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## SPAIN IN EUROPE

Continuous rise in migration to Spain

## \& PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS

Evolving concern for the two main current wars

## © FOLLOW UP SOCIAL DATA

Orders and information: Funcas
Caballero de Gracia, 28
28013 Madrid (Spain)
Phone: +34 915965718
Fax: +34 915965796
publica@funcas.es
www.funcas.es

## SPAIN IN EUROPE

## Continuous rise in migration to Spain

Immigration plays an increasingly important role in both the labor market and the sociodemographic structures of European societies. The weight and age composition of migrants reflects not only the potential of these societies to attract individuals, but it also raises questions about the long-term implications for aging societies in terms of integration, labor market adjustment and social protection.

Spain stands out among European countries as regards the reception of migrants since the beginning of this century. As of January $1^{\text {st }}, 2024$, data from the Continuous Population Statistics reveal that the foreign-born population accounted for 18.1 \% of Spain's total population, one percentage point up from 2023 (Figure 1). This rise to a historic peak of 8.8 million individuals is the result of a steady upward trend over the past two decades. The foreign-born

Spain stands out among European countries as regards the reception of migrants since the beginning of this century

## FIGURE 1

Foreign-born population
Spain, 2002-2024, percentage of total


[^0]Source: Continuous Population Statistics, INE.

In the context of the European Union Spain's proportion of foreign-born population appears to be rather high
population only experienced a slight decrease during the Great Recession -less than one percentage point (from 13.5 \% in January 2011 to 12.7 \% in July 2014) - and a brief pause during the pandemic. Such trends not only reflect demographic shifts, but also underscore Spain's structural potential to attract migration.

In the context of the European Union, Spain's proportion of foreign-born population appears to be rather high. According to Eurostat 2023 data, this percentage amounted to 13.3 \% for the European Union population (Figure 2). Spain, with 17.1 \% of foreign-born residents in 2023, was only closely behind countries with a long-standing tradition of receiving immigrants, such as Sweden ( 20.4 \%) and Germany ( $19.5 \%$ ) and presented a significantly higher figure than France ( 13.1 \%). Even if Portugal registers a similar proportion (16.1 \%), other Southern European countries like Greece (11.3 \%) and Italy (10.9 \%) show significantly lower percentages.

The age composition of the foreign-born population is crucial regarding concerns over labor deficits. Spain stands among the European nations with a notable proportion of immigrants aged 25 to 49 : they represent $42 \%$ of all for-eign-born people (Figure 3). This figure is clearly above the European average of $37 \%$, though lower than that found in Denmark (44 \%), Czech Republic (46 \%), and Finland ( $49 \%$ ). It is to be noted that approximately almost three out of ten individuals residing in Spain within this age group are foreign-born (Figure 4).

Not surprisingly, in Spain regional diversity in immigration is pronounced. The proportion of foreign-born residents varies greatly among autonomous communities. The highest shares in 2024 are in the Balearic Islands ( $27 \%$ ),

## FIGURE 2

Foreign-born population
EU27, 2023, by country, percentage of total


[^1]
## FIGURE 3

Foreign-born population aged 25 to 49
EU27, 2023, by country, percentage of total


Source: Eurostat [migr_pop3ctb__custom_10268627].

## FIGURE 4

Foreign-born population
Spain, 2024, by age group, percentage of total


Source: Continuous Population Statistics, INE.
followed by Catalonia and Madrid (24 \%), Melilla (23 \%), and the Valencian Community and Canary Islands (22 \%) (Figure 5). In contrast, Extremadura ( $6 \%$ ), Asturias ( $10 \%$ ), Castile and Leon, and Galicia (11 \%) display the lowest shares. In regions with more immigrants, like Catalonia and Madrid, as well as the Basque Country and Navarre, a higher proportion of these immigrants are in the 25-49 age group. Adding up to regional disparity, some of the communities with the lowest shares of foreign-born immigrants, such as Asturias, Galicia, and Castile and Leon, also register a higher share of immigrants aged 65 and over (around one out of 4) (Figure 6). A significant number of these

## FIGURE 5

Foreign-born population
Spain, 2024, by autonomous community, percentage of total


Source: Continuous Population Statistics, INE
older migrants came from countries such as Argentina, Cuba, and Venezuela, indicating connections to historical emigration patterns in these regions.

## Shaping new European citizens

In 2022, almost one million individuals $(989,940)$ acquired citizenship in a European country. Most of them $(857,173)$ were previously citizens of non-EU-27 countries. Spain definitely contributed to this process of creating

## FIGURE 6

Foreign-born population aged 25 to 49 and 65 and over
Spain, 2024, by autonomous community, percentage of total

new European citizens: 181,581 foreign-born residents were granted Spanish citizenship in 2022, i.e. 18 \% of all naturalized immigrants in the European Union. This places Spain, alongside with Italy (22 \%) and Germany (17 \%), as key contributors to the increase in European citizenship (Figure 7).

