



focus

O N S P A N I S H S O C I E T Y

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Focus on Spanish Society is published by the Social Studies Office of **Funcas**. The aim of this publication is to depict the Spanish social situation and provide brief insights into some of its most relevant aspects. *Focus on Spanish Society* consists of three sections. The first section, **SPAIN IN EUROPE**, draws attention to recently published statistical data and puts the Spanish case in comparative perspective. The second section, **PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS**, examines in more detail one particular social issue as perceived by the Spanish public and manifested through opinion surveys. Finally, the third section **FOLLOW-UP SOCIAL DATA** presents several social indicators related to demography and families, labour market and education, health and welfare benefits and services.



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SPAIN IN EUROPE

Spain's delayed transition to living with a partner

A striking pattern is emerging across advanced economies that may shed light on the continued decline in fertility, showing that the problem extends beyond why families have fewer children than they would prefer. It also reflects the growing difficulty of forming and maintaining couples, especially among younger generations. This trend is visible across Europe, but it is particularly pronounced in Spain, where many contemporary demographic trends tend to appear in a more intensified form.

The European Social Survey (ESS) provides a valuable basis for comparing how couples formation varies across European countries and across different stages of adulthood. Its harmonised methodology and wide country coverage make it possible to assess, with precision, the share of people living with a partner in each context. Like most statistical sources, however, the ESS identifies only those individuals who live with a partner. Non-cohabiting relationships, especially common at younger ages, therefore remain outside the scope of cross-national analysis. With this limitation in mind, the present analysis draws on data from the EU countries that participated in the survey's 11th wave (2024).

The comparative picture (**Figure 1**) reveals a systematic and striking pattern. Young people in Spain are among the least likely in the European Union to live with their partners. The gap is especially remarkable (and concerning) among those aged 25 to 29: the proportion of young adults living with a partner is far below the European average (27 % compared with the EU's 42 %). The distance between Spaniards and their European peers narrows with age. Among those aged 30 to 35, 64 % of Europeans live with a partner, compared with 58 % in Spain. After age 35, Spain converges with the EU average.


There is only one country in the table (Italy) whose position is worse than Spain's. At very young ages, both countries show a similar share of young people living with a partner, but from age 30 onward Spain gradually moves

Young people in Spain are among the least likely in the European Union to live with their partners. The gap is especially remarkable (and concerning) among those aged 25 to 29



FIGURE 1

Share of people living with a partner
European Union, by age group (ESS 2024). **Percentages**



Notes: The percentages shown represent the share of individuals in each country and age group who report living with a partner. All results are weighted using the post-stratification weight pspwght, following ESS recommendations for producing nationally representative estimates.


Source: own elaboration with ESS data (2024, wave 11).

closer to the European average, while Italy remains at the bottom. It is noteworthy that other Southern European countries with structural challenges and cultural trajectories similar to those of Spain and Italy, such as Greece and Portugal, display higher rates of living with a partner in most age groups (Figure 2). This comparison underscores how distinctive the Spanish pattern



FIGURE 2

Share of people living with a partner
Selected countries of the European Union, by age group (ESS 2024). **Percentages**



Notes: The percentages shown represent the share of individuals in each country and age group who report living with a partner. All results are weighted using the post-stratification weight pspwght, following ESS recommendations for producing nationally representative estimates.

Source: own elaboration with ESS data (2024, wave 11).

is, even within its immediate regional context. By contrast, several Central and Eastern European countries, such as Hungary, stand well above the European average in rates of partner cohabitation. Northern European countries also lead by a wide margin, maintaining consistently high levels of cohabitation across almost all age groups. Taken together, these contrasts position Spain at the opposite end of the European spectrum.

The implications of this pattern are far from trivial. In a context defined by late home leaving, prolonged transitions to adulthood, labour-market uncertainty, mounting pressure in the housing market, and the rise of one-person households, the evidence suggests that Spain is especially exposed to these challenges. Together, they contribute to a scenario in which the transition to living with a partner is increasingly delayed. These dynamics affect a core dimension of adult life and can be expected to have substantial consequences for fertility. Understanding how and why Spain consistently falls below the European average in cohabitation is therefore key to interpreting the country's broader demographic transformation.

