



# focus

O N S P A N I S H S O C I E T Y

---

FEBRUARY 2026

---



*Focus on Spanish Society* is published by the Social Studies Office of **Funcas**. The aim of this publication is to depict the Spanish social situation and provide brief insights into some of its most relevant aspects. *Focus on Spanish Society* consists of three sections. The first section, **SPAIN IN EUROPE**, draws attention to recently published statistical data and puts the Spanish case in comparative perspective. The second section, **PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS**, examines in more detail one particular social issue as perceived by the Spanish public and manifested through opinion surveys. Finally, the third section **FOLLOW-UP SOCIAL DATA** presents several social indicators related to demography and families, labour market and education, health and welfare benefits and services.



ISSN: 3020-8211  
Orders and information:  
**Funcas**  
Caballero de Gracia, 28  
28013 Madrid (Spain)  
Phone: +34 91 596 57 18  
Fax: +34 91 596 57 96  
[publica@funcas.es](mailto:publica@funcas.es)  
[www.funcas.es](http://www.funcas.es)



## SPAIN IN EUROPE

# Union Membership in Europe and Spain

Union membership rates reveal the social penetration of trade unions and their capacity for representing the interests and views of salaried workers. Beyond their institutional role in collective bargaining and other practices of work relations, the degree to which employees decide to join unions reflects their level of identification with these organizations and the organizations' ability to attract and retain new members. In the last years, several studies have highlighted a process of weakening union membership in many advanced economies, especially among the younger workers and those with more unstable employment trajectories. This phenomenon has been linked to structural changes in labor markets, such as increased temporary and part-time employment, greater job rotation, and the transformation of employment relationships.

OECD data on union density (trade union membership as a percentage of the salaried workforce) offer valuable insights into longer-term trends in union membership across advanced economies. Since the early 2000s, Spain has displayed relatively low and gradually declining levels of union membership, falling from around 15% of employees at the beginning of the period to about 12–13% in the most recent years with available data (figure 1). This trajectory contrasts sharply with Sweden, where union density has also declined but remains very high, at around two-thirds of employees, and with Italy, which has maintained comparatively stable and relatively high levels, close to 30%. Germany occupies an intermediate position, with a steady decrease from just over 20% to around 14%.

Another source, based upon a different methodology, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (waves 2022-2024)<sup>1</sup> places Spain in a relative better position within the group of Western European countries with available data.


**Since the early 2000s, Spain has displayed relatively low and gradually declining levels of union membership, falling from around 15% of employees to about 12–13% in the most recent years**

<sup>1</sup> Data coming from the 2022 and 2024 waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). For Spain, the information comes from the 2024 survey.



FIGURE 1

Trade union membership  
Sweden, Italy, Germany and Spain, 2000-2024. **Percentage of the salaried workforce**



Source: own elaboration based on the OECD/AIAS ICTWSS Database, version 2.0 (September 2025).


**Spain shows a very limited union integration of broad segments of the labor market**

With a membership rate of 18% of the salaried population under 65 years of age in 2024, it is clearly below the Nordic countries and Austria, but at a level that is similar to those of Germany, Italy, or the Netherlands (figure 2). At the same time, the high percentage of salaried workers in Spain who have never joined a union stands out, reaching 66%, which suggests a very limited union integration of broad segments of the labor market.



FIGURE 2

Trade union membership  
Selected European countries in the ISSP, 2024. **Percentage of the salaried workforce**



Source: own elaboration with International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data (waves 2022-2024).



## The **age and contractual divide** in union membership

Beyond aggregate differences between countries, the ISSP data allows to analyze the extent to which union membership varies according to age and the workers' position in the labor market. To explore this, we distinguish between full-time workers, who can be considered as insiders, due to their greater job stability, and part-time workers, who help us identify those with more peripheral positions, that is, outsiders. We also take into account the worker's age because age captures differences in career stage, employment stability, and exposure to union organizations.

**Figure 3** presents union membership rates among salaried workers aged 25 to 44 and 45 to 64, differentiating according to work schedule type<sup>2</sup>. The first relevant conclusion is that, in most of the European countries analyzed, union membership is substantially lower among young workers than among older ones, even when considering only full-time employees.