However, these three countries radically differ as regards the origins of naturalized population (Figure 8). In Spain, 39 \% of new citizens were born in Central or South American countries, and 32 \% came from Northern African countries. In contrast, in Germany, nearly half of nationalized immigrants were of Asian origin. Many of them came from Syria (29 \%), Turkey (9 \%), Iraq

Spain was one of the key contributors to the increase in European citizenship along 2022

## FIGURE 7

Naturalized inmigrants share
Selected EU27 countries, 2022, percentage of total


Source: Eurostat [migr_acq__custom_10270064].

## FIGURE 8

Former nationality of naturalized citizens
Selected EU27 countries, 2022, by continent, percentage of total


The nuanced discussion of this demographic transformation, along with its inherent challenges and opportunities, is notably limited in public discourse
(4 \%), Iran (3 \%), and Afghanistan (3 \%), thus reflecting the impact of the refugee crisis on Germany's population. Italy shows a higher heterogeneity of nationalized immigrants, coming from African, South American, and Asian countries. In sum, each country's historic migration links and asylum strategies strongly shape Europe's new citizens.

The distribution of gender among new Spanish citizens is also an interesting aspect of citizenship acquisition in Spain, where women represent 53 \% of the new citizenship grants (Figure 9). The slight prevalence of women among those granted citizenship is registered too in Netherlands and Sweden. By contrast, in Germany women account for only $46 \%$ of new citizens.

The magnitude of citizenship grants in Spain represents a significant change of the population. However, the nuanced discussion of this demographic transformation, along with its inherent challenges and opportunities, is notably limited in public discourse. The increasing importance of migration and nationalization in Spain's population calls for proactive, long-term dialogues on policy reform, addressing integration, labor market demands and the provision of key public services such as education, healthcare, and social welfare.

## FIGURE 9

Female share of naturalized population
EU27, 2022, by country, percentage of total


Source: Eurostat [migr_acq_custom_10270064].

## PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS

## Evolving concern for the two main current wars

The concern of Spaniards about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which was particularly intense during the first months of the war, has stabilized since the end of 2022 at levels around 70 \%: Spaniards aged 18 or over who, according to the monthly surveys of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) (see endnote), declare themselves "very concerned" amount to around one fourth, while those who state they are "quite concerned" represent slightly less than half of all interviewees (Figures 1 and 2).

Following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on October $7^{\text {th }}, 2023$, concern about the war in the Middle East has also gained ground. In November of that year, the first month in which the CIS surveys asked about the concern aroused by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, the percentage of Spaniards "very concerned" about the Middle East conflict (41 \%) exceeded

The concern of Spaniards about the Russian invasion of Ukraine has stabilized since the end of 2022

## FIGURE 1

Concern about the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Degree of concern, mar-22 to mar-24, percentage


Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Public Opinión Barometers from March 2022 to March 2024 (www.cis.es).

## FIGURE 2

Concern about the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Very or quite concerned, mar-22 to mar-24, percentage


Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Public Opinión Barometers from March 2022 to March 2024 (www.cis.es).

By March 2024, following Putins threats about a nuclear war, concern about the war in Ukraine increased
by 16 percentage points the percentage of those who expressed the same intensity of concern about the war in Ukraine (25 \%).

By March 2024 (latest available data), high concern about the war in the Middle East had subsided, but still exceeded that expressed about the war in Ukraine (Figures 3 and 4). However, data from the latest opinion poll, whose fieldwork (March 1-5) was conducted only a few days after Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons against the West if NATO sent troops into Ukraine, reflect a rise in concern about the Ukrainian war.

Concern about the Middle East conflict
Degree of concern, nov-23 to mar-24, percentage


Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Public Opinión Barometers from November 2023 to March 2024 (www.cis.es).

Concern about the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East
Very or quite concerned, nov-23 to mar-24, percentage


Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Public Opinión Barometers from November 2023 to March 2024 (www.cis.es).

The degree of concern about both wars is consistently higher among women than among men. Focusing on the latest available data, eight in ten women feel "very" or "quite concerned" about the war in Ukraine, while among men the proportion is six in ten. The same gender gap of around 12 percentage points is observed in the results to the question on concern about the war in the Middle East: Women again show a higher degree of concern than men (Figure 5).

The public opinion data also indicate that concern about the Middle East conflict has a more prominent political-ideological component than concern about

Concern about the Middle East conflict has a more prominent political-ideological component than concern about the war in Ukraine

Concern about the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East
Very or quite concerned, by gender, mar-24, percentage


[^2]
## FIGURE 6

Concern about the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East
a. Very or quite concerned, by party voted for*, mar-24, percentage | b. Very concerned, by vote, nov-23-mar-24, percentage


* Recall of votes cast in the last general election.