Other Southern European countries display higher rates of people living with a partner in most age groups



Limited homogamy among Spanish highly educated women

Partner selection is far from a random process. One of its most consistent patterns is educational homogamy, the tendency for individuals to form unions with partners who share a similar level of education. This regularity is not a mere sociological curiosity because it has substantial implications for the social and economic landscape. Couples in which both partners hold higher education degrees typically accumulate greater combined income, benefit from stronger labour-market prospects, and enjoy greater overall stability, reinforcing their relative advantage. In contrast, couples in which neither partner has higher education are more exposed to economic vulnerability. Educational homogamy therefore contributes to the intergenerational transmission of both advantage and disadvantage and, in highly polarised labour markets, can deepen inequalities between households.

Women are more likely to form unions with men who have the same or a higher level of education, while men more frequently partner with women who have lower levels of educational attainment


The tendency to form educationally homogamous unions becomes even more salient as educational expansion advances. In nearly all developed countries, including Spain, women now outperform men in university attainment. Yet partnering behaviours remain asymmetric, since women are more likely to form unions with men who have the same or a higher level of education, while men more frequently partner with women who have lower levels of educational attainment. This mismatch between the educational profile of younger cohorts and the preferences or practices that guide partner selection can generate tensions in the “partner market,” particularly for highly educated women whose chances of finding a similarly educated partner may be reduced. Understanding how these tensions emerge and how they differ across European countries is key to interpreting contemporary household formation and the inequalities that can arise from it. Figure 3 illustrates these patterns among cohabiting couples living together aged 25 to 50 in Spain and other EU member states in the ESS (2024, wave 11).

The data indicate that Spain aligns only partially with the patterns observed in other European countries and presents mismatches that merit closer attention. Among university graduates living with a partner, Spanish men display levels of educational homogamy very close to the European average, with 76 % living with a partner who also holds a university degree. This figure is virtually identical to the mean across the countries analysed. Spanish women with university education who live with a partner, however, show a markedly different pattern.



FIGURE 3

Educational profile of cohabiting couples
 EU countries participating in the ESS (ages 25 to 50). **Percentages**



Note: Percentages are weighted using the post-stratification weight pspwght, following ESS recommendations for producing nationally representative estimates.

Source: own elaboration with ESS data (2024, wave 11).

Only 53 % live with a partner of the same educational level, compared with a European average of 64 %. In several countries, the share is considerably higher, reaching 76 % in Germany, 71 % in Finland, 70 % in both Sweden and the Netherlands, 69 % in Ireland, and 68 % in France. This sizeable gap underscores that highly educated women in Spain pair with less-educated men far more frequently than is typical across most European contexts.

Among those without a university degree, the gender differences reappear, although in a less symmetrical way. Spanish men without higher education live with a university-educated partner in 30 % of cases, a proportion broadly consistent with that of other European countries. For Spanish women without higher education, the figure drops to 12 %, well below the European average of 16 % and the figures of countries such as Finland (35 %), Germany (32 %), Sweden (30 %) or Belgium (26 %).

Taken together, these results reinforce the idea of a partner market shaped by the intersection of educational profiles and gender dynamics. In Spain, highly educated women are less likely than their European counterparts to find partners with similar levels of education, and women with lower levels of education are also less likely to form unions with more highly educated partners. These combined processes generate a more polarised pattern of partner selection than that found in many other European contexts, with meaningful implications for how opportunities are distributed across households.

