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Focus on Spanish Society is published by the Social Studies Office of **Funcas**. The aim of this publication is to depict the Spanish social situation and provide brief insights into some of its most relevant aspects. Focus on Spanish Society consists of three sections. The first section, **SPAIN IN EUROPE**, draws attention to recently published statistical data and puts the Spanish case in comparative perspective. The second section, **PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS**, examines in more detail one particular social issue as perceived by the Spanish public and manifested through opinion surveys. Finally, the third section **FOLLOW-UP SOCIAL DATA** presents several social indicators related to demography and families, labour market and education, health and welfare benefits and services.



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SPAIN IN EUROPE

Fragmented geography of asylum in the EU

In 2024, the European Union registered nearly one million first-time asylum applications (912,000), marking a 13 % decrease compared to 2023. Germany remained the main destination, accounting for one in four applications, while Spain held its position as the second-largest host country in the EU27, with 18 % of the total (164,000)—slightly ahead of Italy (151,000) and France (130,000) (**Figure 1**). This marks the second consecutive year that Spain ranks second in volume, a position it has consistently maintained—either second or third—since 2019. Although asylum applications have risen sharply across the EU since the COVID-19 years, their distribution remains highly uneven. Eastern and Central European countries such as Hungary (25 applications), Slovakia (135), and Lithuania (295) played a minimal role in asylum reception. This long-standing imbalance has become increasingly entrenched, fueling ongoing debates over solidarity and responsibility-sharing within the EU, as

2024 is the second consecutive year that Spain ranks second in volume, a position it has consistently maintained—either second or third since 2019

FIGURE 1

First-time asylum applicants

By country, 2024. Number (EU27 total: 911,940) and percentages over total

Germany 229,695 (25.3%)	Spain 164,010 (18.0%)	France 130,860 (14.4%)	Belgium 33,050 (3.6%)	
	Italy 151,120 (16.6%)	Greece	Austria	Ireland
		68,995 (7.6%)	Bulgaria	


Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data [migr_asyappctza].

evidenced by a recent ruling by a top German court, which authorized the return of asylum seekers to Greece.¹

Spain's rise as the second-largest recipient of asylum seekers is particularly notable. Over the past decade, Spain's numbers have grown steadily—even as EU trends fluctuated due to crises such as the Syrian war (**Figure 2**). While 2015 marked a dramatic spike in asylum claims across Europe, Spain experienced a more gradual growth, reaching its highest-ever figure in 2024.

FIGURE 2

First-time asylum applicants Spain and EU27, 2010-2024. Number



Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data [migr_asyappctza].


Germany continues to receive the highest number of asylum applications from individuals fleeing geopolitical conflict zones Data from 2024 confirm sharp divergences in the national profiles of asylum seekers across EU countries. Germany continues to receive the highest number of asylum applications from individuals fleeing geopolitical conflict zones, particularly Syrians (33 % of all first-time applications in Germany), Afghans (15 %), and Turks (13 %) (**Figure 3**). This concentration is further underscored by the fact that a majority of applicants from these nationalities chose Germany as their destination: 62 % of all Turkish asylum seekers in the EU applied in Germany, along with 52 % of Syrians and 47 % of Afghan (**Figure 4**). The second most common destination for Syrians and Afghans was Greece, receiving 15 % and 21 % of their respective applications. For Turkish applicants, the second destination was France (13 %), which is also notable for receiving more than half (53 %) of all applications from Ukrainian nationals. Italy, in contrast, has become the primary destination for asylum seekers from Bangladesh, with 80 % of those who applied in the EU submitting their claims

¹ https://www.dw.com/en/german-court-rules-migrants-can-be-deported-back-to-greece/ a-72258499



First-time asylum applicants

Selected countries, 2024. Percentages by application country



Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data [migr_asyappctza].


there. It is also the main recipient of asylum applications from Peru, with 58 % of Peruvians applying in Italy rather than Spain.

Spain's asylum landscape is markedly different from that of other EU countries, with a strong regional concentration. In 2024, it stood out as the main European destination for Latin American asylum seekers, particularly from Venezuela (40 % of first-time applications in Spain), Colombia (24 %), and, to a lesser extent, Peru (6 %) (**Figure 3**). The 65,000 applications from Venezuelans and 40,000 from Colombians accounted for 90 % and 79 %, respectively, of all first-time applications from those nationalities across the EU (**Figure 4**).