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Public Opinión Barometers from November 2023 to March 2024 (www.cis.es).
the war in Ukraine. This can be ascertained by comparing the responses of those who voted in the last national elections (July 2023) for one of the four parties with the greatest parliamentary representation (Partido Popular [PP], Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE], VOX and Sumar). The differences between voters of the PP, PSOE and Sumar are small when asked about the degree of their concern regarding the war in Ukraine, but they are marked when the question refers to the war in the Middle East: Voters of the left-wing parties, and in particular of the political formation Sumar, are significantly more concerned about the war in the Middle East than about the war in Ukraine (Figure 6a and 6b).

[^3]
## FOLLOW UP SOCIAL DATA

## POPULATION

Population, life expectancy and dependency

|  | Total population | Average age | 67 and older (\%) | Life expectancy at birth (men) | Life expectancy at birth (men) | Life expectancy at 65 (men) | Life expectancy at 65 (women) | Dependency rate (older than 66) | Dependency rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 46,712,650 | 41.8 | 15.7 | 79.9 | 85.5 | 18.9 | 22.8 | 23.0 | 46.6 |
| 2014 | 46,495,744 | 42.2 | 16.0 | 80.1 | 85.6 | 19.0 | 22.9 | 23.6 | 47.3 |
| 2015 | 46,425,722 | 42.5 | 16.3 | 79.9 | 85.4 | 18.8 | 22.6 | 24.1 | 47.9 |
| 2016 | 46,418,884 | 42.7 | 16.6 | 80.3 | 85.8 | 19.1 | 23.0 | 24.7 | 48.5 |
| 2017 | 46,497,393 | 43.0 | 16.9 | 80.3 | 85.7 | 19.1 | 23.0 | 25.1 | 48.9 |
| 2018 | 46,645,070 | 43.2 | 17.0 | 80.4 | 85.8 | 19.2 | 23.0 | 25.4 | 49.0 |
| 2019 | 46,918,951 | 43.4 | 17.2 | 80.8 | 86.2 | 19.4 | 23.4 | 25.5 | 48.9 |
| 2020 | 47,318,050 | 43.6 | 17.3 | 79.5 | 85.0 | 18.3 | 22.3 | 25.8 | 48.8 |
| 2021 | 47,400,798 | 43.8 | 17.5 | 80.2 | 85.8 | 18.9 | 23.1 | 26.0 | 48.5 |
| 2022 | 47,486,727 | 44.1 | 17.7 | 80.4 | 85.7 | 19.1 | 23.0 | 26.3 | 48.5 |
| 2023 | 48,085,361 | 44.2 | 17.8 |  |  |  |  | 26.4 | 48.1 |
| 2024 | 48,592,909 |  | 18.0 |  |  |  |  | 26.6 | 47.8 |
| Source | ECP | IDB | ECP | IDB | IDB | IDB | IDB | ECP | ECP |

Migration

|  | Foreign population (\%) | Foreign-born population (\%) | Foreign-born with Spanish nationality (\% over total foreign born) | Immigration | Emigration |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 10.8 | 13.2 | 24.7 | 280,772 | 532,303 |
| 2014 | 10.1 | 12.8 | 28.7 | 305,454 | 400,430 |
| 2015 | 9.6 | 12.7 | 31.8 | 342,114 | 343,875 |
| 2016 | 9.5 | 12.7 | 33.0 | 414,746 | 327,325 |
| 2017 | 9.5 | 12.9 | 34.4 | 532,132 | 368,860 |
| 2018 | 9.8 | 13.3 | 34.2 | 643,684 | 309,526 |
| 2019 | 10.3 | 14.0 | 33.8 | 750,480 | 296,248 |
| 2020 | 11.1 | 14.8 | 32.9 | 467,918 | 248,561 |
| 2021 | 11.4 | 15.3 | 33.1 | 887,960 ${ }^{+}$ | 696,866 ${ }^{+}$ |
| 2022 | 11.6 | 15.7 | 33.6 | 1,258,8941 | 531,889 |
| 2023 | 12.7 | 17.1 | 32.2 |  |  |
| 2024 | 13.4 | 18.1 |  |  |  |
| Source | ECP | ECP | ECP | EMCR and EM* | EMCR and EM ${ }^{*}$ |

ECP: Estadística Continua de Población. IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. EM: Estadística de Migraciones. EMCR: Estadística de Migraciones y
Cambios de Residencia

## ${ }^{\dagger}$ Break in the series.

* Estadística de migraciones y cambios de residencia (2021 onwards), Estadística de migraciones (up to 2020). Series not comparable.


