## March 2023

Focus on Spanish Society is published by the Social Studies Office of Funcas. The aim of this publication is to depict the Spanish social situation and provide brief insights into some of its most relevant aspects. Focus on Spanish Society consists of three sections. The first section, "Spain in Europe", draws attention to recently published statistical data and puts the Spanish case in comparative perspective. The second section, "Public opinion trends", examines in more detail one particular social issue as perceived by the Spanish public and manifested through opinion surveys. Finally, the third section "Follow-up social data" presents several social indicators related to demography and families, labour market and education, health and welfare benefits and services.

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# Section I. Spain in Europe 

## I.1. Lack of improvement in immigrants' educational levels

At the beginning of this year, the European Commission once again drew attention to the effects that the aging and quantitative decline of the European population will have on the availability of labor, while insisting on the need to attract skilled and talented immigrants. ${ }^{1}$ In all European countries, to a greater or lesser extent, the progressive increase in the proportion of older people who have already left the labor market is causing a lack of qualified workers to sustain economic growth and rising outlays for the welfare state.

The Spanish Government has recognized the strategic importance of labor immigration in the coming decades. In its long-term national strategy, published in 2021 under the title "Spain 2050", the Government has defined 12 priority lines of action, among them the "promotion of legal immigration and the recruitment of foreign talent as additional ways to boost our economy and buttress our welfare state". That same document foresees "a migratory net balance of 191,000 people a year" from 2020 to $2050 .{ }^{2}$ This figure, even though exceeding the annual average registered between 1990 and 2019, is below the projections published by other public institutions such as the National Institute of Statistics (INE) ${ }^{3}$ or the Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF). ${ }^{4}$

Given the relevance attached to immigration in national policy, it is remarkable the scarcity of public information on how the Spanish authorities intend to attract foreigners with skills and talent in an increasingly competitive European context. This information is even more needed if we consider that Spain has not managed to improve the educational composition of its immigrant population during the last decades.

Some interesting findings emerge from the comparative analysis of immigrants' educational levels since the beginning of this century. Data provided by Eurostat allow us to make the following arguments:

- At the beginning of this century, Spain shared with Sweden, Belgium and Hungary a fairly high proportion of foreign-born population (25-54 years) with tertiary education. In the four countries, the percentages of the foreign-born population with university studies amounted in 2004 to ca. 30\%. From that year on, most European countries have managed to increase the share of their foreign-born population with university studies. This also applies to Spain, Sweden, Belgium, and Hungary, but the increases in these countries show significant differences. The increase between 2004 and 2021 (latest year for which statistics are available) was negligible in Spain (30.3\%) compared to the increases registered by Hungary (38.6\%), Belgium (41.5\%) and Sweden (47.6\%). In fact, in 2021, the percentage of foreign-born population ( $25-54$ years) residing in Spain with university degrees was lower than that registered in the Netherlands (42.5\%), Portugal (40.8\%) or France (37.7\%), countries which in 2004 displayed lower rates than Spain. Clearly the most successful country in this regard is

[^0]
## Figure I. 1

Foreign-born population (25-54 years) with tertiary education (selected EU countries, 2004-2021)


Source: Eurostat [EDAT_LFS_9912].

Ireland (Figure I.1). If it already stood out in 2004 for the high proportion of foreign-born population with tertiary education (45.2\%),
the country has been able to increase this share to nearly two thirds (63\%) in 2021 (Table I.1).

Table I. 1
Foreign-born population (25-54 years) by educational attainment level (selected EU countries, 2004 and 2021)