In 2024, Spain stood out as the main European destination for Latin American asylum seekers, particularly from Venezuela and Colombia

FIGURE 4

First-time asylum applicants Selected countries, 2024. **Percentages by nationality**




Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data [migr_asyappctza].

Most of applicants from Mali and Senegal submitted their claims in Spain in 2024, highlighting the country's growing importance along specific migration routes Beyond Latin America, Spain also emerged in 2024 as a key destination for asylum seekers from certain West African countries. Notably, 64 % of applicants from Mali and 60 % from Senegal submitted their claims in Spain (**Figure 4**), highlighting the country's growing importance along specific migration routes. Although these groups still represent a relatively small share of Spain's total applications—6 % for Mali and 5 % for Senegal—the sharp increases compared to 2023 (multiplying their numbers by 8.5 and 3.5, respectively) suggest the emergence of a potentially significant trend.

This shift is particularly striking given the historically limited presence of Malian and Senegalese communities in Spain, especially in the case of Mali. In 2023, just prior to the surge in asylum claims (**Figure 5**), the resident populations from these countries, according to the Population Continuous Statistics, were relatively small—approximately 91,000 people born in Senegal and only 32,000 people born in Mali. By contrast, the rise in asylum applications from Venezuela and Colombia in previous years occurred in a very different context: both countries already had large established communities in Spain before the increase in asylum claims began. In 2015, just before the upsurge in applications, there were around 519,000 people of venezuelan origin and 715,000 individuals born in Colombia living in the country.

FIGURE 5

First time asylum applicants Spain, by selected nacionalities, 2010-2024. Absolute numbers



Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data [migr_asyappctza].

Spain's asylum profile has traditionally appeared less shaped by large-scale, immediate conflict-driven displacements than by linguistic, cultural, and historical ties with Latin America. While it may also be responding to forms of political instability and violence in that region, the response appeared less acute. However, the recent surge in applications from Mali—driven by intensifying conflict—may signal a shift, indicating that Spain's role in responding to more urgent displacement crises in West Africa could become increasingly prominent.



Spain's shift **from secondary route to strategic corridor** for irregular migration

Irregular entries through the EU's southern borders have fluctuated considerably over the last decade, following changes in the geopolitical contexts, enforcement efforts, and the strategic repositioning of smuggling networks. In 2024, these entries fell significantly—down 38 % compared to 2023 (**Figure 6**). This overall decline was largely driven by a sharp reduction in arrivals along the Central Mediterranean route, linked to significantly strengthened efforts to combat migrant smuggling by countries of origin and transit, particularly Tunisia. These measures played a central role in limiting flows toward Italy. At the same time, however, arrivals along the Western Atlantic route—specifically via the Canary Islands—have increased.


In 2024, Italy saw a marked drop in irregular entries, registering 66,617 arrivals—down from a peak of 157,652 in 2023, which had followed a steady increase since 2021. Greece, after years of relatively moderate figures following the peak of the 2016 refugee crisis, experienced a resurgence in 2024, with 62,043 arrivals—its highest since 2019. Spain, by contrast, registered a more gradual increase, reaching 63,970 irregular entries in 2024, its highest level on

In 2024, irregular entries fell significantly compared to 2023. This overall decline was largely driven by a sharp reduction in arrivals along the Central Mediterranean route



FIGURE 6

Irregular entries Selected countries, 2016-2024. Absolute numbers



Source: Own elaboration based on IOM data [Mixed migration flows to Europe, Displacement Tracking Matrix].


record and nearly matching the figures for Italy and Greece. This figure is more than double the number recorded in 2006, the year of the so-called "cayucos crisis" in the Canary Islands. Nevertheless, this number remains relatively small when compared to the overall volume of new residents in Spain. Although data for 2024 are not yet available, in 2023 the country registered approximately 1.25 million new residents. If similar trends continue, irregular entries in 2024 would account for only around 5 % of total new arrivals.