## Fi. HOUSEHOLDS \& FAMILIES

Households

|  | Households (thousands) | Average household size | Households with one person younger than 65 (\%) | Households with one person older than 65 (\%) | Single-parent households (\%) | Emancipation rate 25-29 yeard old (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 18,212 | 2.54 | 13.9 | 10.3 | 8.1 | 50.8 |
| 2014 | 18,329 | 2.52 | 14.2 | 10.6 | 8.2 | 50.4 |
| 2015 | 18,376 | 2.51 | 14.6 | 10.7 | 8.2 | 48.2 |
| 2016 | 18,444 | 2.50 | 14.6 | 10.9 | 8.3 | 47.2 |
| 2017 | 18,513 | 2.49 | 14.2 | 11.4 | 8.6 | 46.1 |
| 2018 | 18,581 | 2.49 | 14.3 | 11.5 | 8.3 | 46.1 |
| 2019 | 18,697 | 2.49 | 14.9 | 11.2 | 9.0 | 45.9 |
| 2020 | 18,794 | 2.49 | 15.0 | 11.4 | 9.1 | 43.2 |
| 2021 | 18,919 | 2.47 | 15.6 | 11.0 | 9.0 | 40.3 |
| 2022 | 19,113 | 2.46 | 15.4 | 11.7 | 8.8 | 42.0 |
| 2023 | 19,385 | 2.45 |  |  |  | 44.2 |
| Source | LFS | LFS | EPF | EPF | EPF | LFS |

EPF: Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares
Single-parent households (\%): One adult with a child /children
Emancipation rate 25-29 years old (\%): Percentage of persons (25-29 years old) living in households in which they are not children of the reference person.

Nuptiality \& divorces

|  | Marriage per inhabitant | Marriage per inhabitant (Spanish) | Marriage per inhabitant (foreigners) | First marriages over total marriages (\%) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Mean age } \\ \text { at first } \\ \text { marriage, } \\ \text { (men) } \end{gathered}$ | Mean age at first marriage, (women) | Same sex marriages, (men) (\%) | Same sex marriages, (women) (\%) | Mixed marriages (\%) | Divorces per inhabitant |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 0.46 | 0.49 | 0.34 | 84.3 | 34.2 | 32.3 | 1.07 | 0.93 | 15.0 | 0.28 |
| 2014 | 0.49 | 0.52 | 0.34 | 84.3 | 34.4 | 32.5 | 1.05 | 1.00 | 13.7 | 0.29 |
| 2015 | 0.52 | 0.55 | 0.34 | 83.7 | 34.8 | 32.9 | 1.17 | 1.10 | 13.1 | 0.28 |
| 2016 | 0.54 | 0.58 | 0.37 | 83.1 | 35.2 | 33.3 | 1.28 | 1.25 | 13.2 | 0.28 |
| 2017 | 0.55 | 0.58 | 0.38 | 82.4 | 35.5 | 33.6 | 1.37 | 1.37 | 14.0 | 0.29 |
| 2018 | 0.53 | 0.57 | 0.36 | 81.5 | 35.8 | 33.8 | 1.45 | 1.54 | 14.2 | 0.28 |
| 2019 | 0.53 | 0.57 | 0.37 | 80.5 | 36.3 | 34.3 | 1.54 | 1.64 | 15.1 | 0.27 |
| 2020 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 0.22 | 76.6 | 37.5 | 35.5 | 1.72 | 1.93 | 17.3 | 0.23 |
| 2021 | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.30 | 80.4 | 37.1 | 35.1 | 1.54 | 2.00 | 14.8 | 0.25 |
| 2022 | 0.58 | 0.63 | 0.37 | 81.4 | 37.0 | 35.1 | 1.65 | 1.96 | 15.3 | 0.24 |
| Source | IDB | IDB | IDB | IDB | MNP | MNP | MNP | MNP | MNP | IDB |

IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. MNP: Movimiento Natural de la Población.
Marriages per inhabitant: Average number of times an individual would marry in his or her lifetime, if the same age-specific nuptiality intensity were to be maintained as observed in the current year. Mixed marriage: Marriage of a Spaniard to a foreigner. Divorces per inhabitant: Average number of times an individual would divorce in his or her lifetime, if the same intensity of divorce by age as observed in the current year were to be maintained.