Compared to most countries included in the analysis, Spain presents a distinctive profile. Among workers aged 25 to 44, 18% of full-time employees are union members, a percentage that drops to 10% among part-time workers. This difference indicates that outsider status is associated with a lower probability of membership in the early stages of working life. This diagnosis applies even more clearly to Italy. In both Spain and Italy, union membership is concentrated to a greater extent among workers with more stable trajectories, while young people in more precarious positions largely remain outside union organizations.

Among older workers, the gap according to work schedule duration is substantially smaller, almost non-existent. In the 45 to 64 age group, membership rates stand around 24% among part-time employees and 26% among full-time workers. This suggests that, once certain job stability is achieved and experience is accumulated in the labor market, the difference between insiders and outsiders loses relevance.

**The outsider status is associated with a lower probability of membership in the early stages of working life both in Spain and Italy**


<sup>2</sup> Given the small sample size in some subgroups, some results should be interpreted with caution.




FIGURE 3

## Trade union membership

a. Selected European countries in the ISSP, 2024, workers aged 25 to 44, by type of workday. **Percentage of the salaried workforce**



b. Selected European countries in the ISSP, 2024, workers aged 45 to 64, by type of workday. **Percentage of the salaried workforce**



● Full-time

× Part-time

Note: Denmark data not available.

Source: own elaboration with International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data (waves 2022-2024).

**Unions maintain a relatively stronger presence among workers with stable trajectories, but find it difficult in integrating new entrants**

International comparison reinforces this interpretation. In the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway and Iceland) the differences between work schedules are small, even among younger workers, which reflects an inclusive union model. In these contexts, membership depends much less on contractual position. By contrast, in most of Central and Eastern Europe the patterns of union membership by type of contract and by age are more irregular, all within a context of reduced membership rates.

Spain conforms to a membership model based predominantly on labor market insiders. Unions maintain a relatively stronger presence among workers with stable trajectories, but encounter greater difficulties in integrating new entrants to the labor market and those in more vulnerable positions.

From a dynamic perspective, this pattern poses relevant challenges for the sustainability of union representation in the medium term. Low membership among young outsiders limits the generational renewal of organizations and may contribute to a progressive aging of their social base. Moreover, it increases the risk that broad labor market segments remain underrepresented in social dialogue mechanisms.

In sum, the data suggest that in Spain, union membership weakness has a marked generational and contractual component. It is not only a matter of an aggregate reduction in the number of members, but also of a persistent difficulty in establishing strong ties with younger workers and with those in more fragile employment positions.

**The Spanish pattern poses relevant challenges for the sustainability of union representation in the medium term**



## PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS

# Public Confidence in the Spanish **Justice System**: Strong but Not Without **Warning Signs**

**The justice system clearly outperforms political institutions, suggesting it retains considerable legitimacy compared to other state institutions**

In democratic societies, the legitimacy of the justice system depends not only on its formal independence but also on the citizens' perception of its fairness. When public trust erodes, the consequences extend beyond the courtrooms, undermining the rule of law and creating space for institutional fragility. Understanding how citizens view their justice system is therefore essential to diagnosing the democratic health of a country.

In contemporary Western societies, Spain included, increasing polarization intensifies the relevance of this question. High-profile legal cases involving political figures attract intense scrutiny and partisan interpretation, placing courts under pressure. Recent survey data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) reveals a complex picture: surface stability masking deeper currents of skepticism, and troubling consensus across ideological divides.

According to December 2025 CIS data, the justice system occupies a relatively strong position in public trust, ranking third out of the nine institutions measured. On a 1-10 confidence scale, it averages 4.9, well above the bottom-ranked political parties (3.5), and trade unions (3.7) (**figure 1**). It is true that it sits considerably behind the 1978 Constitution (6.4), which stands out notably, but it scores nearly identically to the Constitutional Court (5.0). This positioning is noteworthy. The justice system clearly outperforms political institutions, suggesting it retains considerable legitimacy compared to other state institutions.