Spain presents a markedly different profile from Greece and Italy, with a strong concentration of arrivals from West and North Africa As happens regarding asylum applications, the national profiles of irregular arrivals vary sharply across the three routes (**Figure 7**). Italy's flows are dominated by people from Bangladesh (21 %), Syria (19 %), and Tunisia (12 %), alongside a broad mix of other nationalities (36 %). Greece is still the main entry point for Syrians (34 %) and Afghans (24 %), as well as for smaller shares of Egyptians, Turks, and Eritreans. Spain presents a markedly different profile, with a strong concentration of arrivals from West and North Africa. In 2024, nationals from Mali (27 %), Senegal (20 %), Algeria (16 %), and Morocco (13 %) together represented over three-quarters of all irregular entries into Spain.



Irregular entries

Selected countries, 2016-2024. Percentages by nationality



Source: Own elaboration based on IOM data [Mixed migration flows to Europe, Displacement Tracking Matrix].

Spain's growing relevance as a corridor for irregular migration is closely linked to the changes observed in its asylum profile. Although irregular entries still represent a small share of the overall inflows, the trend is nonetheless significant as it reflects growing pressure from regions such as the Sahel, where escalating insecurity and violence are driving mobility. In the context of mounting uncertainty in the global geopolitical landscape, this dynamic suggests that Spain is no longer a peripheral route but a central player in Europe's irregular migration geography.




PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS

Spain's Public Opinion on Immigration **Remains Among the Most Positive** in Europe

In a context of sustained growth in Spain's migrant population —averaging around 1.2 million new residents per year over the past two years— it is particularly relevant to examine how public attitudes toward immigration have evolved. According to 2024 data from the European Social Survey (ESS), Spanish public opinion on immigration stands out as notably positive in the European context. When asked whether immigration is good or bad for their country's economy—on a scale from 0 (very bad) to 10 (very good) several findings are particularly striking. With the exception of Greece, which consistently reports the most negative views across all indicators, most EU15 countries with available data cluster between average scores of 4.5 to 6.5 (**Figure 1**). Spain has consistently been among the most positive countries, In a context of sustained growth in Spain's migrant population, public opinion on immigration stands out as notably positive

FIGURE 1



Agreement with the statement that immigration improves the country's economy Average in a scale 0 (no) to 10 (yes)

reaching a score of 6.2 in 2024-one of the highest in the EU. Remarkably, Spain already held the third-highest position as far back as 2002, just behind Sweden and Austria.


Although the trend showed a slight decline until 2013 — likely due to the deep economic crisis that began in 2008 — Spain's scores remained close to those of the Scandinavian countries. In fact, this period highlights the remarkable resilience of Spanish public opinion: even during years when unemployment exceeded 25 %, support for immigration remained largely stable.

Even during years when unemployment exceeded 25 %, support for immigration remained largely stable

Given the generally positive attitudes, it is worth asking: who in Spain supports restricting immigration flows? In 2002, when Spain still had relatively little experience as a destination country for immigration, 50 % of the population supported allowing either only a few or no immigrants from poor non-European countries to settle (**Figure 2 - left**). Since then, support for restrictive positions has nearly halved, falling to 28 % in 2024. This places Spain among the least restrictive EU countries, behind only Norway (16 %), the United Kingdom (26 %), and Sweden (27 %) (**Figure 2 - right**).



Preference for few or no immigrants from poorer non-European countries **Percentages, by country and year**




Source: Own elaboration based on ESS 2002-2024 data. Weighted values.

An even more telling indicator is the proportion of people who believe no immigrants of this type should be allowed at all. In 2009, at the height of the Great Recession, 15 % of Spaniards held this view (**Figure 3**). By 2024, that number had dropped to just 6 %, making Spain one of the countries with the fewest supporters of total closure—surpassed only by Norway (2 %) and Sweden (2 %).

To understand the social and political underpinnings of this trend, we can look at the relationship between ideology and support for restrictions. When FIGURE 3

Preference for few or no immigrants from poorer non-European countries **Percentages, by country, 2024**




comparing four key years -2002, 2009, 2015, and 2024 -a clear pattern emerges: the further to the right respondents place themselves on the ideological scale (0 = left, 10 = right), the more likely they are to favour restrictive immigration policies (**Figure 4**).

Yet, this general relationship has evolved. In 2009, during the early stages of the economic crisis, nearly 40 % of left-leaning respondents in Spain supported some form of restriction, compared to 70 % among those on the right. By 2024, however, these figures had dropped across the entire spectrum: just over 10 % among those on the left, and around 50 % among those on the



Preference for few or no immigrants from poorer non-European countries Percentages, by country and ideology



Source: Own elaboration based on ESS 2024 data. Weighted values.