## 令 HOUSEHOLDS \& FAMILIES

Fertility (I)

|  | Median age at first child (women) | Median age at first child (Spanish women) | Median age at first child (foreign women) | Total fertility rate | Total fertility rate (Spanish women) | Total fertility rate (foreign women) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 30.4 | 31.0 | 27.3 | 1.27 | 1.23 | 1.52 |
| 2014 | 30.6 | 31.1 | 27.5 | 1.32 | 1.27 | 1.61 |
| 2015 | 30.7 | 31.2 | 27.6 | 1.33 | 1.28 | 1.65 |
| 2016 | 30.8 | 31.3 | 27.6 | 1.33 | 1.28 | 1.71 |
| 2017 | 30.9 | 31.5 | 27.6 | 1.31 | 1.25 | 1.70 |
| 2018 | 31.0 | 31.6 | 27.8 | 1.26 | 1.20 | 1.64 |
| 2019 | 31.1 | 31.7 | 28.1 | 1.23 | 1.17 | 1.58 |
| 2020 | 31.2 | 31.8 | 28.3 | 1.18 | 1.13 | 1.45 |
| 2021 | 31.5 | 32.1 | 28.8 | 1.18 | 1.15 | 1.35 |
| 2022 | 31.6 | 32.2 | 28.5 | 1.16 | 1.12 | 1.35 |
| Source | IDB | IDB | IDB | IDB | IDB | IDB |

Fertility (II)

|  | Births to single mothers (\%) | Births to single Spanish mothers (\%) | Births to single foreign mothers (\%) | Abortion rate | Abortion by Spanishborn women (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 40.9 | 41.0 | 40.2 | 11.7 | 62.2 |
| 2014 | 42.5 | 43.1 | 39.7 | 10.5 | 63.3 |
| 2015 | 44.5 | 45.5 | 39.6 | 10.4 | 63.9 |
| 2016 | 45.9 | 47.0 | 40.7 | 10.4 | 64.5 |
| 2017 | 46.8 | 48.1 | 41.1 | 10.5 | 64.6 |
| 2018 | 47.3 | 48.9 | 41.2 | 11.1 | 63.7 |
| 2019 | 48.4 | 50.1 | 42.4 | 11.5 | 62.6 |
| 2020 | 47.6 | 50.0 | 39.3 | 10.3 | 64.1 |
| 2021 | 49.3 | 52.0 | 39.2 | 10.7 | 65.1 |
| 2022 | 50.1 | 53.1 | 40.3 | 11.7 | 66.7 |
| Source | IDB | IDB | IDB | MS | MS |

IDB: Indicadores Demográficos Básicos. MS: Ministerio Sanidad.
Total fertility rate: Average number of children a woman would have during her childbearing life if she were to maintain the same age-specific fertility intensity as observed in the current year.

## EDUCATION

Educational attainment

|  | Population 25 years and older with primary education (\%) | Population 16 years and older with tertiary education (\%) | Population 25-34 with primary education (\%) | Population 25-34 with tertiary education (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 28.6 | 28.2 | 7.6 | 41.1 |
| 2014 | 26.3 | 29.0 | 6.8 | 41.5 |
| 2015 | 25.2 | 29.3 | 7.3 | 41.0 |
| 2016 | 24.2 | 29.8 | 7.2 | 41.0 |
| 2017 | 23.2 | 30.4 | 6.7 | 42.6 |
| 2018 | 22.3 | 31.1 | 6.3 | 44.3 |
| 2019 | 20.9 | 32.3 | 5.8 | 46.5 |
| 2020 | 19.2 | 33.4 | 5.5 | 47.4 |
| 2021 | 17.9 | 34.4 | 5.5 | 48.7 |
| 2022 | 17.6 | 34.7 | 5.4 | 50.5 |
| 2023 | 17.4 | 35.2 | 5.2 | 52.1 |
| Source | LFS | LFS | LFS | LFS |

Educational enrollment ratios

|  | Gross enrollment ratio in pre-primary education, first cycle | Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education | Gross enrollment rate in lower vocational training | Gross enrollment rate in upper vocational training | Gross enrollment rate in undergraduate or posgraduate studies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 31.9 | 81.3 | 39.1 | 37.1 | 46.5 |
| 2014 | 33.0 | 81.5 | 41.0 | 40.6 | 47.6 |
| 2015 | 34.2 | 80.7 | 41.5 | 41.7 | 47.4 |
| 2016 | 35.1 | 80.2 | 40.3 | 41.0 | 47.4 |
| 2017 | 36.7 | 76.9 | 38.5 | 43.6 | 47.7 |
| 2018 | 38.5 | 74.3 | 37.8 | 45.1 | 47.6 |
| 2019 | 39.9 | 72.5 | 38.1 | 44.9 | 47.1 |
| 2020 | 41.3 | 71.0 | 38.8 | 47.3 | 46.7 |
| 2021 | 36.0 | 70.4 | 41.1 | 53.6 | 47.6 |
| 2022 | 42.0 | 69.5 | 42.3 | 54.6 | 47.3 |
| 2023 | 45.7 | 67.2 | 42.7 | 54.8 | 46.2 |
| Source | MEFPD and ECP | MEFPD and ECP | MEFPD and ECP | MEFPD and ECP | MU |