The level of trust of the public in the justice system has remained relatively stable since 2021, the same as the rest of institutions and organizations, except political parties, which show a clear decline (**figure 2**). However, when asked directly whether their confidence in the justice system has changed over the last five years, the percentage reporting a lower confidence rose from 26 % in





FIGURE 1

Public confidence in institutions  
December 2025. **Average in a 1-10 scale**



**Question:** In general, could you rate from 1 to 10 the level of trust you currently have in each of these institutions and political organizations, understanding that 1 represents the lowest level of trust and 10 the highest level of trust?

**Source:** CIS, Study no. 3535.

2023 to 34 % in 2025 (**figure 3**). This increase comes primarily at the expense of those reporting an unchanged confidence, suggesting a gradual erosion.


The most striking findings emerge when citizens assess specific dimensions of judicial fairness (**figure 4**). Only 20 % agree that the justice system treats rich and poor equally, suggesting a widespread perception of class bias. Even more remarkable, only 10 % agree that politicians receive the same treatment as ordinary citizens. Similarly, the public strongly disagrees

**When asked directly whether their confidence in the justice system has changed over the last five years, the percentage reporting a lower confidence rose**



FIGURE 2

Public confidence in institutions  
2021-2025. **Average in a 1-10 scale**




**Question:** In general, could you rate from 1 to 10 the level of trust you currently have in each of these institutions and political organizations, understanding that 1 represents the lowest level of trust and 10 the highest level of trust?

**Source:** CIS, Studies nos. 3343, 3383, 3424, 3486 and 3535.



FIGURE 3

## Public confidence in justice system

2021-2025. **Confidence level 5 years ago compared to now, percentages**

**Question:** And five years ago, in general, did you have more, the same or less confidence than you do now in the justice system?

**Source:** CIS, Studies nos. 3343, 3383, 3424, 3486 and 3535.

**Only 20 % agree that the justice system treats rich and poor equally, suggesting a widespread perception of class bias**


that the justice system is always impartial in cases affecting political parties. Crucially, these perceptions cut across ideological positions and whether on the left, the center, or the right, Spaniards overwhelmingly share the view that politicians receive a different treatment (**figure 5**).

Not all findings are negative. Over half of respondents agree that women have equal opportunities to advance in judicial careers (**figure 4**). This may reflect a visible reality: [women now constitute 57 % of judges and magistrates in Spain](#), and among recent entrants to the judiciary, the female presence is



FIGURE 4

## Public opinion on judicial fairness

April 2025. **Percentages**

**Question:** I'm going to read you a series of statements about the Spanish judicial system. For each one, I'd like you to tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.


**Source:** CIS, Study no. 3497.



FIGURE 5

### Justice system treats politicians and ordinary citizens equally

Strongly disagree or disagree, April 2025. **Percentages by ideological self-placement (1-left, 10-right)**



**Question:** I'm going to read you a series of statements about the Spanish judicial system. For each one, I'd like you to tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

**Source:** CIS, Study no. 3497.

even more pronounced, since around 70% of those who joined in the most recent cohorts were women.

The Spanish justice system faces a subtle but serious challenge. While it maintains relative advantage in public trust over political institutions, warning signs suggest underlying fragility. The growing share of citizens reporting declining confidence and the big proportion of respondents believing that politicians are privileged by the justice system point to an erosion of legitimacy. In an era of institutional fragility and polarization, these patterns merit serious attention from policymakers, judicial authorities, and citizens alike.

**The Spanish justice system faces a subtle but serious challenge which merit serious attention from policymakers, judicial authorities, and citizens alike**