While support for restriction among left-leaning Spaniards is now in line with the European average, those on the right appear significantly less restrictive right. The most notable decline occurred among left-leaning respondents, who have moved away from restriction more decisively over time.

This pattern mirrors trends seen in other European countries included in the survey. However, Spain stands out in one important respect: while support for restriction among left-leaning Spaniards is now in line with the European average, those on the right appear significantly less restrictive. In 2024, just over 50 % of right-leaning respondents in Spain supported restrictions, compared to an average of 68 % among their counterparts in other countries.

FOLLOW UP SOCIAL DATA



POPULATION

Population, life expectancy and dependency

	Total population	Average age	67 and older (%)	Life expectancy at birth (men)	Life expectancy at birth (women)	Life expectancy at 65 (men)	Life expectancy at 65 (women)	Dependency rate (older than 66) ¹	Dependency rate ²
2014	46,495,744	42.2	16.0	80.1	85.6	19.0	22.9	23.6	47.3
2015	46,425,722	42.5	16.3	79.9	85.4	18.8	22.6	24.1	47.9
2016	46,418,884	42.7	16.6	80.3	85.8	19.1	23.0	24.7	48.5
2017	46,497,393	43.0	16.9	80.3	85.7	19.1	23.0	25.1	48.9
2018	46,645,070	43.2	17.0	80.4	85.8	19.2	23.0	25.4	49.0
2019	46,918,951	43.4	17.2	80.8	86.2	19.4	23.4	25.5	48.9
2020	47,318,050	43.6	17.3	79.5	85.0	18.3	22.3	25.8	48.8
2021	47,400,798	43.8	17.5	80.2	85.8	18.9	23.1	26.0	48.5
2022	47,486,727	44.1	17.7	80.4	85.7	19.1	23.0	26.3	48.5
2023	48,085,361	44.2	17.8				•	26.4	48.1
2024	48,619,695		18.0					28.4	47.8
2025**	49,077,984		18.3					28.9	47.6
Source	ECP	IDB	ECP	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	ECP	ECP

Migration

	Foreign population (%)	Foreign-born population (%)	Foreign-born with Spanish nationality (% over total foreign born)	Immigration	Emigration
2014	10.1	12.8	28.7	305,454	400,430
2015	9.6	12.7	31.8	342,114	343,875
2016	9.5	12.7	33.0	414,746	327,325
2017	9.5	12.9	34.4	532,132	368,860
2018	9.8	13.3	34.2	643,684	309,526
2019	10.3	14.0	33.8	750,480	296,248
2020	11.1	14.8	32.9	467,918	248,561
2021	11.4	15.3	33.1	887,960 ³	696,866 ³
2022	11.6	15.7	33.6	1,258,894	531,889
2023	12.7	17.1	32.2		•
2024	13.4	18.1			•
2025**	13.4	18.1			•
Source	ECP	ECP	ECP	EMCR and EM*	EMCR and EM*

ECP: Estadística Continua de Población. IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. EM: Estadística de Migraciones. EMCR: Estadística de Migraciones y Cambios de Residencia

¹ Population older than 66 / population between 16 and 66 x 100.² (Population older than 66 + younger than 16 / population between 16 and 66) x 100.

³ Break in the series.

* Estadística de Migraciones y Cambios de Residencia (2021 onwards), Estadística de Migraciones (up to 2020). Series not comparable. ** Provisional. **Dependency rate:** (15 or less years old population + 67 or more years old population)/ 16-66 years old population, as a percentage. **Dependency rate** (older than 66): 67 or more years old population / 16-67 years old population, as a percentage.

HOUSEHOLDS & FAMILIES

Households

	Households (thousands)	Average household size	Households with one person younger than 65 (%)	Households with one person older than 65 (%)	Single-parent households (%)	Emancipation rate 25-29 years old (%)
2014	18,329	2.52	14.2	10.6	8.2	50.4
2015	18,376	2.51	14.6	10.7	8.2	48.2
2016	18,444	2.50	14.6	10.9	8.3	47.2
2017	18,513	2.49	14.2	11.4	8.6	46.1
2018	18,581	2.49	14.3	11.5	8.3	46.1
2019	18,697	2.49	14.9	11.2	9.0	45.9
2020	18,794	2.49	15.0	11.4	9.1	43.2
2021	18,746	2.51	15.6	11.0	9.0	37.9
2022	19,078	2.49	15.4	11.7	8.8	40.4
2023	19,369	2.48	16.4	12.0	8.4	42.5
2024	19,537	2.48				42.3
2025*	19,672	2.48				43.1
Source	EPA	EPA	EPF	EPF	EPF	EPA

EPF: Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares. EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa.