Educational outcomes and expenditure

|  | Graduation rate in 4-year university degrees (\%) | Drop-out rate in undergraduate studies (\%) | Early school leavers from education and training (\%) | Public expenditure (\%GDP) | Private expenditure (\%GDP) | Private expenditure (\% total expenditure in education) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 48.6 | 33.9 | 23.6 | 4.40 | 1.42 | 25.1 |
| 2014 | 50.2 | 33.2 | 21.9 | 4.34 | 1.41 | 25.5 |
| 2015 | 51.8 | 33.2 | 20.0 | 4.32 | 1.37 | 24.9 |
| 2016 | 52.8 | 33.2 | 19.0 | 4.27 | 1.35 | 24.9 |
| 2017 | 53.4 | 31.7 | 18.3 | 4.25 | 1.31 | 24.5 |
| 2018 |  |  | 17.9 | 4.21 | 1.34 | 25.0 |
| 2019 |  |  | 17.3 | 4.26 | 1.32 | 24.4 |
| 2020 |  |  | 16.0 | 4.93 | 1.45 | 23.4 |
| 2021 |  |  | 13.3 | 4.89 |  |  |
| 2022 |  |  | 13.9 |  |  |  |
| 2023 |  |  | 13.6 |  |  |  |
| Source | MU | MU | MEFPD | MEFPD | OECD | OECD |

LFS: Labor Force Survey. MEFPD: Ministerio de Educación, Formación Profesional y Deporte. ECP: Encuesta Continua de Población. MU: Ministerio de Universidades. OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Gross enrollment ratio in pre-primary education, first cycle: Enrolled in early childhood education as a percentage of the population aged 0 to 2 years. Gross enrollment rate in upper secondary education: Upper secondary enrollment as a percentage of the population aged 16 to 17. Gross enrollment rate in lower vocational training: On-site and distance learning enrollment. Enrolled in intermediate level training cycles as a percentage of the population aged 16 to 17 . Gross enrollment rate in upper vocational training: On-site and distance learning enrolment. Enrolled in higher level training cycles as a percentage of the population aged 18 to 19. Gross enrollment rate in undergraduate or posgraduate studies: Enrolled in official bachelor's or master's degrees as a percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 . Graduation rate in 4 -year university degrees (\%): Percentage of students who complete the degree in the theoretical time foreseen or in one additional academic year. Drop-out rate in undergraduate studies (\%): New entrants in an academic year who stop studying in one of the following 3 years. Early school leavers from education and training (\%): Percentage of the population aged 18-24 who have not completed upper secondary education and are not in any form of education or training.

Employment

|  | Employed population (thousands) | Unemployed population (thousands) | Employment rate (men) | Employment rate (women) | Unemployment rate (men) | Employment rate (women) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 17,139 | 6,051 | 60.1 | 51.0 | 25.7 | 26.8 |
| 2014 | 17,344 | 5,610 | 61.6 | 52.0 | 23.7 | 25.5 |
| 2015 | 17,866 | 5,056 | 64.0 | 53.4 | 20.9 | 23.7 |
| 2016 | 18,342 | 4,481 | 65.8 | 55.1 | 18.2 | 21.5 |
| 2017 | 18,825 | 3,917 | 67.6 | 56.5 | 15.8 | 19.1 |
| 2018 | 19,328 | 3,479 | 69.0 | 57.8 | 13.8 | 17.1 |
| 2019 | 19,779 | 3,248 | 69.9 | 58.8 | 12.5 | 16.1 |
| 2020 | 19,202 | 3,531 | 67.3 | 56.6 | 14.0 | 17.5 |
| 2021 | 19,774 | 3,430 | 68.7 | 58.9 | 13.2 | 16.8 |
| 2022 | 20,391 | 3,025 | 70.5 | 60.5 | 11.4 | 14.9 |
| 2023 | 21,006 | 2,894 | 71.3 | 62.0 | 10.7 | 13.9 |
| Source | LFS | LFS | LFS | LFS | LFS | LFS |

## 2. LABOUR MARKET

Public employment, temporary contracts \& part-time employment

|  | Public employees (\% total employed) | Employees with temporary contracts, private sector (\% total employees) | Employees with temporary contracts, public sector (\% total employees) | Part-time employed (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 17.1 | 24.1 | 19.6 | 15.8 |
| 2014 | 16.9 | 25.0 | 20.2 | 15.9 |
| 2015 | 16.7 | 26.0 | 21.6 | 15.7 |
| 2016 | 16.4 | 26.9 | 22.5 | 15.2 |
| 2017 | 16.1 | 27.4 | 23.7 | 15.0 |
| 2018 | 16.3 | 27.1 | 25.4 | 14.6 |
| 2019 | 16.3 | 25.9 | 27.7 | 14.6 |
| 2020 | 17.2 | 23.0 | 28.1 | 14.0 |
| 2021 | 17.4 | 23.6 | 30.9 | 13.9 |
| 2022 | 17.1 | 18.5 | 31.4 | 13.5 |
| 2023 | 16.9 | 13.8 | 30.4 | 13.3 |
| Source | LFS | LFS | LFS | LFS |

LFS: Labor Force Survey.