## POPULATION

### Population, life expectancy and dependency

	Total population	Average age	67 and older (%)	Life expectancy at birth (men)	Life expectancy at birth (women)	Life expectancy at 65 (men)	Life expectancy at 65 (women)	Dependency rate (older than 66)	Dependency rate
2014	46,495,744	42.2	16.0	80.1	85.6	19.0	22.9	23.6	47.3
2015	46,425,722	42.5	16.3	79.9	85.4	18.8	22.6	24.1	47.9
2016	46,418,884	42.7	16.6	80.3	85.8	19.1	23.0	24.7	48.5
2017	46,497,393	43.0	16.9	80.3	85.7	19.1	23.0	25.1	48.9
2018	46,645,070	43.2	17.0	80.4	85.8	19.2	23.0	25.4	49.0
2019	46,918,951	43.4	17.2	80.8	86.2	19.4	23.4	25.5	48.9
2020	47,318,050	43.6	17.3	79.5	85.0	18.3	22.3	25.8	48.8
2021	47,400,798	43.8	17.5	80.2	85.8	18.9	23.1	26.0	48.5
2022	47,486,727	44.1	17.7	80.4	85.7	19.1	23.0	26.3	48.5
2023	48,085,361	44.2	17.8	81.1	86.3	19.7	23.5	26.4	48.1
2024	48,619,695	44.4	18.0	81.4	86.5	19.9	23.6	26.6	47.8
2025	49,128,297	44.6	18.3					26.9	47.6
Source	ECP	IDB	ECP	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	ECP	ECP

### Migration

	Foreign population (%)	Foreign-born population (%)	Foreign-born with Spanish nationality (% over total foreign born)	Immigration	Emigration
2014	10.1	12.8	28.7	305,454	400,430
2015	9.6	12.7	31.8	342,114	343,875
2016	9.5	12.7	33.0	414,746	327,325
2017	9.5	12.9	34.4	532,132	368,860
2018	9.8	13.3	34.2	643,684	309,526
2019	10.3	14.0	33.8	750,480	296,248
2020	11.1	14.8	32.9	467,918	248,561
2021	11.4	15.3	33.1	887,960 <sup>a</sup>	696,866 <sup>a</sup>
2022	11.6	15.7	33.6	1,258,894	531,889
2023	12.7	17.1	32.2	1,250,991	608,695
2024	13.4	18.2	32.1	1,288,562	662,294
2025	14.1	19.1	32.2		
Source	ECP	ECP	ECP	EMCR and EM*	EMCR and EM*

**ECP:** Estadística Continua de Población. **IDB:** Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. **EM:** Estadística de Migraciones. **EMCR:** Estadística de Migraciones y Cambios de Residencia

<sup>a</sup> Break in the series.

\* Estadística de Migraciones y Cambios de Residencia (2021 onwards), Estadística de Migraciones (up to 2020). Series not comparable.

**Dependency rate:** (15 or less years old population + 67 or more years old population) / 16-66 years old population, as a percentage. **Dependency rate (older than 66):** 67 or more years old population / 16-67 years old population, as a percentage.



## HOUSEHOLDS &amp; FAMILIES

## Households

	Households (thousands)	Average household size	Households with one person younger than 65 (%)	Households with one person older than 65 (%)	Single-parent households (%)	Emancipation rate 25-29 years old (%)
2014	18,329	2.52	14.2	10.6	8.2	50.4
2015	18,376	2.51	14.6	10.7	8.2	48.2
2016	18,444	2.50	14.6	10.9	8.3	47.2
2017	18,513	2.49	14.2	11.4	8.6	46.1
2018	18,581	2.49	14.3	11.5	8.3	46.1
2019	18,697	2.49	14.9	11.2	9.0	45.9
2020	18,794	2.49	15.0	11.4	9.1	43.2
2021	18,746	2.51	15.6	11.0	9.0	37.9
2022	19,078	2.49	15.4	11.7	8.8	40.4
2023	19,369	2.48	16.4	12.0	8.4	42.5
2024	19,537	2.48	16.3	11.9	9.5	42.3
2025	19,760	2.48				43.5
Source	EPA	EPA	EPF	EPF	EPF	EPA

EPF: Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares. EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa.

**Note:** The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base. The EPF data in 2023 are not strictly comparable with previous ones, as they are based on new population estimates.

**Single-parent households (%)**: One adult with a child /children

**Emancipation rate 25-29 years old (%)**: Percentage of persons (25-29 years old) living in households in which they are not children of the reference person.