Only 53 % of Spanish women with university education live with a partner of the same educational level, compared with a European average of 64 %



PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS

Public concern over the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East follows parallel trends yet reveals divergent divides

Both conflicts' concerns display nearly parallel trajectories so that since the early phases of each war, levels of concern have shown a slow but steady decline


The ceasefire agreement reached regarding the war in the Middle East last October, although widely welcomed, has not fully reassured public opinion, which continues to view the situation as fragile and unresolved. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine remains clearly active, with no immediate prospect of de-escalation, and although several diplomatic initiatives have been launched, none has yet materialised into a concrete peace process. Despite these different stages of conflict, levels of concern among the public are strikingly similar in November 2025. According to the monthly surveys of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), 64 % of Spaniards aged 18 or over describe themselves as very or quite concerned about the war in Ukraine, a figure almost identical to the 63 % who express the same level of concern about the war in the Middle East (**Figure 1**). The intensity of concern, however, shows a noteworthy difference, since 27 % of respondents say they are very worried about the conflict in the Middle East, compared with 21 % for Ukraine. This indicates that, even after the ceasefire, the conflict in Gaza continues to be associated with a slightly heightened sense of unease among respondents.

Looking at the evolution of concern over time, both conflicts display nearly parallel trajectories (**Figure 2**). Since the early phases of each war, levels of concern have shown a slow but steady decline. This erosion, which is to be expected in prolonged crises as attention fatigue sets in, has been modest in both cases. A comparison between the data collected in July and the figures recorded after the peace treaty in the Middle East confirms that concern has fallen slightly, but the decrease is very limited.

The two conflicts diverge most clearly in their ideological imprint. In November 2025, concern about the war in the Middle East shows a markedly sharper

FIGURE 1

Concern over the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine
November 2025. **Percentages**




Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Public Opinion Barometer, Study No. 3530 (www.cis.es).

ideological gradient than concern about the war in Ukraine (Figure 3). Individuals who place themselves on the left express higher levels of worry about the Middle East than those on the right, a pattern present since the earliest stages of the conflict and one that has intensified markedly over time (Figure 4). This widening divide is driven largely by a decline in expressed concern among respondents on the right, while concern among those on the left has remained broadly stable. The war in Ukraine followed a different trajectory. At the beginning of the conflict, levels of concern were broadly shared

Concern about the war in the Middle East recently shows a markedly sharper ideological gradient than concern about the war in Ukraine

FIGURE 2

Concern over the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine
Very or quite concerned, March 2022-November 2025. **Percentages**




Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Public Opinion Barometers (www.cis.es).



FIGURE 3

Concern over the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine

Very or quite concerned, November 2025. **Percentages by ideological self-placement (1-left, 10-right)**



Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Public Opinion Barometer, Study No. 3530 (www.cis.es).

The ideological gradient has widened over time in both conflicts, more pronouncedly about the Middle East war


across the ideological spectrum, and no pronounced divide was evident. As time has passed, however, an ideological gradient has begun to emerge here as well, though it remains considerably weaker than the divide observed in relation to the Middle East.

Importantly, the ideological gradient has widened over time in both conflicts, although the shift has been considerably more pronounced in the Middle East. By late 2025, the war in Gaza continues to elicit substantial concern despite the peace treaty, and it has come to reflect a noticeably sharper degree of political polarization in public perceptions.




FIGURE 4

a) Concern over the war in the Middle East
Very or quite concerned, November 2023, October 2024 and November 2025. **Percentages by ideological self-placement (1-left, 10-right)**



b) Concern over the war in Ukraine
Very or quite concerned, March 2023, October 2024 and November 2025. **Percentages by ideological self-placement (1-left, 10-right)**



Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Public Opinion Barometers, Studies Nos. 3355, 3427, 3478, 3530 (www.cis.es).