* First quarter data.

Note: The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base. The EPF data in 2023 are not strictly comparable with previous ones, as they are based on new population estimates. Single-parent households (%): One adult with a child /children

Emancipation rate 25-29 years old (%): Percentage of persons (25-29 years old) living in households in which they are not children of the reference person.

Nuptiality & divorces

	Marriages per inhabitant	Marriages per inhabitant (Spanish)	Marriages per inhabitant (foreigners)	First marriages over total marriages (%)	Mean age at first marriage, (men)	Mean age at first marriage, (women)	Same sex marriages, (men) (%)	Same sex marriages, (women) (%)	Mixed marriages (%)	Divorces per inhabitant
2014	0.49	0.52	0.34	84.3	34.4	32.5	1.05	1.00	13.7	0.29
2015	0.52	0.55	0.34	83.7	34.8	32.9	1.17	1.10	13.1	0.28
2016	0.54	0.58	0.37	83.1	35.2	33.3	1.28	1.25	13.2	0.28
2017	0.55	0.58	0.38	82.4	35.5	33.6	1.37	1.37	14.0	0.29
2018	0.53	0.57	0.36	81.5	35.8	33.8	1.45	1.54	14.2	0.28
2019	0.53	0.57	0.37	80.5	36.3	34.3	1.54	1.64	15.1	0.27
2020	0.28	0.30	0.22	76.6	37.5	35.5	1.72	1.93	17.3	0.23
2021	0.47	0.52	0.30	80.4	37.1	35.1	1.54	2.00	14.8	0.25
2022	0.58	0.63	0.37	81.4	37.0	35.1	1.65	1.96	15.3	0.24
2023	0.55	0.60	0.35	81.5	36.9	35.7	1.84	2.09	16.7	0.22
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	MNP	MNP	MNP	IDB

IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. MNP: Movimiento Natural de la Población.

Marriages per inhabitant: Average number of times an individual would marry in his or her lifetime, if the same age-specific nuptiality intensity were to be maintained as observed in the current year. Mixed marriage: Marriage of a Spaniard to a foreigner. Divorces per inhabitant: Average number of times an individual would divorce in his or her lifetime, if the same intensity of divorce by age as observed in the current year were to be maintained.

HOUSEHOLDS & FAMILIES

Fertility (I)

	Mean age at first child, women	Mean age at first child, Spanish women	Mean age at first child, foreign women	Total fertility rate	Total fertility rate (Spanish women)	Total fertility rate (foreign women)
2014	30.6	31.1	27.5	1.32	1.27	1.61
2015	30.7	31.2	27.6	1.33	1.28	1.65
2016	30.8	31.3	27.6	1.33	1.28	1.71
2017	30.9	31.5	27.6	1.31	1.25	1.70
2018	31.0	31.6	27.8	1.26	1.20	1.64
2019	31.1	31.7	28.1	1.23	1.17	1.58
2020	31.2	31.8	28.3	1.18	1.13	1.45
2021	31.5	32.1	28.8	1.18	1.15	1.35
2022	31.6	32.2	28.5	1.16	1.12	1.35
2023	31.5	32.2	28.5	1.12	1.09	1.28
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB	IDB

Fertility (II)

	Births to non married mothers (%)	Births to non married Spanish mothers (%)	Births to non married foreign mothers (%)	Abortion rate (voluntary abortions / female population, 15-44 years old x 1,000)	Abortion by Spanish- born women (%)
2014	42.5	43.1	39.7	10.5	63.3
2015	44.5	45.5	39.6	10.4	63.9
2016	45.9	47.0	40.7	10.4	64.5
2017	46.8	48.1	41.1	10.5	64.6
2018	47.3	48.9	41.2	11.1	63.7
2019	48.4	50.1	42.4	11.5	62.6
2020	47.6	50.0	39.3	10.3	64.1
2021	49.3	52.0	39.2	10.7	65.1
2022	50.1	53.1	40.3	11.7	66.7
2023	50.0	52.7	41.5	12.2	63.1
Source	IDB	IDB	IDB	MS	MS

IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. MS: Ministerio Sanidad.