## Nuptiality &amp; divorces

	Marriages per inhabitant	Marriages per inhabitant (Spanish)	Marriages per inhabitant (foreigners)	First marriages over total marriages (%)	Mean age at first marriage, (men)	Mean age at first marriage, (women)	Same sex marriages, (men) (%)	Same sex marriages, (women) (%)	Mixed marriages (%)	Divorces per inhabitant
2014	0.49	0.52	0.34	84.3	34.4	32.3	1.03	0.98	13.7	0.29
2015	0.52	0.55	0.34	83.7	34.8	32.7	1.14	1.07	13.1	0.28
2016	0.54	0.58	0.37	83.1	35.1	32.9	1.25	1.22	13.2	0.28
2017	0.55	0.58	0.38	82.4	35.3	33.2	1.34	1.33	14.0	0.29
2018	0.53	0.57	0.36	81.5	35.6	33.4	1.41	1.50	14.2	0.28
2019	0.53	0.57	0.37	80.5	36.0	33.9	1.50	1.59	15.1	0.27
2020	0.28	0.30	0.22	76.6	37.1	34.9	1.66	1.86	17.3	0.23
2021	0.47	0.52	0.30	80.4	36.8	34.6	1.48	1.93	14.8	0.25
2022	0.58	0.63	0.37	81.4	36.7	34.6	1.59	1.89	15.3	0.24
2023	0.55	0.60	0.35	81.5	36.9	34.9	1.84	2.09	16.7	0.22
2024	0.55	0.61	0.36	81.4	37.3	35.2	2.02	2.16	16.7	0.24
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	MNP	MNP	MNP	IDB

IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. MNP: Movimiento Natural de la Población.

**Marriages per inhabitant**: Average number of times an individual would marry in his or her lifetime, if the same age-specific nuptiality intensity were to be maintained as observed in the current year. **Mixed marriage**: Marriage of a Spaniard to a foreigner. **Divorces per inhabitant**: Average number of times an individual would divorce in his or her lifetime, if the same intensity of divorce by age as observed in the current year were to be maintained.



## HOUSEHOLDS &amp; FAMILIES

## Fertility (I)

	Average age at first child, total women	Average age at first child, Spanish women	Average age at first child, foreign women	Total fertility rate	Total fertility rate (Spanish women)	Total fertility rate (foreign women)
2014	30.6	31.1	27.5	1.32	1.27	1.61
2015	30.7	31.2	27.6	1.33	1.28	1.65
2016	30.8	31.3	27.6	1.33	1.28	1.71
2017	30.9	31.5	27.6	1.31	1.25	1.70
2018	31.0	31.6	27.8	1.26	1.20	1.64
2019	31.1	31.7	28.1	1.23	1.17	1.58
2020	31.2	31.8	28.3	1.18	1.13	1.45
2021	31.5	32.1	28.8	1.18	1.15	1.35
2022	31.6	32.2	28.5	1.16	1.12	1.35
2023	31.5	32.2	28.5	1.12	1.09	1.28
2024	31.5	32.3	28.4	1.10	1.07	1.27
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB

## Fertility (II)

	Births to unmarried mothers (%)	Births to unmarried Spanish mothers (%)	Births to unmarried foreign mothers (%)	Abortion rate	Abortions by women born in Spain (%)
2014	42.5	43.1	39.7	10.5	63.3
2015	44.5	45.5	39.6	10.4	63.9
2016	45.9	47.0	40.7	10.4	64.5
2017	46.8	48.1	41.1	10.5	64.6
2018	47.3	48.9	41.2	11.1	63.7
2019	48.4	50.1	42.4	11.5	62.6
2020	47.6	50.0	39.3	10.3	64.1
2021	49.3	52.0	39.2	10.7	65.1
2022	50.1	53.1	40.3	11.7	66.7
2023	50.0	52.7	41.5	12.2	63.1
2024	50.0	52.4	42.9	12.4	62.2
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	MS	MS

IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. MS: Ministerio Sanidad.

**Total fertility rate:** Average number of children a woman would have during her childbearing life if she were to maintain the same age-specific fertility intensity as observed in the current year. **Abortion rate:** Number of abortions / women between 15 and 44 years old x 1,000. **Abortion by women born in Spain (%):** Abortions by women born in Spain as percentage of all abortions by women living in Spain.