## INEQUALITY \& POVERTY

Inequality \& poverty

|  | Gini index of equivalised disposable income | At-risk-of-poverty rate (\%) | At-risk-of-poverty rate, 2008 fixed threshold (\%) | Severe material deprivation (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 34.7 | 22.2 | 30.9 | 6.2 |
| 2014 | 34.6 | 22.1 | 29.9 | 7.1 |
| 2015 | 34.5 | 22.3 | 29.2 | 6.4 |
| 2016 | 34.1 | 21.6 | 26.5 | 5.8 |
| 2017 | 33.2 | 21.5 | 25.5 | 5.1 |
| 2018 | 33.0 | 20.7 | 24.9 | 5.4 |
| 2019 | 32.1 | 21.0 | 21.8 | 4.7 |
| 2020 | 33.0 | 21.7 | 22.8 | 7.0 |
| 2021 | 32.0 | 20.4 | 20.5 | 7.3 |
| 2022 | 31.5 | 20.2 | 20.1 | 8.1 |
| 2023 |  |  |  | 8.9 |
| Source | ECV | ECV | ECV | ECV |

ECV: Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida.
Gini index of equivalised disposable income: The extent to which the distribution of equivalised disposable income (net income divided by unit of consumption; modified OECD scale) deviates from a distribution of perfect equity (all individuals obtain the same income). At-risk-of-poverty rate (\%): Population below the poverty line. Poverty threshold: $60 \%$ of median equivalised disposable income (annual net income per unit of consumption; modified OECD scale) in each year. At-risk-of-poverty rate, 2008 fixed threshold (\%): Population below the poverty line. Poverty threshold: 60\% of median equivalised disposable income (annual net income per unit of consumption; modified OECD scale). In this case, the threshold used is 2008. Severe material deprivation (\%): People with material deprivation in at least 4 items (Europe 2020 Strategy).

## SOCIAL PROTECTION

Public expenditure \& contributory benefits

|  | Public expenditure on minimum income benefits (\% GDP) | Expenditure on social protection, cash benefits (\% GDP) | Contributory benefits |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Permanent disability, pensions | Permanent disability, average amount ( $€$ ) | Retirement, pensions | Retirement, average amount (€) | Widowhood, pensions | Widowhood, average amount (€) | Unemployment |
| 2013 | 0.15 | 18.2 | 935,220 | 908 | 5,451,465 | 979 | 2,336,240 | 618 |  |
| 2014 | 0.15 | 17.9 | 929,484 | 916 | 5,558,964 | 1000 | 2,348,388 | 624 |  |
| 2015 | 0.16 | 17.2 | 931,668 | 923 | 5,641,908 | 1021 | 2,353,257 | 631 | 838,392 |
| 2016 | 0.14 | 17.0 | 938,344 | 930 | 5,731,952 | 1043 | 2,358,666 | 638 | 763,697 |
| 2017 | 0.14 | 16.7 | 947,130 | 936 | 5,826,123 | 1063 | 2,360,395 | 646 | 726,575 |
| 2018 | 0.14 | 16.9 | 951,838 | 946 | 5,929,471 | 1091 | 2,359,931 | 664 | 751,172 |
| 2019 | 0.14 | 17.4 | 957,500 | 975 | 6,038,326 | 1138 | 2,361,620 | 712 | 807614 |
| 2020 | 0.21 | 22.2 | 952,704 | 985 | 6,094,447 | 1162 | 2,352,680 | 725 | 1,828,489 |
| 2021 | 0.33 | 20.3 | 949,765 | 994 | 6,165,349 | 1190 | 2,353,987 | 740 | 922,856 |
| 2022 |  | 18.8 | 951,067 | 1035 | 6,253,797 | 1254 | 2,351,703 | 778 | 773,227 |
| 2023 |  |  | 945,963 | 1119 | 6,367,671 | 1375 | 2,351,851 | 852 | 801,091 |
| 2024 |  |  | 944,546 ${ }^{1}$ | $1161^{1}$ | 6,448,205 ${ }^{1}$ | $1436{ }^{1}$ | 2,351,734 ${ }^{1}$ | $892^{1}$ | 911,932 ${ }^{2}$ |
| Source | MTES | Eurostat | MTES | MTES | MTES | MTES | MTES | MTES | MTES |