FOLLOW UP SOCIAL DATA



POPULATION

Population, life expectancy and dependency

	Total population	Average age	67 and older (%)	Life expectancy at birth (men)	Life expectancy at birth (women)	Life expectancy at 65 (men)	Life expectancy at 65 (women)	Dependency rate (older than 66) ¹	Dependency rate ²
2014	46,495,744	42.2	16.0	80.1	85.6	19.0	22.9	23.6	47.3
2015	46,425,722	42.5	16.3	79.9	85.4	18.8	22.6	24.1	47.9
2016	46,418,884	42.7	16.6	80.3	85.8	19.1	23.0	24.7	48.5
2017	46,497,393	43.0	16.9	80.3	85.7	19.1	23.0	25.1	48.9
2018	46,645,070	43.2	17.0	80.4	85.8	19.2	23.0	25.4	49.0
2019	46,918,951	43.4	17.2	80.8	86.2	19.4	23.4	25.5	48.9
2020	47,318,050	43.6	17.3	79.5	85.0	18.3	22.3	25.8	48.8
2021	47,400,798	43.8	17.5	80.2	85.8	18.9	23.1	26.0	48.5
2022	47,486,727	44.1	17.7	80.4	85.7	19.1	23.0	26.3	48.5
2023	48,085,361	44.2	17.8	81.1	86.3	19.7	23.5	26.4	48.1
2024	48,619,695	44.4	18.0	81.4	86.5	19.9	23.6	26.6	47.8
2025**	49,093,546	44.6	18.3					26.9	47.6
Source	ECP	IDB	ECP	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	ECP	ECP

Migration

	Foreign population (%)	Foreign-born population (%)	Foreign-born with Spanish nationality (% over total foreign born)	Immigration	Emigration
2014	10.1	12.8	28.7	305,454	400,430
2015	9.6	12.7	31.8	342,114	343,875
2016	9.5	12.7	33.0	414,746	327,325
2017	9.5	12.9	34.4	532,132	368,860
2018	9.8	13.3	34.2	643,684	309,526
2019	10.3	14.0	33.8	750,480	296,248
2020	11.1	14.8	32.9	467,918	248,561
2021	11.4	15.3	33.1	887,960 ³	696,866 ³
2022	11.6	15.7	33.6	1,258,894	531,889
2023	12.7	17.1	32.2	1,250,991	608,695
2024	13.4	18.2	32.1		
2025**	14.1	19.1	32.2		
Source	ECP	ECP	ECP	EMCR and EM*	EMCR and EM*

ECP: Estadística Continua de Población. IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. EM: Estadística de Migraciones. EMCR: Estadística de Migraciones y Cambios de Residencia

¹ Population older than 66 / population between 16 and 66 x 100. ² (Population older than 66 + younger than 16 / population between 16 and 66) x 100.

³ Break in the series.

* Estadística de Migraciones y Cambios de Residencia (2021 onwards), Estadística de Migraciones (up to 2020). Series not comparable. ** Provisional. **Dependency rate:** (15 or less years old population + 67 or more years old population) / 16-66 years old population, as a percentage. **Dependency rate (older than 66):** 67 or more years old population / 16-67 years old population, as a percentage.



HOUSEHOLDS & FAMILIES

Households

	Households (thousands)	Average household size	Households with one person younger than 65 (%)	Households with one person older than 65 (%)	Single-parent households (%)	Emancipation rate 25-29 years old (%)
2014	18,329	2.52	14.2	10.6	8.2	50.4
2015	18,376	2.51	14.6	10.7	8.2	48.2
2016	18,444	2.50	14.6	10.9	8.3	47.2
2017	18,513	2.49	14.2	11.4	8.6	46.1
2018	18,581	2.49	14.3	11.5	8.3	46.1
2019	18,697	2.49	14.9	11.2	9.0	45.9
2020	18,794	2.49	15.0	11.4	9.1	43.2
2021	18,746	2.51	15.6	11.0	9.0	37.9
2022	19,078	2.49	15.4	11.7	8.8	40.4
2023	19,369	2.48	16.4	12.0	8.4	42.5
2024	19,537	2.48	16.3	11.9	9.5	42.3
2025*	19,728	2.48				43.7
Source	EPA	EPA	EPF	EPF	EPF	EPA

EPF: Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares. EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa.

* First, second and third quarter data.

Note: The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base. The EPF data in 2023 are not strictly comparable with previous ones, as they are based on new population estimates.

Single-parent households (%): One adult with a child /children

Emancipation rate 25-29 years old (%): Percentage of persons (25-29 years old) living in households in which they are not children of the reference person.