## EDUCATION

## Educational attainment

	Population 25 years and older with primary education (%)	Population 25 years and older with tertiary education (%)	Population 25-34 years old with primary education (%)	Population 25-34 years old with tertiary education (%)
2014	26.3	29.0	6.8	41.5
2015	25.2	29.3	7.3	41.0
2016	24.2	29.8	7.2	41.0
2017	23.2	30.4	6.7	42.6
2018	22.3	31.1	6.3	44.3
2019	20.9	32.3	5.8	46.5
2020	19.2	33.4	5.5	47.4
2021	18.4	34.1	5.6	48.5
2022	18.0	34.4	5.6	50.2
2023	17.8	34.9	5.3	52.0
2024	17.0	35.4	5.0	52.6
2025	16.8	36.0	4.8	52.5
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA

## Educational enrollment ratios

	Gross enrollment rate in pre-primary education, first cycle	Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (general)	Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (vocational)	Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (vocational)	Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (university: undergraduate and postgraduate)
2014	34.2	80.7	41.5	41.7	47.4
2015	35.1	80.2	40.3	41.0	47.4
2016	36.7	76.9	38.5	43.6	47.7
2017	38.5	74.3	37.8	45.1	47.6
2018	39.9	72.5	38.1	44.9	47.1
2019	41.3	71.0	38.8	47.3	46.7
2020	36.0	70.4	41.1	53.6	47.6
2021	42.0	69.5	42.3	54.6	47.3
2022	46.0	67.1	42.6	55.4	46.1
2023	47.9	65.8	43.4	57.3	45.7
2024	49.3	62.7	43.3	58.0	45.8
Source	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MU and ECP



## EDUCATION

## Educational outcomes and expenditure

	Graduation rate in 4-year university degrees (%)	Drop-out rate in undergraduate studies (%)	Early school leavers from education and training (%)	Public expenditure (%GDP)	Private expenditure (%GDP)	Private expenditure (% total expenditure in education)
2014	50.2	33.2	21.9	4.31	1.41	24.7
2015	51.8	33.2	20.0	4.29	1.36	24.1
2016	52.8	33.2	19.0	4.24	1.34	24.1
2017	53.4	31.7	18.3	4.22	1.30	23.7
2018	54.8	31.4	17.9	4.18	1.33	24.2
2019	55.5	30.6	17.3	4.24	1.31	23.7
2020			16.0	4.89	1.43	22.7
2021			13.3	4.84	1.28	20.4
2022			13.9	4.61		
2023			13.7	4.54		
2024			13.0			
Source	MU	MU	MEFPD	MEFPD	OECD	OECD

EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa. MEFPD: Ministerio de Educación, Formación Profesional y Deporte. ECP: Estadística Continua de Población. MU: Ministerio de Universidades. OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

**Note:** The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base.

**Gross enrollment rate in pre-primary education, first cycle:** Enrolled in early childhood education as a percentage of the population aged 0 to 2 years. **Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (general):** General secondary enrollment (Bachillerato) as a percentage of the population aged 16 to 17. **Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (vocational):** On-site and distance learning enrollment. Enrolled in intermediate level training cycles (Ciclos Formativos de Grado Medio) as a percentage of the population aged 16 to 17. **Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (vocational):** On-site and distance learning enrollment. Enrolled in higher level training cycles (Ciclos Formativos de Grado Superior) as a percentage of the population aged 18 to 19. **Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (university: undergraduate or postgraduate studies):** Enrolled in official bachelor's or master's degrees as a percentage of the population aged 18 to 24. **Graduation rate in 4-year university degrees (%):** Percentage of students who complete the degree in the theoretical time foreseen or in one additional academic year. **Drop-out rate in undergraduate studies (%):** New entrants in an academic year who stop studying in one of the following 3 years. **Early school leavers from education and training (%):** Percentage of the population aged 18-24 who have not completed upper secondary education and are not in any form of education or training.