|  | Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (ISCED 0-2) |  | Upper secondary and postsecondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 3 and 4) |  | Tertiary education (ISCED 5-8) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2004 | 2021 | 2004 | 2021 | 2004 | 2021 |
| Belgium | 41.8 | 27.8 | 28.3 | 30.7 | 29.9 | 41.5 |
| France | 45.8 | 32.2 | 30.4 | 30.2 | 23.8 | 37.7 |
| Germany | 32.5 | 33.7 | 47.1 | 37.1 | 20.5 | 29.1 |
| Greece | 38.1 | 31.1 | 42.4 | 49.2 | 19.4 | 19.8 |
| Hungary | 12.1 | 10.5 | 58.8 | 50.8 | 29.2 | 38.6 |
| Ireland | 22.8 | 4.9 | 32.0 | 32.1 | 45.2 | 63.0 |
| Italy* | 45.7 | 48.0 | 42.0 | 39.4 | 12.3 | 12.6 |
| Netherlands | 34.5 | 28.8 | 41.0 | 28.8 | 24.5 | 42.5 |
| Portugal | 50.4 | 23.8 | 25.3 | 35.4 | 24.3 | 40.8 |
| Spain | 41.5 | 37.8 | 29.4 | 31.9 | 29.1 | 30.3 |
| Sweden | 20.2 | 27.4 | 49.5 | 25.1 | 30.3 | 47.6 |
| Note: * 2004 | ta refers to [EDAT |  |  |  |  |  |

Figure I. 2
Foreign-born population (25-54 years) with lower educational level (selected EU countries, 2004-2021)


Source: Eurostat [EDAT_LFS_9912]

- At the beginning of this century, the EU countries showed very disparate percentages of foreign-born population (25-54 years) with lower educational levels (compulsory
secondary education or below). Together with Belgium, France, Italy and Portugal, Spain displayed the highest proportions (oscillating between $40 \%$ and $50 \%$ ). The share of low-

Table 1.2
Native population (25-54 years) by educational attainment level (selected EU countries, 2004 and 2021)

|  | Less than primary, primary and <br> lower secondary education <br> (ISCED | Upper secondary and post- <br> secondary non-tertiary education <br> (ISCED | Tertiary education (ISCED 5-8) |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Figure I. 3
Foreign-born and Spanish-born population (25-54 years) by educational attainment (2004 and 2021)

$\square$ Tertiary education (ISCED 5-8)

- Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 3 and 4)
- Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (ISCED 0-2)

Source: Eurostat [EDAT_LFS_9912].
educated immigrants has shrunk in most European countries, but not to the same extent. For example, in Portugal the percentage fell by more than 25 percentage points between 2004 (50.4\%) and 2021 (23.8\%). In Ireland, it remarkably sank by almost 20 points (2004: 22.8\%; 2021: 4.9\%), and in Belgium and France, by more than 10 points (Belgium - 2004: 41,8\%; 2021: 27.8\%; France - 2004: 45.8\%; 2024: 32.2\%). Yet, in Spain the drop between those two years was very small (2004: 41.5\%; 2021: 37.8\%) (Figure I.2). In fact, Spain exhibited in 2021 one of the highest percentages in the EU of foreignborn population (25-54 years) with a basic educational level, only ahead of Italy (48.0\%) (Table I.1).

- This lack of improvement in immigrants' educational levels in Spain is even more remarkable if we consider the changes in the educational level of the native population. Among the Spanish native population (2554 years) the proportion of people with lower educational levels has radically decreased during the first decades of this century (2004:
50.2\%; 2021: $30.8 \%$ ), while the proportion of those who have achieved university degrees has soared (2004: 30.2\%; 2021: 48.2\%) (Figure I.3). Although the increase in educational levels of the native population is observable in all European countries, Spain has made extraordinary progress in this regard and in 2021 it is among the EU countries with the highest proportion of population aged 25 to 54 with at least a college degree.

To sum up, though higher than in Greece and Italy, the proportion of foreign-born population with tertiary education is in Spain comparatively low. In contrast to other European countries, Spain has not been able to improve in the last decades the educational level of immigrants aged 25-54. In addition, since the educational level of the native population in the same age cohort has considerably increased between 2004 and 2021, the educational differences between the native population and the immigrant population have widened (Figure I.3), again in contrast to other European countries in which educational levels of both the native and the foreign-born populations have improved.

## I.2. Significant educational disparities among immigrants on the basis of place of birth

The argument expounded in the previous section can be further developed by considering the immigrants' place of birth. There is solid evidence based on data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey showing that the educational composition of immigrants differs to a great extent depending on their birthplace.