Total fertility rate: Average number of children a woman would have during her childbearing life if she were to maintain the same age-specific fertility intensity as observed in the current year.



Educational attainment

	Population 25 years and older with primary education (%)	Population 25 years and older with tertiary education (%)	Population 25-34 years old with primary education (%)	Population 25-34 years old with tertiary education (%)
2014	26.3	29.0	6.8	41.5
2015	25.2	29.3	7.3	41.0
2016	24.2	29.8	7.2	41.0
2017	23.2	30.4	6.7	42.6
2018	22.3	31.1	6.3	44.3
2019	20.9	32.3	5.8	46.5
2020	19.2	33.4	5.5	47.4
2021	18.4	34.1	5.6	48.5
2022	18.0	34.4	5.6	50.2
2023	17.8	34.9	5.3	52.0
2024	17.0	35.4	5.0	52.6
2025*	16.7	35.8	4.6	52.5
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA

Educational enrollment ratios

	Gross enrollment rate in pre-primary education, first cycle	Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (general)	Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (vocational)	Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (vocational)	Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (university: undergraduate and postgraduate)
2013	31.9	81.3	39.1	37.1	46.5
2014	33.0	81.5	41.0	40.6	47.6
2015	34.2	80.7	41.5	41.7	47.4
2016	35.1	80.2	40.3	41.0	47.4
2017	36.7	76.9	38.5	43.6	47.7
2018	38.5	74.3	37.8	45.1	47.6
2019	39.9	72.5	38.1	44.9	47.1
2020	41.3	71.0	38.8	47.3	46.7
2021	36.0	70.4	41.1	53.6	47.6
2022	42.0	69.5	42.3	54.6	47.3
2023	46.0	67.1	42.6	55.4	46.1
2024 1	47.9	65.8	43.4	57.3	45.7
Source	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MEFPD and ECP	MU and ECP

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Educational outcomes and expenditure

	Graduation rate in 4-year university degrees (%)	Drop-out rate in undergraduate studies (%)	Early school leavers from education and training (%)	Public expenditure (%GDP)	Private expenditure (%GDP)	Private expenditure (% total expenditure in education)
2013	48.6	33.9	23.6	4.38	1.41	24.5
2014	50.2	33.2	21.9	4.31	1.41	24.7
2015	51.8	33.2	20.0	4.29	1.36	24.1
2016	52.8	33.2	19.0	4.24	1.34	24.1
2017	53.4	31.7	18.3	4.22	1.30	23.7
2018	54.8	31.4	17.9	4.18	1.33	24.2
2019			17.3	4.24	1.31	23.7
2020			16.0	4.89	1.43	22.7
2021			13.3	4.84	1.28	20.4
2022			13.9	4.62		••••••
2023			13.0	4.53		
Source	MU	MU	MEFPD	MEFPD	OECD	OECD

EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa. MEFPD: Ministerio de Educación, Formación Profesional y Deporte. ECP: Estadística Continua de Población. MU: Ministerio de Universidades. OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

* First quarter data. Note: The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base.

Gross enrollment rate in pre-primary education, first cycle: Enrolled in early childhood education as a percentage of the population aged 0 to 2 years. Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (general): General secondary enrollment (Bachillerato) as a percentage of the population aged 16 to 17. Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education (vocational): On-site and distance learning enrollment. Enrolled in intermediate level training cycles (Ciclos Formativos de Grado Medio) as a percentage of the population aged 16 to 17. Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (vocational): On-site and distance learning enrolment. Enrolled in higher level training cycles (Ciclos Formativos de Grado Superior) as a percentage of the population aged 18 to 19. Gross enrollment rate in tertiary education (university: undergraduate or postgraduate studies): Enrolled in official bachelor's or master's degrees as a percentage of the population aged 18 to 24. Graduation rate in 4-year university degrees (%): Percentage of students who complete the degree in the theoretical time foreseen or in one additional academic year. Drop-out rate in undergraduate studies (%): New entrants in an academic year who stop studying in one of the following 3 years. Early school leavers from education and training (%): Percentage of the population aged 18-24 who have not completed upper secondary education and are not in any form of education or training.