Nuptiality & divorces

	Marriages per inhabitant	Marriages per inhabitant (Spanish)	Marriages per inhabitant (foreigners)	First marriages over total marriages (%)	Mean age at first marriage, (men)	Mean age at first marriage, (women)	Same sex marriages, (men) (%)	Same sex marriages, (women) (%)	Mixed marriages (%)	Divorces per inhabitant
2014	0.49	0.52	0.34	84.3	34.4	32.3	1.03	0.98	13.7	0.29
2015	0.52	0.55	0.34	83.7	34.8	32.7	1.14	1.07	13.1	0.28
2016	0.54	0.58	0.37	83.1	35.1	32.9	1.25	1.22	13.2	0.28
2017	0.55	0.58	0.38	82.4	35.3	33.2	1.34	1.33	14.0	0.29
2018	0.53	0.57	0.36	81.5	35.6	33.4	1.41	1.50	14.2	0.28
2019	0.53	0.57	0.37	80.5	36.0	33.9	1.50	1.59	15.1	0.27
2020	0.28	0.30	0.22	76.6	37.1	34.9	1.66	1.86	17.3	0.23
2021	0.47	0.52	0.30	80.4	36.8	34.6	1.48	1.93	14.8	0.25
2022	0.58	0.63	0.37	81.4	36.7	34.6	1.59	1.89	15.3	0.24
2023	0.55	0.60	0.35	81.5	36.9	35.7	1.84	2.09	16.7	0.22
2024	0.55	0.61	0.36	81.4	37.3	35.2	2.02	2.16	16.7	0.24
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	MNP	MNP	MNP	IDB

IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. MNP: Movimiento Natural de la Población.

Marriages per inhabitant: Average number of times an individual would marry in his or her lifetime, if the same age-specific nuptiality intensity were to be maintained as observed in the current year. Mixed marriage: Marriage of a Spaniard to a foreigner. Divorces per inhabitant: Average number of times an individual would divorce in his or her lifetime, if the same intensity of divorce by age as observed in the current year were to be maintained.



HOUSEHOLDS & FAMILIES

Fertility (I)

	Average age at first child, total women	Average age at first child, Spanish women	Average age at first child, foreign women	Total fertility rate	Total fertility rate (Spanish women)	Total fertility rate (foreign women)
2014	30.6	31.1	27.5	1.32	1.27	1.61
2015	30.7	31.2	27.6	1.33	1.28	1.65
2016	30.8	31.3	27.6	1.33	1.28	1.71
2017	30.9	31.5	27.6	1.31	1.25	1.70
2018	31.0	31.6	27.8	1.26	1.20	1.64
2019	31.1	31.7	28.1	1.23	1.17	1.58
2020	31.2	31.8	28.3	1.18	1.13	1.45
2021	31.5	32.1	28.8	1.18	1.15	1.35
2022	31.6	32.2	28.5	1.16	1.12	1.35
2023	31.5	32.2	28.5	1.12	1.09	1.28
2024	31.5	32.3	28.4	1.10	1.07	1.27
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB

Fertility (II)

	Births to unmarried mothers (%)	Births to unmarried Spanish mothers (%)	Births to unmarried foreign mothers (%)	Abortion rate	Abortions by women born in Spain (%)
2014	42.5	43.1	39.7	10.5	63.3
2015	44.5	45.5	39.6	10.4	63.9
2016	45.9	47.0	40.7	10.4	64.5
2017	46.8	48.1	41.1	10.5	64.6
2018	47.3	48.9	41.2	11.1	63.7
2019	48.4	50.1	42.4	11.5	62.6
2020	47.6	50.0	39.3	10.3	64.1
2021	49.3	52.0	39.2	10.7	65.1
2022	50.1	53.1	40.3	11.7	66.7
2023	50.0	52.7	41.5	12.2	63.1
2024	50.0	52.4	42.9	12.4	62.2
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	MS	MS

IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. MS: Ministerio Sanidad.

Total fertility rate: Average number of children a woman would have during her childbearing life if she were to maintain the same age-specific fertility intensity as observed in the current year. **Abortion rate:** Number of abortions / women between 15 and 44 years old x 1,000. **Abortion by women born in Spain (%):** Abortions by women born in Spain as percentage of all abortions by women living in Spain.