Non contributory benefits

|  | Non-contributory benefits |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Unemployment | Disability | Retirement |
| 2013 |  | 195,478 | 250,815 |
| 2014 |  | 197,303 | 252,328 |
| 2015 | 1,102,529 | 198,891 | 253,838 |
| 2016 | 997,192 | 199,762 | 254,741 |
| 2017 | 902,193 | 199,120 | 256,187 |
| 2018 | 853,437 | 196,375 | 256,842 |
| 2019 | 912,384 | 193,122 | 259,570 |
| 2020 | 1,017,429 | 188,670 | 261,325 |
| 2021 | 969,412 | 184,378 | 262,177 |
| 2022 | 882,585 | 179,967 | 265,831 |
| 2023 | 875,969 | 175,792 | 272,188 |
| $2024{ }^{2}$ | 916,084 | 173,394 | 276,040 |
| Source | MTES | MTES | MTES |

MTES: Ministerio de Trabajo y Economía Social.

[^4]Expenditure \& primary care staff

|  | Public expenditure (\% GDP) | Private expenditure (\% GDP) | Private expenditure (\% total expenditure) | Primary care doctors per 1,000 people asigned | Primary care nurses per 1,000 people asigned |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 6.2 | 2.6 | 29.0 | 0.76 | 0.65 |
| 2014 | 6.2 | 2.7 | 29.7 | 0.76 | 0.65 |
| 2015 | 6.2 | 2.6 | 28.7 | 0.76 | 0.64 |
| 2016 | 6.1 | 2.5 | 28.4 | 0.76 | 0.65 |
| 2017 | 6.0 | 2.6 | 29.5 | 0.77 | 0.65 |
| 2018 | 6.0 | 2.7 | 29.8 | 0.77 | 0.66 |
| 2019 | 6.1 | 2.7 | 29.5 | 0.78 | 0.67 |
| 2020 | 7.6 | 2.9 | 26.9 | 0.78 | 0.66 |
| 2021 | 7.2 | 3.1 | 28.4 | 0.77 | 0.66 |
| 2022 | 6.9 | 3.1 | 29.8 | 0.78 | 0.70 |
| Source | Eurostat | OECD | OECD | INCLASNS | INCLASNS |

Other staff \& waiting times

|  | Medical specialists per 1,000 inhabitants | Specialist nurses per 1,000 inhabitants | Patients waiting for a first consultation in specialised care per 1,000 inhabitants ${ }^{1}$ | Average waiting time for a first consultation in specialised care (days) ${ }^{1}$ | Patients waiting for a nonurgent surgical intervention per 1,000 inhabitants ${ }^{1}$ | Average waiting time for non-urgent surgery (days) ${ }^{1}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 1.78 | 3.04 | 39.0 | 67.0 | 12.3 | 98.0 |
| 2014 | 1.81 | 3.14 | 39.4 | 65.0 | 11.4 | 87.0 |
| 2015 | 1.85 | 3.19 | 43.4 | 58.0 | 12.2 | 89.0 |
| 2016 | 1.90 | 3.27 | 45.7 | 72.1 | 13.7 | 115.0 |
| 2017 | 1.93 | 3.38 | 45.9 | 66.2 | 13.1 | 106.1 |
| 2018 | 1.98 | 3.45 | 62.5 | 95.9 | 14.8 | 129.0 |
| 2019 | 1.97 | 3.50 | 63.7 | 87.6 | 15.5 | 121.5 |
| 2020 | 2.02 | 3.74 | 53.6 | 99.4 | 15.1 | 147.8 |
| 2021 | 2.11 | 3.90 | 77.2 | 88.9 | 15.4 | 122.9 |
| 2022 | 2.14 | 3.87 | 85.4 | 95.2 | 17.1 | 120.1 |
| 2023 |  |  | 78.5 | 87.5 | 17.6 | 111.8 |
| Source | INCLASNS | INCLASNS | INCLASNS | INCLASNS | INCLASNS | INCLASNS |

${ }^{1}$ Only in the public health system.
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[^0]:    Note: 2024 data are provisional

[^1]:    Source: Eurostat [migr_pop3ctb__custom_10267251].

[^2]:    Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Public Opinión Barometer March 2024 (www.cis.es).

[^3]:    endnote The results shown in the figures are extracted from the interviewees' answers to the following questions:
    Could you tell me if you are very concerned, quite concerned, somewhat concerned, a little concerned, or not concerned at all about Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

[^4]:    ${ }^{1}$ Data refer to January-February
    ${ }^{2}$ Data refer to January
    Expenditure on social protection, cash benefits (\% GDP): Includes benefits for: sickness or disability, old age, survivors, family and children, unemployment, housing, social exclusion and other expenses. Public expenditure on minimum income benefits (\% GDP): Minimum insertion wage and migrants' allowances and other benefits.