The foreign-born population residing in Spain with the lowest educational achievements comes from Africa: three quarters of African immigrants (25-54 years) have not completed studies beyond compulsory school; one fifth has completed post-obligatory non-tertiary education, and only $6 \%$ has obtained a university degree. Being the largest group of immigrants residing in Spain, immigrants born in Latin American countries present a more
balanced educational composition: almost a third ( $31 \%$ ) has attained compulsory education or less, a proportion that coincides with that of people who have completed secondary postobligatory education, while $24 \%$ has achieved tertiary education (Figure I.4).

Moreover, a significant part of African and of Latin American immigrants with a university degree have obtained it while residing in Spain. Thus, their educational level when they migrated to Spain was lower than the current one (Figure I.5).

Labor Force Survey data reinforce the evidence of significant educational disparities between the immigrant and the native population in Spain. Under the sensible assumption that educational similarities between different populations favor social integration, the noteworthy differences in the educational composition between the immigrant and the native population in Spain raises concerns not only on economic, but also on social grounds.

Figure I. 4
Educational level of foreign-born population (25-54 years) by birthplace (Spain, 2022)


Source: Spanish Labor Force Survey (I-IV quarters 2022).

## Figure I. 5

Foreign-born population (25-54 years) having completed tertiary education in Spain by birthplace (Spain, 2022)


Note: We define migrants who finished their studies in Spain as those who concluded them in the year they arrived to Spain or later.
Source: Spanish Labor Force Survey (I-IV quarters 2022).

# Section II. Public opinion trends 

Immigration: A non-salient public issue with intergenerational differences in attitudes

Despite the strategic importance of immigration for Spain, this issue is virtually absent in the public debate. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that Spaniards do not place immigration among the main problems facing the country. When asked about the most important problems of Spain in the monthly opinion surveys administered by the Center for Sociological Research (CIS), references to immigration are very scarce compared to other topics (such as political problems, economic problems, and unemployment) and have even decreased since the pandemic (Figure II. 1 and II.2).

However, it should be kept in mind that the formulation of this question allows for the

## Figure II. 1

Perceived main problems in Spain (2019-2023)
establishment of a ranking of relative importance since it asks interviewees to mention the first, the second and the third most important problem of the country. Therefore, few mentions do not necessarily mean that immigration is not perceived as a problem, but that other issues are deemed more problematic. In any case, immigration also does not appear in a prominent place when interviewees are asked about the problems that most personally affect them (Figure II.3).

But when faced with a specific question requiring an assessment of immigration, interviewees' answers hint at the coexistence in public opinion of disparate attitudes. Survey data reveal that most Spaniards support immigration, though positive opinions decrease during periods of economic recession (Figure II.4). In the summer of 2021 (latest available data) 56\% of interviewees rated immigration as "positive" or "very positive". This opinion was more widespread among males and young people (under 35 years old). Still, around a quarter of survey respondents (and almost a third of interviewees aged 65 and over) manifested a negative or very negative


[^1]
## Figure II. 2

## Perceived main problems in Spain (March 2023)



Question: "What is in your view the main problem that currently exists in Spain? And the second? And the third?". Source: Center for Sociological Research (www.cis.es), opinion barometer 3383.

## Figure II. 3

Problems that most affect interviewees personally (March 2023)


Question: "And what is the problem that most affects you personally?"
Source: Center for Sociological Research (www.cis.es), opinion barometers 3292-3383.

Figure II. 4

## Appraisal of immigration in Spain (2008-2017, 2021)



Question: "In general terms do you think that immigration is very positive, positive, negative or very negative for this country?"
Source: Center for Sociological Research (www.cis.es), opinion barometers 2273, 2817, 2846, 2918, 2967, 3019, 3119, 3161, 3190 and 3326.
view of immigration. Among elderly people, and particularly among females, negative opinions were almost as prevalent as positive ones
(Figure II.5). Unfortunately, data that may indicate how this opinion has evolved since 2021 are not available.

## Figure II. 5

Appraisal of immigration in Spain, by age groups (June 2021)


Question: "In general terms do you think that immigration is very positive, positive, negative or very negative for this country?".
Source: Center for Sociological Research (www.cis.es), opinion survey 3326.