EDUCATION

Educational attainment

	Population 25 years and older with primary education (%)	Population 25 years and older with tertiary education (%)	Population 25-34 years old with primary education (%)	Population 25-34 years old with tertiary education (%)
2014	26.3	29.0	6.8	41.5
2015	25.2	29.3	7.3	41.0
2016	24.2	29.8	7.2	41.0
2017	23.2	30.4	6.7	42.6
2018	22.3	31.1	6.3	44.3
2019	20.9	32.3	5.8	46.5
2020	19.2	33.4	5.5	47.4
2021	18.4	34.1	5.6	48.5
2022	18.0	34.4	5.6	50.2
2023	17.8	34.9	5.3	52.0
2024	17.0	35.4	5.0	52.6
2025*	16.8	35.8	4.7	52.3
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA

Educational enrollment ratios

	Gross enrollment rate in pre-primary education, first cycle	Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (general)	Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (vocational)	Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (vocational)	Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (university: undergraduate and postgraduate)
2014	34.2	80.7	41.5	41.7	47.4
2015	35.1	80.2	40.3	41.0	47.4
2016	36.7	76.9	38.5	43.6	47.7
2017	38.5	74.3	37.8	45.1	47.6
2018	39.9	72.5	38.1	44.9	47.1
2019	41.3	71.0	38.8	47.3	46.7
2020	36.0	70.4	41.1	53.6	47.6
2021	42.0	69.5	42.3	54.6	47.3
2022	46.0	67.1	42.6	55.4	46.1
2023	47.9	65.8	43.4	57.3	45.7
2024	49.3	62.7	43.3	58.0	45.8
Source	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MU and ECP



EDUCATION

Educational outcomes and expenditure

	Graduation rate in 4-year university degrees (%)	Drop-out rate in undergraduate studies (%)	Early school leavers from education and training (%)	Public expenditure (%GDP)	Private expenditure (%GDP)	Private expenditure (% total expenditure in education)
2014	50.2	33.2	21.9	4.31	1.41	24.7
2015	51.8	33.2	20.0	4.29	1.36	24.1
2016	52.8	33.2	19.0	4.24	1.34	24.1
2017	53.4	31.7	18.3	4.22	1.30	23.7
2018	54.8	31.4	17.9	4.18	1.33	24.2
2019	55.5	30.6	17.3	4.24	1.31	23.7
2020			16.0	4.89	1.43	22.7
2021			13.3	4.84	1.28	20.4
2022			13.9	4.61		
2023			13.7	4.54		
2024			13.0			
Source	MU	MU	MEFPD	MEFPD	OECD	OECD

EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa. MEFPD: Ministerio de Educación, Formación Profesional y Deporte. ECP: Estadística Continua de Población. MU: Ministerio de Universidades. OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

* First, second and third quarter data.

Note: The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base.

Gross enrollment rate in pre-primary education, first cycle: Enrolled in early childhood education as a percentage of the population aged 0 to 2 years. **Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (general):** General secondary enrollment (Bachillerato) as a percentage of the population aged 16 to 17. **Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (vocational):** On-site and distance learning enrollment. Enrolled in intermediate level training cycles (Ciclos Formativos de Grado Medio) as a percentage of the population aged 16 to 17. **Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (vocational):** On-site and distance learning enrolment. Enrolled in higher level training cycles (Ciclos Formativos de Grado Superior) as a percentage of the population aged 18 to 19. **Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (university: undergraduate or postgraduate studies):** Enrolled in official bachelor's or master's degrees as a percentage of the population aged 18 to 24. **Graduation rate in 4-year university degrees (%):** Percentage of students who complete the degree in the theoretical time foreseen or in one additional academic year. **Drop-out rate in undergraduate studies (%):** New entrants in an academic year who stop studying in one of the following 3 years. **Early school leavers from education and training (%):** Percentage of the population aged 18-24 who have not completed upper secondary education and are not in any form of education or training.