## LABOUR MARKET

## Employment and unemployment

	Employed population (thousands)	Unemployed population (thousands)	Employment rate (16-64, men)	Employment rate (16-64, women)	Unemployment rate (men)	Employment rate (women)
2014	17,344	5,610	61.6	52.0	23.6	25.4
2015	17,866	5,056	64.0	53.4	20.8	23.5
2016	18,342	4,481	65.8	55.1	18.1	21.4
2017	18,825	3,917	67.6	56.5	15.7	19.0
2018	19,328	3,479	69.0	57.8	13.7	17.0
2019	19,779	3,248	69.9	58.8	12.4	16.0
2020	19,202	3,531	67.3	56.6	13.9	17.4
2021	19,834	3,476	68.7	58.6	13.2	16.8
2022	20,548	3,079	70.5	60.2	11.4	14.9
2023	21,182	2,938	71.3	61.7	10.7	13.9
2024	21,654	2,771	71.8	62.6	10.2	12.7
2025	22,221	2,608	72.2	63.3	9.6	12.0
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA





## LABOUR MARKET

### Public employment, temporary contracts & part-time employment

	Public employees (% total employed)	Employees with temporary contracts, private sector (% total employees)	Employees with temporary contracts, public sector (% total employees)	Part-time employed (%)
2014	16.9	25.0	20.2	15.9
2015	16.7	26.0	21.6	15.7
2016	16.4	26.9	22.5	15.2
2017	16.1	27.4	23.7	15.0
2018	16.3	27.1	25.4	14.6
2019	16.3	25.9	27.7	14.6
2020	17.2	23.0	28.1	14.0
2021	17.3	23.7	31.2	13.9
2022	16.9	18.8	31.6	13.6
2023	16.6	14.0	30.6	13.3
2024	16.4	12.8	28.8	13.6
2025	16.0	12.5	27.4	13.7
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA

EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa.

**Note:** The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base. Employment rate calculated for the 16-64 population. Unemployment rate calculated over the active population (16 and more).



## INEQUALITY & POVERTY

### Inequality & poverty

	Gini index of equivalised disposable income	At-risk-of-poverty rate (%)	At-risk-of-poverty rate, 2008 fixed threshold (%)	Severe material deprivation (%)
2014	34.6	22.1	29.9	7.1
2015	34.5	22.3	29.2	6.4
2016	34.1	21.6	26.5	5.8
2017	33.2	21.5	25.5	5.1
2018	33.0	20.7	24.9	5.4
2019	32.1	21.0	21.8	4.7
2020	33.0	21.7	22.8	7.0
2021	32.0	20.4	20.5	7.3
2022	31.5	20.2	20.1	8.1
2023	31.2	19.7	18.7	8.9
2024	30.8	19.5	16.3	8.4
2025				7.6
Source	ECV	ECV	ECV	ECV

ECV: Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida.

**Gini index of equivalised disposable income:** The extent to which the distribution of equivalised disposable income (net income divided by unit of consumption; modified OECD scale) deviates from a distribution of perfect equity (all individuals obtain the same income). **At-risk-of-poverty rate (%):** Population below the poverty line. Poverty threshold: 60% of median equivalised disposable income (annual net income per unit of consumption; modified OECD scale) in each year. **At-risk-of-poverty rate, 2008 fixed threshold (%):** Population below the poverty line. Poverty threshold: 60% of median equivalised disposable income (annual net income per unit of consumption; modified OECD scale). In this case, the threshold used is the 2008 one. **Severe material deprivation (%):** People with material deprivation in at least 4 items (Europe 2020 Strategy).