## Section III. Follow-up social data

## Table III. 1

## Population

|  | Total population | Average age | 65 and older (\%) | Life expectancy at birth (men) | Life expectancy at birth (women) | Dependency rate | Dependency rate (older than 64) | Foreign-born population (\%) | New entries (all nationalities) | New exits (born in Spain) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | 46,157,822 | 40.8 | 16.5 | 78.2 | 84.3 | 47.5 | 24.5 | 13.1 | 701,997 | 33,053 |
| 2010 | 47,021,031 | 41.1 | 16.9 | 79.1 | 85.1 | 48.6 | 25.0 | 14.0 | 441,051 | 39,211 |
| 2012 | 47,265,321 | 41.6 | 17.4 | 79.4 | 85.1 | 50.4 | 26.1 | 14.3 | 344,992 | 51,666 |
| 2014 | 46,771,341 | 42.1 | 18.1 | 80.1 | 85.7 | 51.6 | 27.4 | 13.4 | 368,170 | 66,803 |
| 2015 | 46,624,382 | 42.4 | 18.4 | 79.9 | 85.4 | 52.4 | 28.0 | 13.2 | 417,655 | 74,873 |
| 2016 | 46,557,008 | 42.7 | 18.6 | 80.3 | 85.8 | 52.9 | 28.4 | 13.2 | 492,600 | 71,508 |
| 2017 | 46,572,132 | 42.9 | 18.8 | 80.4 | 85.7 | 53.2 | 28.8 | 13.3 | 592,604 | 63,754 |
| 2018 | 46,722,980 | 43.1 | 19.1 | 80.5 | 85.9 | 53.6 | 29.3 | 13.7 | 715,255 | 56,745 |
| 2019 | 47,026,208 | 43.3 | 19.3 | 80.9 | 86.2 | 53.7 | 29.6 | 14.4 | 827,052 | 61,338 |
| 2020 | 47,450,795 | 43.6 | 19.4 | 79.6 | 85.1 | 53.5 | 29.8 | 15.2 | 523,618 | 41,708 |
| 2021 | 47,385,107 | 43.8 | 19.6 | 80.2 | 85.8 | 53.4 | 30.1 | 15.5 | 621,216 | 56,098 |
| 2022 | 47,475,420 | 44.1 | 20.0 |  |  | 53.5 | 30.7 | 15.9 |  |  |
| Sources | $s$ EPC | EPC | EPC | ID INE | ID INE | EPC | EPC | EPC | EVR | EVR |

EPC: Estadística del Padrón Continuo.
ID INE: Indicadores Demográficos INE.
EVR: Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales
Dependency rate: (15 or less years old population + 65 or more years old population)/ 16-64 years old population, as a percentage
Dependency rate (older than 64): 65 or more years old population/ 16-64 years old population, as a percentage.

Table III. 2
Households and families
Households

|  | Households <br> (thousands) | Average household size | Households with one <br> person younger than $65(\%)$ | Households with one person <br> older than $65(\%)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | 16,742 | 2.71 | 12.0 | 10.2 |
| 2010 | 17,174 | 2.67 | 12.8 | 9.9 |
| 2012 | 17,434 | 2.63 | 13.7 | 9.9 |
| 2014 | 18,329 | 2.51 | 14.2 | 10.6 |
| 2015 | 18,376 | 2.54 | 14.6 | 10.7 |
| 2016 | 18,444 | 2.52 | 14.6 | 10.9 |
| 2017 | 18,512 | 2.52 | 14.2 | 11.4 |
| 2018 | 18,581 | 2.51 | 14.3 | 11.5 |
| 2019 | 18,697 | 2.52 | 14.9 | 11.2 |
| 2020 | 18,794 | 2.52 | 15.0 | 11.4 |
| 2021 | 18,919 | 2.50 | 15.6 | 11.0 |
| 2022 | 19,113 | 2.48 |  | EPF |
| Sources | LFS |  |  | EPF |