LABOUR MARKET

Employment and unemployment

	Employed population (thousands)	Unemployed population (thousands)	Employment rate (16-64, men)	Employment rate (16-64, women)	Unemployment rate (men)	Employment rate (women)
2014	17,344	5,610	61.6	52.0	23.6	25.4
2015	17,866	5,056	64.0	53.4	20.8	23.5
2016	18,342	4,481	65.8	55.1	18.1	21.4
2017	18,825	3,917	67.6	56.5	15.7	19.0
2018	19,328	3,479	69.0	57.8	13.7	17.0
2019	19,779	3,248	69.9	58.8	12.4	16.0
2020	19,202	3,531	67.3	56.6	13.9	17.4
2021	19,834	3,476	68.7	58.6	13.2	16.8
2022	20,548	3,079	70.5	60.2	11.4	14.9
2023	21,182	2,938	71.3	61.7	10.7	13.9
2024	21,654	2,771	71.8	62.6	10.2	12.7
2025*	22,140	2,652	72.2	63.6	9.5	11.9
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA



LABOUR MARKET

Public employment, temporary contracts & part-time employment

	Public employees (% total employed)	Employees with temporary contracts, private sector (% total employees)	Employees with temporary contracts, public sector (% total employees)	Part-time employed (%)
2014	16.9	25.0	20.2	15.9
2015	16.7	26.0	21.6	15.7
2016	16.4	26.9	22.5	15.2
2017	16.1	27.4	23.7	15.0
2018	16.3	27.1	25.4	14.6
2019	16.3	25.9	27.7	14.6
2020	17.2	23.0	28.1	14.0
2021	17.3	23.7	31.2	13.9
2022	16.9	18.8	31.6	13.6
2023	16.6	14.0	30.6	13.3
2024	16.4	12.8	28.8	13.6
2025*	15.9	12.6	27.6	13.7
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA

EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa.

* First and second quarter data.

Note: The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base. Employment rate calculated for the 16-64 population. Unemployment rate calculated over the active population (16 and more).



INEQUALITY & POVERTY

Inequality & poverty

	Gini index of equivalised disposable income	At-risk-of-poverty rate (%)	At-risk-of-poverty rate, 2008 fixed threshold (%)	Severe material deprivation (%)
2014	34.6	22.1	29.9	7.1
2015	34.5	22.3	29.2	6.4
2016	34.1	21.6	26.5	5.8
2017	33.2	21.5	25.5	5.1
2018	33.0	20.7	24.9	5.4
2019	32.1	21.0	21.8	4.7
2020	33.0	21.7	22.8	7.0
2021	32.0	20.4	20.5	7.3
2022	31.2	19.7	18.7	8.1
2023				8.4
Source	ECV	ECV	ECV	ECV

ECV: Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida.

Gini index of equivalised disposable income: The extent to which the distribution of equivalised disposable income (net income divided by unit of consumption; modified OECD scale) deviates from a distribution of perfect equity (all individuals obtain the same income). **At-risk-of-poverty rate (%):** Population below the poverty line. Poverty threshold: 60% of median equivalised disposable income (annual net income per unit of consumption; modified OECD scale) in each year. **At-risk-of-poverty rate, 2008 fixed threshold (%):** Population below the poverty line. Poverty threshold: 60% of median equivalised disposable income (annual net income per unit of consumption; modified OECD scale). In this case, the threshold used is the 2008 one. **Severe material deprivation (%):** People with material deprivation in at least 4 items (Europe 2020 Strategy).