## SOCIAL PROTECTION

## Public expenditure &amp; contributory benefits

	Public expenditure on minimum income benefits (% GDP)	Expenditure on social protection, cash benefits (% GDP)	Contributory benefits						
			Permanent disability, pensions	Permanent disability, average amount (€)	Retirement, pensions	Retirement, average amount (€)	Widowhood, pensions	Widowhood, average amount (€)	Unemployment
2014	0.15	17.8	929,484	916	5,558,964	1,000	2,348,388	624	
2015	0.16	17.0	931,668	923	5,641,908	1,021	2,353,257	631	838,392
2016	0.14	16.9	938,344	930	5,731,952	1,043	2,358,666	638	763,697
2017	0.14	16.6	947,130	936	5,826,123	1,063	2,360,395	646	726,575
2018	0.14	16.8	951,838	946	5,929,471	1,091	2,359,931	664	751,172
2019	0.14	17.3	957,500	975	6,038,326	1,138	2,361,620	712	807,614
2020	0.21	21.9	952,704	985	6,094,447	1,162	2,352,680	725	1,828,489
2021	0.33	20.1	949,765	994	6,165,349	1,190	2,353,987	740	922,856
2022	0.35	18.4	951,067	1,035	6,253,797	1,254	2,351,703	778	773,227
2023	0.42	18.5	945,963	1,119	6,367,671	1,375	2,351,851	852	801,091
2024			965,412	1,163	6,484,984	1,443	2,351,531	896	840,127
2025			1,026,943	1,209	6,594,140	1,506	2,348,268	935	864,169
2026*			1,053,843	1,253	6,666,863	1,564	2,348,590	972	
Source	MTES	Eurostat	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES

## Non contributory benefits

	Non-contributory benefits		
	Unemployment	Disability	Retirement
2014		197,303	252,328
2015	1,102,529	198,891	253,838
2016	997,192	199,762	254,741
2017	902,193	199,120	256,187
2018	853,437	196,375	256,842
2019	912,384	193,122	259,570
2020	1,017,429	188,670	261,325
2021	969,412	184,378	262,177
2022	882,585	179,967	265,831
2023	875,969	175,792	272,188
2024	869,316	171,353	282,403
2025	916,498	167,868	292,951
Source	MTES	MTES	MTES

MTES: Ministerio de Trabajo y Economía Social.

\* January data.

**Expenditure on social protection, cash benefits (% GDP):** Includes benefits for: sickness or disability, old age, survivors, family and children, unemployment, housing, social exclusion and other expenses. **Public expenditure on minimum income benefits (% GDP):** Minimum insertion wage and migrants' allowances and other benefits.



## HEALTH

## Expenditure &amp; primary care staff

	Public expenditure (% GDP)	Private expenditure (% GDP)	Private expenditure (% total expenditure)	Primary care doctors per 1,000 people assigned	Primary care nurses per 1,000 people assigned
2014	6.1	2.7	30.7	0.76	0.65
2015	6.1	2.6	29.7	0.76	0.64
2016	6.0	2.5	29.5	0.76	0.65
2017	5.9	2.6	30.5	0.77	0.65
2018	6.0	2.7	30.8	0.77	0.66
2019	6.1	2.7	30.6	0.78	0.67
2020	7.6	2.9	27.9	0.78	0.66
2021	7.2	2.7	27.4	0.77	0.66
2022	6.8	2.5	27.1	0.78	0.70
2023	6.6	2.4	26.8	0.79	0.74
2024		2.5	27.2	0.79	0.76
Source	Eurostat	OECD	OECD	INCLASNS	INCLASNS

## Other staff &amp; waiting times

	Medical specialists per 1,000 inhabitants	Specialist nurses per 1,000 inhabitants	Patients waiting for a first consultation in specialised care per 1,000 inhabitants <sup>1</sup>	Average waiting time for a first consultation in specialised care (days) <sup>1</sup>	Patients waiting for a non-urgent surgical intervention per 1,000 inhabitants <sup>1</sup>	Average waiting time for non-urgent surgery (days) <sup>1</sup>
2014	1.81	3.14	39.4	65.0	11.4	87.0
2015	1.85	3.19	43.4	58.0	12.2	89.0
2016	1.90	3.27	45.7	72.1	13.7	115.0
2017	1.93	3.38	45.9	66.2	13.1	106.1
2018	1.98	3.45	62.5	95.9	14.8	129.0
2019	1.97	3.50	63.7	87.6	15.5	121.5
2020	2.02	3.74	53.6	99.4	15.1	154.9
2021	2.11	3.90	77.2	88.9	15.4	122.8
2022	2.14	3.87	85.4	95.2	17.1	120.1
2023	2.15	3.87	81.5	101.0	18.1	128.0
2024			83.2	105.0	17.8	126.0
Source	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS

INCLASNS: Indicadores clave del Sistema Nacional del Salud.

<sup>1</sup> Only in the public health system.