## Table III. 2

Households and families (continued)
Nuptiality

|  | Marriage rate <br> (Spanish) | Marriage rate <br> (foreign population) | Divorce rate <br> (per 1,000) | Mean age at <br> first marriage <br> (men) | Mean age <br> at first marriage <br> (women) | Same sex <br> marriages <br> (\%) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | 8.5 | 8.4 | 2.39 | 32.4 | 30.2 | 1.62 |
| 2010 | 7.2 | 7.9 | 2.21 | 33.2 | 31.0 | 1.87 |
| 2012 | 7.2 | 6.7 | 2.23 | 33.8 | 31.7 | 2.04 |
| 2014 | 6.9 | 6.5 | 2.17 | 34.4 | 32.3 | 2.06 |
| 2015 | 7.3 | 6.5 | 2.08 | 34.8 | 32.7 | 2.26 |
| 2016 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 2.08 | 35.0 | 32.9 | 2.46 |
| 2017 | 7.3 | 6.9 | 2.10 | 35.3 | 33.2 | 2.67 |
| 2018 | 7.1 | 6.6 | 2.04 | 35.6 | 33.4 | 2.9 |
| 2019 | 7.1 | 6.7 | 1.95 | 36.0 | 33.9 | 3.1 |
| 2020 | 3.8 | 5.6 | 1.63 | 37.1 | 34.9 | 3.5 |
| 2021 | 6.3 | ID INE |  | ID INE | ID INE | ID INE |

## Fertility

|  | Median age at first child (women) | Total fertility rate (Spanish women) | Total fertility rate (foreign women) | Births to single mothers (\%) | Abortion rate | Abortion by Spanish-born women (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | 29.3 | 1.36 | 1.83 | 33.2 | 11.8 | 55.6 |
| 2010 | 29.8 | 1.30 | 1.68 | 35.5 | 11.5 | 58.3 |
| 2012 | 30.3 | 1.27 | 1.56 | 39.0 | 12.0 | 61.5 |
| 2014 | 30.6 | 1.27 | 1.62 | 42.5 | 10.5 | 63.3 |
| 2015 | 30.7 | 1.28 | 1.66 | 44.4 | 10.4 | 65.3 |
| 2016 | 30.8 | 1.27 | 1.70 | 45.8 | 10.4 | 65.8 |
| 2017 | 30.9 | 1.24 | 1.70 | 46.8 | 10.5 | 66.1 |
| 2018 | 31.0 | 1.20 | 1.65 | 47.3 | 11.1 | 65.3 |
| 2019 | 31.1 | 1.17 | 1.59 | 48.4 | 11.5 | 64.1 |
| 2020 | 31.2 | 1.12 | 1.45 | 47.6 | 10.3 | 65.8 |
| 2021 | 31.6 | 1.16 | 1.38 | 49.3 |  |  |
| Sources | ID INE | ID INE | ID INE | ID INE | MSAN | MSAN |

LFS: Labour Force Survey.
EPF: Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares.
ID INE: Indicadores Demográficos INE.
CGPJ: Consejo General del Poder Judicial.
MSAN: Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad.
MNP: Movimiento Natural de la Población.
Marriage rate: Number of marriages per thousand population.
Divorce rate: Number of divorces per thousand population.
Total fertility rate: The average number of children that would be born per woman living in Spain if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and bore children according to a given fertility rate at each age.
Abortion rate: Number of abortions per 1,000 women ( $15-44$ years).

Table III. 3
Education
Educational attainment

|  | Population 16 years <br> and older with primary <br> education <br> $(\%)$ | Population 30-34 <br> with primary education <br> $(\%)$ | Population $\mathbf{1 6}$ years and <br> older with tertiary education <br> $(\%)$ | Population 30-34 <br> with tertiary education <br> $(\%)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | 32.1 | 9.2 |  |  |
| 2010 | 30.6 | 8.6 | 16.1 | 26.9 |
| 2012 | 28.5 | 7.5 | 17.0 | 27.7 |
| 2014 | 24.4 | 6.1 | 17.8 | 26.6 |
| 2015 | 23.3 | 6.6 | 27.2 | 42.3 |
| 2016 | 2.4 | 6.6 | 27.5 | 40.9 |
| 2017 | 21.4 | 6.6 | 28.1 | 40.7 |
| 2018 | 20.5 | 6.3 | 28.5 | 41.2 |
| 2019 | 19.3 | 6.1 | 29.2 | 42.4 |
| 2020 | 17.7 | 5.8 | 30.3 | 44.7 |
| 2021 | 16.4 | 5.8 | 31.3 | 44.8 |
| 2022 | LFS | 32.3 | 46.7 |  |
| Source | LFS |  | LFS | 49.2 |