SOCIAL PROTECTION

Public expenditure & contributory benefits

	Public expenditure on minimum income benefits (% GDP)	Expenditure on social protection, cash benefits (% GDP)	Contributory benefits						
			Permanent disability, pensions	Permanent disability, average amount (€)	Retirement, pensions	Retirement, average amount (€)	Widowhood, pensions	Widowhood, average amount (€)	Unemployment
2014	0.15	17.8	929,484	916	5,558,964	1,000	2,348,388	624	
2015	0.16	17.0	931,668	923	5,641,908	1,021	2,353,257	631	838,392
2016	0.14	16.9	938,344	930	5,731,952	1,043	2,358,666	638	763,697
2017	0.14	16.6	947,130	936	5,826,123	1,063	2,360,395	646	726,575
2018	0.14	16.8	951,838	946	5,929,471	1,091	2,359,931	664	751,172
2019	0.14	17.3	957,500	975	6,038,326	1,138	2,361,620	712	807,614
2020	0.21	21.9	952,704	985	6,094,447	1,162	2,352,680	725	1,828,489
2021	0.33	20.1	949,765	994	6,165,349	1,190	2,353,987	740	922,856
2022	0.35	18.4	951,067	1,035	6,253,797	1,254	2,351,703	778	773,227
2023	0.42	18.5	945,963	1,119	6,367,671	1,375	2,351,851	852	801,091
2024			965,412	1,163	6,484,984	1,443	2,351,531	896	840,127
2025*			1,024,399	1,208	6,589,395	1,505	2,348,145	935	860,233
Source	MTES	Eurostat	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES

Non contributory benefits

	Non-contributory benefits		
	Unemployment	Disability	Retirement
2014		197,303	252,328
2015	1,102,529	198,891	253,838
2016	997,192	199,762	254,741
2017	902,193	199,120	256,187
2018	853,437	196,375	256,842
2019	912,384	193,122	259,570
2020	1,017,429	188,670	261,325
2021	969,412	184,378	262,177
2022	882,585	179,967	265,831
2023	875,969	175,792	272,188
2024	869,316	171,353	282,403
2025*	914,826	168,032	292,629
Source	MTES	MTES	MTES

MTES: Ministerio de Trabajo y Economía Social.

* January-November data, but for unemployment benefits (January-October).

Expenditure on social protection, cash benefits (% GDP): Includes benefits for: sickness or disability, old age, survivors, family and children, unemployment, housing, social exclusion and other expenses. **Public expenditure on minimum income benefits (% GDP):** Minimum insertion wage and migrants' allowances and other benefits.



HEALTH

Expenditure & primary care staff

	Public expenditure (% GDP)	Private expenditure (% GDP)	Private expenditure (% total expenditure)	Primary care doctors per 1,000 people assigned	Primary care nurses per 1,000 people assigned
2014	6.1	2.7	30.7	0.76	0.65
2015	6.1	2.6	29.7	0.76	0.64
2016	6.0	2.5	29.5	0.76	0.65
2017	5.9	2.6	30.5	0.77	0.65
2018	6.0	2.7	30.8	0.77	0.66
2019	6.1	2.7	30.6	0.78	0.67
2020	7.6	2.9	27.9	0.78	0.66
2021	7.2	2.7	27.4	0.77	0.66
2022	6.8	2.5	27.1	0.78	0.70
2023	6.6	2.4	26.8	0.79	0.74
2024		2.5	27.2	0.79	0.76
Source	Eurostat	OECD	OECD	INCLASNS	INCLASNS

Other staff & waiting times

	Medical specialists per 1,000 inhabitants	Specialist nurses per 1,000 inhabitants	Patients waiting for a first consultation in specialised care per 1,000 inhabitants ¹	Average waiting time for a first consultation in specialised care (days) ¹	Patients waiting for a non-urgent surgical intervention per 1,000 inhabitants ¹	Average waiting time for non-urgent surgery (days) ¹
2014	1.81	3.14	39.4	65.0	11.4	87.0
2015	1.85	3.19	43.4	58.0	12.2	89.0
2016	1.90	3.27	45.7	72.1	13.7	115.0
2017	1.93	3.38	45.9	66.2	13.1	106.1
2018	1.98	3.45	62.5	95.9	14.8	129.0
2019	1.97	3.50	63.7	87.6	15.5	121.5
2020	2.02	3.74	53.6	99.4	15.1	154.9
2021	2.11	3.90	77.2	88.9	15.4	122.8
2022	2.14	3.87	85.4	95.2	17.1	120.1
2023	2.15	3.87	81.5	101.0	18.1	128.0
2024			83.2	105.0	17.8	126.0
Source	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS

INCLASNS: Indicadores clave del Sistema Nacional del Salud.

¹ Only in the public health system.