LABOUR MARKET

Employment

	Employed population (thousands)	Unemployed population (thousands)	Employment rate (16-64, men)	Employment rate (16-64, women)	Unemployment rate (men)	Employment rate (women)
2014	17,344	5,610	61.6	52.0	23.6	25.4
2015	17,866	5,056	64.0	53.4	20.8	23.5
2016	18,342	4,481	65.8	55.1	18.1	21.4
2017	18,825	3,917	67.6	56.5	15.7	19.0
2018	19,328	3,479	69.0	57.8	13.7	17.0
2019	19,779	3,248	69.9	58.8	12.4	16.0
2020	19,202	3,531	67.3	56.6	13.9	17.4
2021	19,834	3,476	68.7	58.6	13.2	16.8
2022	20,548	3,079	70.5	60.2	11.4	14.9
2023	21,182	2,938	71.3	61.7	10.7	13.9
2024	21,654	2,771	71.8	62.6	10.2	12.7
2025*	21,765	2,789	71.2	62.7	10.1	12.7
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA

LABOUR MARKET

Public employment. temporary contracts & part-time employment

	Public employees (% total employed)	Employees with temporary contracts. private sector (% total employees)	Employees with temporary contracts. public sector (% total employees)	Part-time employed (%)
2014	16.9	25.0	20.2	15.9
2015	16.7	26.0	21.6	15.7
2016	16.4	26.9	22.5	15.2
2017	16.1	27.4	23.7	15.0
2018	16.3	27.1	25.4	14.6
2019	16.3	25.9	27.7	14.6
2020	17.2	23.0	28.1	14.0
2021	17.3	23.7	31.2	13.9
2022	16.9	18.8	31.6	13.6
2023	16.6	14.0	30.6	13.3
2024	16.4	12.8	28.8	13.6
2025*	16.1	12.1	28.0	14.1
Source	EPA	EPA	EPA	EPA

EPA: Encuesta de Población Activa.

* First quarter data.

Note: The EPA data from 2021 onwards are calculated using a new population base. Employment rate calculated for the 16-64 population. Unemploment rate calculated over the active population (16 and more).

INEQUALITY & POVERTY

Inequality & poverty

	Gini index of equivalised disposable income	At-risk-of-poverty rate (%)	At-risk-of-poverty rate, 2008 fixed threshold (%)	Severe material deprivation (%)
2013	34.7	22.2	30.9	6.2
2014	34.6	22.1	29.9	7.1
2015	34.5	22.3	29.2	6.4
2016	34.1	21.6	26.5	5.8
2017	33.2	21.5	25.5	5.1
2018	33.0	20.7	24.9	5.4
2019	32.1	21.0	21.8	4.7
2020	33.0	21.7	22.8	7.0
2021	32.0	20.4	20.5	7.3
2022	31.2	19.7	18.7	8.1
2023				8.4
Source	ECV	ECV	ECV	ECV

ECV: Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida.

Gini index of equivalised disposable income: The extent to which the distribution of equivalised disposable income (net income divided by unit of consumption; modified OECD scale) deviates from a distribution of perfect equity (all individuals obtain the same income). At-risk-of-poverty rate (%): Population below the poverty line. Poverty threshold: 60% of median equivalised disposable income (annual net income per unit of consumption; modified OECD scale) in each year. At-risk-of-poverty rate, 2008 fixed threshold (%): Population below the poverty line. Poverty threshold: 60% of median equivalised disposable income (annual net income per unit of consumption; modified OECD scale). In this case, the threshold used is the 2008 one. Severe material deprivation (%): People with material deprivation in at least 4 items (Europe 2020 Strategy).