Students involved in non-compulsory education

|  | Pre-primary education | Secondary education | Vocational training | Under-graduate students | ```Post-graduate students (except doctorate)``` |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | 1,763,019 | 629,247 | 472,604 | 1,377,228 | 50,421 |
| 2010 | 1,872,829 | 672,213 | 555,580 | 1,445,392 | 104,844 |
| 2012 | 1,912,324 | 692,098 | 617,686 | 1,450,036 | 113,805 |
| 2014 | 1,840,008 | 690,738 | 652,846 | 1,364,023 | 142,156 |
| 2015 | 1,808,322 | 695,557 | 641,741 | 1,321,698 | 171,043 |
| 2016 | 1,780,377 | 687,595 | 652,471 | 1.303.252 | 190,143 |
| 2017 | 1,767,179 | 676,311 | 667,984 | 1,287,791 | 209,754 |
| 2018 | 1,750,579 | 667,287 | 675,971 | 1,290,455 | 217,840 |
| 2019 | 1,749,597 | 673,740 | 706,533 | 1,296,379 | 237,118 |
| 2020 | 1,622,098 | 687,084 | 772,417 | 1,336,009 | 247,251 |
| 2021 | 1,622,919• | 691,437 | 776,664• | 1,338,304 | 258,991 |
| Source | MECD | MECD | MECD | MECD | MECD |

Education expenditure

|  | Public expenditure (millions of $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}$ ) | Public expenditure (\% GDP) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | 51,716 | 4.6 |
| 2010 | 53,099 | 4.9 |
| 2012 | 46,476 | 4.5 |
| 2014 | 44,846 | 4.3 |
| 2015 | 46,598 | 4.3 |
| 2016 | 47,579 | 4.3 |
| 2017 | 49,458 | 4.2 |
| 2018 | 50,807 | 4.2 |
| 2019 | 53,053 | 4.3 |
| 2020 | 55,176 | 4.7 |
| 2021 | 59,657 | $4.6 \bullet$ |
| Sources | MECD | INE |

LFS: Labour Force Survey.
MECD: Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte
INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística.

- Provisional data.


## Table III. 4

Social protection: Benefits
Contributory benefits*

|  | Unemployment | Retirement |  | Permanent disability |  | Widowhood |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total | Total | Average amount ( $€$ ) | Total | Average amount ( $€$ ) | Total | Average amount (€) |
| 2008 | 1,100,879 | 4,936,839 | 814 | 906,835 | 801 | 2,249,904 | 529 |
| 2010 | 1,471,826 | 5,140,554 | 884 | 933,730 | 850 | 2,290,090 | 572 |
| 2012 | 1,381,261 | 5,330,195 | 946 | 943,296 | 887 | 2,322,938 | 602 |
| 2014 | 1,059,799 | 5,558,964 | 1000 | 929,484 | 916 | 2,348,388 | 624 |
| 2015 | 838,392 | 5,641,908 | 1,021 | 931,668 | 923 | 2,353,257 | 631 |
| 2016 | 763,697 | 5,731,952 | 1,043 | 938,344 | 930 | 2,364,388 | 638 |
| 2017 | 726,575 | 5,826,123 | 1,063 | 947,130 | 936 | 2,360,395 | 646 |
| 2018 | 751,172 | 5,929,471 | 1,091 | 951,838 | 946 | 2,359,931 | 664 |
| 2019 | 807,614 | 6,038,326 | 1,138 | 957,500 | 975 | 2,361,620 | 712 |
| 2020 | 1,828,489 | 6,094,447 | 1,162 | 952,704 | 985 | 2,352,680 | 725 |
| 2021 | 922,856 | 6,165,349 | 1,190 | 949,765 | 994 | 2,353,987 | 740 |
| 2022 | 896,156. | 6,324,746• | 1,370• | 946,694• | 1,121• | 2,351,647• | 849• |
| Source | INSS | INSS | INSS | INSS | INSS | INSS | INSS |

