expenditure on social protection, cash benefits (% GDP)	Contributory benefits						
			Permanent disability, pensions	Permanent disability, average amount (€)	Retirement, pensions	Retirement, average amount (€)	Widowhood, pensions	Widowhood, average amount (€)	Unemploy-ment
2015	0.16	17.0	931,668	923	5,641,908	1,021	2,353,257	631	838,392
2016	0.14	16.9	938,344	930	5,731,952	1,043	2,358,666	638	763,697
2017	0.14	16.6	947,130	936	5,826,123	1,063	2,360,395	646	726,575
2018	0.14	16.8	951,838	946	5,929,471	1,091	2,359,931	664	751,172
2019	0.14	17.3	957,500	975	6,038,326	1,138	2,361,620	712	807,614
2020	0.21	21.9	952,704	985	6,094,447	1,162	2,352,680	725	1,828,489
2021	0.33	20.1	949,765	994	6,165,349	1,190	2,353,987	740	922,856
2022	0.35	18.4	951,067	1,035	6,253,797	1,254	2,351,703	778	773,227
2023	0.38	18.5	945,963	1,119	6,367,671	1,375	2,351,851	852	801,091
2024	0.41	18.7	965,412	1,163	6,484,984	1,443	2,351,531	896	840,127
2025			1,026,943	1,209	6,594,140	1,506	2,348,268	935	864,169
2026*			1,058,545	1,254	6,699,263	1,570	2,343,551	974	886,943
Source	MTES	Eurostat	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES

Non contributory benefits

	Non-contributory benefits		
	Unemployment	Disability	Retirement
2015	1,102,529	198,891	253,838
2016	997,192	199,762	254,741
2017	902,193	199,120	256,187
2018	853,437	196,375	256,842
2019	912,384	193,122	259,570
2020	1,017,429	188,670	261,325
2021	969,412	184,378	262,177
2022	882,585	179,967	265,831
2023	875,969	175,792	272,188
2024	869,316	171,353	282,403
2025	916,498	167,868	292,951
2026*	903,737	164,955	301,418
Source	MTES	MTES	MTES

MTES: Ministerio de Trabajo y Economía Social.

* January to August data, but for unemployment (January-July).

Expenditure on social protection, cash benefits (% GDP): Includes benefits for: sickness or disability, old age, survivors, family and children, unemployment, housing, social exclusion and other expenses. **Public expenditure on minimum income benefits (% GDP):** Minimum insertion wage and migrants' allowances and other benefits.

HEALTH

Expenditure & primary care staff

	Public expenditure (% GDP)	Private expenditure (% GDP)	Private expenditure (% total expenditure)	Primary care doctors per 1,000 people asigned	Primary care nurses per 1,000 people asigned
2015	6.1	2.7	29.7	0.76	0.64
2016	6.0	2.7	29.5	0.76	0.65
2017	5.9	2.8	30.5	0.77	0.65
2018	6.0	2.8	30.8	0.77	0.66
2019	6.1	2.8	30.6	0.78	0.67
2020	7.6	3.0	27.9	0.78	0.66
2021	7.2	2.8	27.4	0.77	0.66
2022	6.8	2.6	27.1	0.78	0.70
2023	6.6	2.5	26.8	0.79	0.73
2024	6.5	2.3	27.2	0.79	0.75
2025		2.3	26.1	0.79	0.75
Source	Eurostat	OECD	OECD	INCLASNS	INCLASNS

Other staff & waiting times

	Medical specialists per 1,000 inhabitants	Specialist nurses per 1,000 inhabitants	Patients waiting for a first consultation in specialised care per 1,000 inhabitants[1]	Average waiting time for a first consultation in specialised care (days)[1]	Patients waiting for a non-urgent surgical intervention per 1,000 inhabitants[1]	Average waiting time for non-urgent surgery (days)[1]
2015	1.85	3.19	43.4	58	12.2	89
2016	1.90	3.27	45.7	72	13.7	115
2017	1.93	3.38	45.9	66	13.1	106
2018	1.98	3.45	62.5	96	14.8	129
2019	1.97	3.50	63.7	88	15.5	121
2020	2.02	3.74	53.6	99	15.1	155
2021	2.11	3.90	77.2	89	15.4	123
2022	2.14	3.87	85.4	95	17.1	120
2023	2.15	3.87	81.5	101	18.1	128
2024	2.21	3.91	83.2	105	17.8	126
2025			84.4	102	17.7	121
Source	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS

INCLASNS: Indicadores clave del Sistema Nacional del Salud.

[1] Only in the public health system.

focus

ON SPANISH SOCIETY