SOCIAL PROTECTION

Public expenditure & contributory benefits

	Public expenditure on minimum income benefits (% GDP)	enditure on social ninimum protection, come cash nefits benefits	Contributory benefits						
			Permanent disability, pensions	Permanent disability, average amount (€)	Retirement, pensions	Retirement, average amount (€)	Widowhood, pensions	Widowhood, average amount (€)	Unemploy- ment
2014	0.15	17.8	929.484	916	5.558.964	1.000	2.348.388	624	
2015	0.16	17.0	931,668	923	5,641,908	1,021	2,353,257	631	838,392
2016	0.14	16.9	938,344	930	5,731,952	1,043	2,358,666	638	763,697
2017	0.14	16.6	947,130	936	5,826,123	1,063	2,360,395	646	726,575
2018	0.14	16.8	951,838	946	5,929,471	1,091	2,359,931	664	751,172
2019	0.14	17.3	957,500	975	6,038,326	1,138	2,361,620	712	807,614
2020	0.21	21.9	952,704	985	6,094,447	1,162	2,352,680	725	1,828,489
2021	0.33	20.1	949,765	994	6,165,349	1,190	2,353,987	740	922,856
2022	0.37	18.4	951,067	1,035	6,253,797	1,254	2,351,703	778	773,227
2023	•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	18.5	945,963	1,119	6,367,671	1,375	2,351,851	852	801,091
2024		•	965,412	1,163	6,484,984	1,443	2,351,531	896	840,127
2025*		•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	1,006,570	1,206	6,566,320	1,501	2,348,494	933	905,948
Source	MTES	Eurostat	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES	MTES

Non contributory benefits

		Non-contributory benefits		
••••••	Unemployment	Disability	Retirement	
2014		197,303	252,328	
2015	1,102,529	198,891	253,838	
2016	997,192	199,762	254,741	
2017	902,193	199,120	256,187	
2018	853,437	196,375	256,842	
2019	912,384	193,122	259,570	
2020	1,017,429	188,670	261,325	
2021	969,412	184,378	262,177	
2022	882,585	179,967	265,831	
2023	875,969	175,792	272,188	
2024	858,594	171,353	282,403	
2025*	755,712	169,397	288,662	
Source	MTES	MTES	MTES	

MTES: Ministerio de Trabajo y Economía Social.

* January-April data, but for unemployment benefits (January-March).

Expenditure on social protection, cash benefits (% GDP): Includes benefits for: sickness or disability, old age, survivors, family and children, unemployment, housing, social exclusion and other expenses. Public expenditure on minimum income benefits (% GDP): Minimum insertion wage and migrants' allowances and other benefits.



Expenditure & primary care staff

	Public expenditure (% GDP)	Private expenditure (% GDP)	Private expenditure (% total expenditure)	Primary care doctors per 1,000 people asigned	Primary care nurses per 1,000 people asigned
2014	6.1	2.7	29.7	0.76	0.65
2015	6.1	2.6	28.7	0.76	0.64
2016	6.0	2.5	28.4	0.76	0.65
2017	5.9	2.6	29.5	0.77	0.65
2018	6.0	2.7	29.8	0.77	0.66
2019	6.1	2.7	29.5	0.78	0.67
2020	7.6	2.9	26.8	0.78	0.66
2021	7.2	2.7	26.3	0.77	0.66
2022	6.8	2.5	26.0	0.78	0.70
2023	6.6	2.4	25.7	0.78	0.73
Source	Eurostat	OECD	OECD	INCLASNS	INCLASNS

Other staff & waiting times

	Medical specialists per 1,000 inhabitants	Specialist nurses per 1,000 inhabitants	Patients waiting for a first consultation in specialised care per 1,000 inhabitants ¹	Average waiting time for a first consultation in specialised care (days) ¹	Patients waiting for a non- urgent surgical intervention per 1,000 inhabitants ¹	Average waiting time for non-urgent surgery (days) ¹
2014	1,81	3.14	39.4	65.0	11.4	87.0
2015	1,85	3.19	43.4	58.0	12.2	89.0
2016	1,90	3.27	45.7	72.1	13.7	115.0
2017	1,93	3.38	45.9	66.2	13.1	106.1
2018	1,98	3.45	62.5	95.9	14.8	129.0
2019	1,97	3.50	63.7	87.6	15.5	121.5
2020	2,02	3.74	53.6	99.4	15.1	154.9
2021	2,11	3.90	77.2	88.9	15.4	122.8
2022	2,14	3.87	85.4	95.2	17.1	120.1
2023	2,15	3.87	81.5	101.0	18.1	128.0
2024			83.8	94	17.9	121
Source	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS	INCLASNS

INCLASNS: Indicadores clave del Sistema Nacional del Salud.

¹ Only in the public health system.