Non-contributory benefits

| Social Security |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Unemployment | Retirement | Disability | Other |
| 2008 | 646,186 | 265,314 | 199,410 | 63,626 |
| 2010 | $1,445,228$ | 257,136 | 196,159 | 49,535 |
| 2012 | $1,327,027$ | 251,549 | 194,876 | 36,310 |
| 2014 | $1,221,390$ | 252,328 | 197,303 | 26,842 |
| 2015 | $1,102,529$ | 253,838 | 198,891 | 23,643 |
| 2016 | 997,192 | 254,741 | 199,762 | 21,350 |
| 2017 | 902,193 | 256,187 | 199,120 | 19,019 |
| 2018 | 853,437 | 256,842 | 196,375 | 16,472 |
| 2019 | 912,384 | 259,570 | 193,122 | 14,997 |
| 2020 | $1,017,429$ | 261,325 | 188,670 | 13,373 |
| 2021 | 969,412 | 262,177 | 184,378 | 11,892 |
| 2022 | 907,796 | $267,650 \bullet$ | $177,250 \bullet$ | $10,031 \bullet$ |
| Sources | INSS |  | IMSERSO | IMSERSO |

[^2]
## Expenditure

|  | Public expenditure (\% GDP) |  | Public expenditure (millions of $€$ ) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | 6.1 |  | 67,344 |  |
| 2010 | 6.6 |  | 71,136 |  |
| 2012 | 6.3 |  | 64,734 |  |
| 2014 | 6.2 |  | 63,507 |  |
| 2015 | 6.2 |  | 66,489 |  |
| 2016 | 6.1 |  | 67,724 |  |
| 2017 | 6.0 |  | 69,312 |  |
| 2018 | 6.0 |  | 72,157 |  |
| 2019 | 6.1 |  | 75,929 |  |
| 2020 | 7.6 |  | 85,503 |  |
| 2021 | $7.3 \bullet$ |  | 88,625 |  |
| Sources | Eurostat |  | Eurostat |  |
| Resources |  |  |  |  |
|  | Medical specialists per 1,000 inhabitants | Primary care doctors per 1,000 people assigned | Specialist nurses per 1,000 inhabitants | Primary care nurses per 1,000 people assigned |
| 2008 | 1.8 | 0.8 | 3.0 | 0.6 |
| 2010 | 1.8 | 0.8 | 3.2 | 0.6 |
| 2012 | 1.8 | 0.8 | 3.1 | 0.6 |
| 2014 | 1.8 | 0.8 | 3.1 | 0.7 |
| 2015 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 3.2 | 0.7 |
| 2016 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 3.3 | 0.6 |
| 2017 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 3.4 | 0.6 |
| 2018 | 2.0 | 0.8 | 3.5 | 0.7 |
| 2019 | 2.0 | 0.8 | 3.5 | 0.7 |
| 2020 | 2.0 | 0.8 | 3.7 | 0.7 |
| Sources | INCLASNS | INCLASNS | INCLASNS | INCLASNS |

Satisfaction*
Time on waiting list (days)

|  | With the working of <br> the health system | With medical history and <br> tracing by family doctor <br> or pediatrician | Non-urgent surgical <br> procedures | First specialist <br> consultations <br> per 1,000 inhabitants |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 71 | 59 |
| 2010 | 6.6 | 7.3 | 65 | 53 |
| 2012 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 76 | 53 |
| 2014 | 6.3 | 7.5 | 87 | 65 |
| 2015 | 6.4 | 7.5 | 89 | 58 |
| 2016 | 6.6 | 7.6 | 115 | 72 |
| 2017 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 106 | 66 |
| 2018 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 129 | 96 |
| 2019 | 6.7 | 7.6 | 115 | 81 |
| 2020 |  |  | 148 | 99 |
| 2021 |  | INCLASNS | 121 | 75 |
| Sources | INCLASNS |  | INCLASNS | INCLASNS |

```
INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
INCLASNS: Indicadores Clave del Sistema Nacional de Salud.
* Average of population satisfaction measured on a scale of 1 to 10, where }1\mathrm{ means "totally unsatisfactory"
and }10\mathrm{ "totally satisfactory".
- Provisional data.
```


## Table III. 6

## Labour market

|  | Employment |  | Unemployment |  |  |  | Social Security affiliation |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Men (in thousands) | Women (in thousands) | Men (in thousands) | Women (in thousands) | Rate (men) | Rate (women) | Men (in thousands) | Women (in thousands) | Foreign population (in thousands) |
| 2008 | 11,805 | 8,665 | 1,320 | 1,276 | 10.1 | 12.8 | 10,884 | 8,121 | 2,052 |
| 2010 | 10,424 | 8,301 | 2,536 | 2,104 | 19.6 | 20.2 | 9,710 | 7,872 | 1,841 |
| 2012 | 9,608 | 8,025 | 3,131 | 2,680 | 24.6 | 25.0 | 9,034 | 7,705 | 1,693 |
| 2014 | 9,443 | 7,902 | 2,917 | 2,694 | 23.6 | 25.4 | 8,853 | 7,639 | 1,555 |
| 2015 | 9,760 | 8,106 | 2,559 | 2,497 | 20.8 | 23.6 | 9,154 | 7,864 | 1,608 |
| 2016 | 10,001 | 8,341 | 2,213 | 2,268 | 18.1 | 21.4 | 9,421 | 8,097 | 1,688 |
| 2017 | 10,266 | 8,559 | 1,905 | 2,011 | 15.7 | 19.0 | 9,758 | 8,369 | 1,802 |
| 2018 | 10,532 | 8,795 | 1,675 | 1,805 | 13.7 | 17.0 | 10,058 | 8,643 | 1,947 |
| 2019 | 10,746 | 9,034 | 1,528 | 1,720 | 12.4 | 16.0 | 10,286 | 8,903 | 2,043 |
| 2020 | 10,430 | 8,773 | 1,679 | 1,852 | 13.9 | 17.4 | 10,038 | 8,729 | 2,046 |
| 2021 | 10,652 | 9,122 | 1,599 | 1,831 | 13.1 | 16.7 | 10,285 | 8,964 | 2,167 |
| 2022 | 10,965 | 9,425 | 1,393 | 1,632 | 11.3 | 14.8 | 10,634 | 9,371 | 2,385 |
| 2023 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 10,636 | 9,441* | 2,449 |
| Sources | $s$ LFS | LFS | LFS | LFS | LFS | LFS | BEL | BEL | BEL |

BEL: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales.
LFS: Labour Force Survey.

- Data refer to January-February.

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[^0]:    See press release on January 10, 2023: "Labour migration: Commission and Member States enhance cooperation to tackle shortages in the EU labour market" (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_103).
    See España 2050. Fundamentos y propuestas para una Estrategia Nacional de Largo Plazo (Madrid: Ministerio de la Presidencia, 2021: 22 and 221)
    The INE projects an annual migratory balance above 450,000 persons until 2027, which from this year should decrease and by 2050 consist of ca. 250,000 persons.
    4 The AIReF estimates an average annual inflow of 330,000 foreigners between 2020 and 2050. See AIReF (2020). "Actualización de previsiones demográficas y de gasto en pensiones. Documento técnico 1/20 (https://www.airef.es/es/cifras-de-poblacion/).

[^1]:    Question: "What is in your view the main problem that currently exists in Spain? And the second? And the third?" Source: Center for Sociological Research (www.cis.es), opinion barometer 3383.

[^2]:    INSS: Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social.
    IMSERSO: Instituto de Mayores y Servicios Sociales.
    *Benefits for orphans and dependent family members of deceased Social Security affiliates not included.

    - Data refer to January.
    - Data refer to January-February.

